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Relevance of Democratic Centralism to CPSU Examined

90UN0320A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 11 Nov 89 pp 1, 2

[Interview with A.K. Masyagin, consultant to CPSU Party Building and Cadre Work Department, by V. Dyunin, correspondent of SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA: "Not Dare to Command!"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Aleksey Kononovich, as the majority of the mass media in the country, we have developed a discussion about the state of affairs in the CPSU. Today I would like to discuss with you, as a specialist in party building, a subject that is connected with the operation of the principle of democratic centralism in the CPSU. It seems to me that many authors, who raise this subject in the mass media have so confused our reader that, in some letters received by the editors, he even is asking: "Will the principle of democratic centralism remain in the Statute at all, will our party be guided by it in the future?"

[Masyagin] I am convinced that it will and must.

If we want to have an active, creative organization, one which thinks in an acute political manner, if we wish that the decisions that have been developed in the collective search with the people fight their way into life with collective force, if we wish that the people, especially during difficult times, critical times, filled with doubts and instability, can be guided by the party, then democratic centralism is inevitable. One can be guided only by something which has a strong foundation and well-formed contours, it is impossible to be guided by something which instantly collapses from contact with life and comes unravelled. The party is needed by our present-day society, and the party needs democratic centralism.

[Correspondent] It turns out that in our country we do not have any problem with democratic centralism? And how could you in general formulate its essence?

[Masyagin] I shall begin with the second question. The essence of democratic centralism is well known. It is the organic combination of discipline and democracy, centralism and autonomy. The whole problem arises when it is required to secure this organic combination. Each of the "items" I have named is similar to medicine. All that is needed is to use it excessively or to take less than what is prescribed, and it turns from something useful into something harmful or useless.

Today our press and party documents are full of examples of how in the period of the cult of personality and the years of stagnation democracy in the party was transformed in many respects into a pure formality, discipline operated selectively in regard to party and other leaders and "rank-and-file" communists, and the political autonomy of even the largest party organizations was reduced to zero. Centralism reached such a level that neither the primary organizations nor the party committees had to especially trouble themselves to

determine the problems to be discussed—one after the other, the agendas came down from above, and as a rule, had to be carried out.

So there are very many problems with democratic centralism. First of all, to correct the multitude of defects, and this is difficult since a generation of party workers was raised on deformed requirements, and, as the election campaign for the elections of USSR people's deputies, it is by no means simple to get rid of this.

Secondly, in my view, the development of new approaches and norms is also necessary. Thus, party organizations are entering a most difficult sphere, plunging into the element of nationality problems, taking upon themselves the responsibility for their solution on the basis of democracy, humanism, and internationalism. Now autonomy is becoming real, the price of any solutions is increasing, saving references to the actions of the center in the case of mistakes will hardly help.

The subject of "minority" also deserves special discussion. The paradox consists in the fact that people talk a great deal about this, although no permanent institution of the minority has existed in our party since the beginning of the 1930's. Nevertheless, consideration of the opinion of the minority are the guarantee of a pluralism of views and opinions in the party, especially in the development of fundamental documents, are necessary.

And nevertheless the main thing is the organic, skillful combination, in every given situation, of democracy and discipline, centralism and autonomy. Such a combination, so that even the concepts of discipline and centralism (in contrast to democracy and autonomy) would cease to act in the role of some sort of scarecrow. It seems to me, V.I. Lenin gave a surprisingly profound formulation of the combination of these diametrically opposed concepts. The dialectics of the relations of the activeness of the party masses in the development of decisions and the activeness in their implementation, in his view, must lead to the creation of the kind of conditions where "our staff" will be guided by the good and conscious will of the army, which is marching behind the staff and at the same time directs its staff."

[Correspondent] In the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI of 15 October it is asserted that "the Stalinist interpretation of democratic centralism has become petrified," that "for half a century it underwent absurdly insignificant changes." What is your attitude to this assertion?

[Masyagin] I am familiar with this view. Especially as it was set forth earlier in slight variations in a few publications. To counterbalance this view, I would like to set forth my position on the subject we are discussing.

First of all, democratic centralism cannot only belong to Stalin, even if he took a hand in the formulation of its tenets. It cannot belong [to Stalin] if only for the same

reason for which, for example, the tenet of the presumption of innocence, which, according to the historians, was for the first time stated in the "Digests of Justinian", does not belong to this Byzantine emperor. He codified in his collection of laws what had been practiced in Roman law for a long time.

About the principle of democratic centralism, it should be said that it was developed by the entire party from the moment of its beginnings. The role of Lenin, above all, was enormous in this. But it should be taken into consideration that the norms of democratic centralism in many respects are universal and were used before the 20th century. These norms are applied today rather broadly in political practice.

[Correspondent] And who else is guided by democratic centralism?

[Masyagin] The majority of the communist parties today is guided by democratic centralism. Some norms are being utilized by socialist and social democratic parties, and even conservative parties, not to speak of a multitude of organizations and movements.

But I will say that we nevertheless have to separate the theory and the formulation of the very concept of democratic centralism from the practice which was applied under Stalin. These, as they say, are two different things. The perverted practice cannot be taken as the essence of democratic centralism itself.

Although at present they do not recommend frequent citations from Lenin, in reference to the fact that his statements relate to another time, I shall nevertheless take the risk to turn again to one of his thoughts, since it has on the whole a methodological character. Speaking about the fact that it proved impossible to carry out one of the proposals approved by the party congress, he noted: "Our troubles were caused not by the mechanism, but by individuals; the point is that some individuals, taking refuge under a formalistic interpretation of the statute, avoided the execution of the will of the congress."

If we approach the history of democratic centralism in our party with such criteria, we can, it seems to me, separate the grain from the weed.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless, it turns out that you do not see anything defective in the now available formulations, which reveal democratic centralism in the existing Statute, in contrast to the point of view, which as a whole subjects them to doubt and sees in them the result of the evil genius of Stalin?

[Masyagin] Well no, such a conclusion is incorrect. The matter is more complicated than a simple "yes" or "no" answer. I see, or I don't see.

Above all, factual accuracy is necessary. Of the formulations of democratic centralism given under Stalin at the 17th Party Congress, one has remained unchanged in the Statute now in effect: "Strict party discipline and the

subjugation of the minority to the majority." I think that this provision will be retained in the future as well, although, it goes without saying, changes may be introduced in the conditions of its application, for example, with respect to the minority, about which we have already talked. Thus it can hardly be said that "the Stalinist interpretation of democratic centralism has become petrified."

[Correspondent] Yes, but, perhaps, all these changes are of a purely editorial, bureaucratic-amplifying character?

[Masyagin] By no means. Here, for example, the 27th Congress amended the interpretation of democratic centralism with a completely new point, underscored "collectivity in the work of all organizations and the ruling organs of the party and the personal responsibility of every communist for the fulfillment of his obligations and party instructions." Present is an attempt to strengthen the democratic aspect in the interpretation of the principle.

Or another example. In the Statute adopted by the 17th Congress, one of the provisions of democratic centralism was defined as follows: "The appointment by election of all leading party organs from top to bottom." The 22nd CPSU Congress gave this provision a completely different formulation, which is also contained in the Statute currently in effect: "The appointment by election of all leading party organs from bottom to top." Do you catch the difference?

[Correspondent] In general, with difficulty. It turns out to be some sort of "tightrope-walking" with words—their transposition hither and thither. Well, what meaning do you see in this?

[Masyagin] I see enormous significance in this. In the formulation of the 17th Congress, the pre-October approach to the creation of the structures of the party and the imprint of the illegal conditions of activity were in many respects retained, where frequently they created and recreated party organizations and committees precisely from the top, where the center virtually determined everything. The 22nd Congress, although it took place already at the end of the period which it has come to be accepted to call the "thaw", nevertheless expressed an aspiration to greater assertion of the principles of democratism in the party.

I would say that, unfortunately, even today the potential of this formulation of the 22nd Congress has not been exhausted. The primary organizations must become the real basis of the party. They must delegate powers to the upper echelons. They must take a direct part in the elections of both the party leaders and the higher organs. And if it is impossible directly, then in another way to effectively influence the elections. The principal approaches to the development of the general party line, too, must be formed from below, and, finally, the primary organizations must become centers of political work and political struggle.

[Correspondent] Consequently, you see shortcomings in the present-day definitions of democratic centralism?

[Masyagin] It should be noted that it is not only this provision of democratic centralism that is not developed as it should be. For example, the periodic accountability. It has started to become very formalized and ineffective. It is no coincidence that the CPSU Central Committee adopted special measures to make accountability more urgent, where it proposed, after the 27th Congress, to hold reports on their direction of the cause of restructuring, on the role of concrete leaders in this. The campaign went livelier than ever, especially thanks to the participation of people not affiliated with the party.

Not long ago a plenum of the Leningrad Party Gorkom was held. The secretary for ideology was transferred to other work, and a new person was elected in her place. The question arose: Why does a worker leave and his activity is not summed up in any way, why his report about this is not heard. Indeed, accountability would increase a great deal if, during his transfer, the members of the elected organ, perhaps, even through voting, would give him an assessment and would decide the question already in accordance with it. How much less formalism of any kind would there be during the reports.

Finally, if we are talking about the formulation of an "unconditional binding force of the decisions of the higher organs for the lower ones", I see excessive absoluteness in the word "unconditional" for present-day times, although this has its historical explanation. In any case, in improving the relations between the higher and the lower organs, it is important, in my view, to carry through, in the entire Statute, the idea expressed by the Leninist words: "Not dare to command!"

[Correspondent] Some journalists assert that the Statute practically was not changed at the 27th Congress and did not reflect the processes of restructuring in any way. Is this so?

[Masyagin] I do not agree with this at all. I see in these assertions the manifestation of what I for myself call "rally" criticism, which, as a rule, suffers from the dilettantism, although it attracts people with its "revolutionary scope" and destructive pathos. I will only say one thing: More than 100 corrections and changes were introduced in the currently effective Statute at the 27th Congress.

[Correspondent] But, perhaps, these corrections are of a purely superficial character, they do not carry any substantial or normative weight, and they cannot be taken into consideration in the general, as it were global, assessment?

[Masyagin] I understand. Eagles do not catch a fly, they need a large prey. Statutes, like laws, are written so that here any details are important. But I am talking only about some, in my view, important and fundamental things.

The effective Statute, in contrast to the previous one, granted every party member the right to criticize at party meetings and conferences not only any communist, but also any party organ. I think that there is no need to comment on this.

The 27th Congress established a procedure under which a communist who has committed a misdemeanor answers for it, first of all, before the primary party organization. Is this not a step forward in the political and moral improvement of the party?

In the present Statute it is emphasized that the party operates on the basis of broad glasnost, that party committees utilize various forms for the involvement of communists in the activity of party organs on public principles, that the communists themselves are obligated to actively promote the increasingly fuller realization of socialist self-government of the people, and to strengthen the principle of social justice. So tell me, is this still not substantial, is this still not the vocabulary and not the concept of restructuring, is this a step backward? Of course, restructuring on the political plane is developing swiftly, and a great deal now seems inadequate. But this is already another question. But in principle we are all wise after the event.

[Correspondent] The following question somehow arises naturally with me. Why did our comrades in the discussions not notice these novelties? Evidently, it made its way into life in a faded way, it did not find a lot of reflection in party practice. Readers report that even now leaders do little in the way of accounting for their faults in the lower party organizations, public principles are poorly developed, and there is not the requisite support for the principles of self-government. Evidently, in the Statute there is some kind of defect here, it is still not working?

[Masyagin] I would not agree with this. The Statute can help, but it cannot replace the development of party practice itself. It can even state some kinds of concepts, which have not yet taken root in life, let us say, that self-government and that freedom of political discussions. In other words, to be a reference point, to serve as source of ideas. Well, and for the implementation of ideas, as Marx said, practical force must be applied. And this force they do not apply everywhere.

Thus, if we now descend from heaven to earth, we must see that in the party there have not yet properly developed many of the processes, under which the new possibilities and new rights would be naturally used by all communists and would prove to be extremely necessary to them. For this reason, we now say that the party is lagging behind, that there are crisis phenomena in it, that not all communists operate actively, that the primary party organizations do not influence many restructuring processes. Because of this, the impression is created that this is the fault of the Statute. As a matter of fact, it is not the Statute, but life itself, which is at fault.

[Correspondent] The 27th Congress called democratic centralism the guiding principle not only of the organizational building but also of the entire life and activity of the party. From this point of view, I would like to raise the following question. An enormous place in the life of the primary party organizations is occupied by the monitoring of the economic activity of the administration, during which, clearly, many attributes of democratic centralism are used. In your article in PRAVDA (of 23 August of this year), you proposed to repudiate such a right in the Statute. Can you not provide more detailed arguments for this proposal?

[Masyagin] All right, I will try.

First of all, granting the right of monitoring the economic activity of the administration virtually guaranteed the rigid coupling of the interests of the party organizations with the administrative command system. Receipt of the right of monitoring turned out to be an insidious thing, for it practically placed also the responsibility for the affairs of the enterprise on the party organizations. And this inevitably led to them to the fact that they began to identify their interests with the interests of the administration, that they lost their political independence in the assessment of production and economic matters, that they turned into their own sort of departmental politicized department of technical control, which came nearer in everything to it in terms of the results of activity being attained. This is why, for example, now, when group egotism in enterprises has developed most widely, we have not seen that the party organizations have any kind of effective immunity against this, that they are able to show themselves as an active force.

Of course, communists and many party organizations honestly aspired to help production in various stages, but history is indeed impassive, it factors out emotions. And, it seems to me that the monitoring of economic activity is a sort of form of non-economic compulsion in the national economy, which has departed for the past together with the pre-capitalist formations.

The second thing. We do not have serious legal foundations to establish the monitoring of the economic activity of the administration on the part of the party organizations. It does not emanate directly from the constitution. Perhaps indirectly from its Article 6, but this is little for a law. This right simply belongs to the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, when revolutionary expediency was considered higher than any "formal" democracy and legality.

And the third thing. With the development and strengthening of the principles of self government, the monitoring of production receives the advice of the labor collective of the enterprise as its highest organ. Two constant controlling organs for one collective is extremely much. The communists will exert their influence through the technical control sector (STK) and other forms.

[Correspondent] What would you like to say in conclusion?

[Masyagin] Now a mass of proposals is being received as to how to transform the Statute and the principle of democratic centralism. Undoubtedly, many valuable opinions, but there are also those which, in my view, should be given deep thought beforehand.

The question is about something which is at times forgotten: In a larger sense, the party does not operate for the communists (or not only for them), but first of all—for the people. One can, of course, suggest a great deal that will secure greater ideological and organizational comfort for the communists in the party itself and make life easier for them in the environment where they work. But in the background, it seems to me, there must stand what helps us to solve the problems which concern the people.

Discussion of Renewal of Party Ranks

90UN0263A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 18, Oct 89 (signed to press 5 Sep 89) pp 33-37

[Interview with F. Klyukach, chairman of the Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Department, Minsk Obkom, Belorussian CP, conducted by L. Yunchik: "Party Renewal: What It Will Be Like"]

[Text] The editorial staff received a letter with an unusual enclosure—a party membership card. After a journalistic and party investigation was conducted on this matter, I decided to have a frank discussion with the chairman of the Belorussian CP Minsk Obkom Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Department, F. Klyukach—a member of the party committee bureau, under whose "jurisdiction" this case, which up until recently had been considered unprecedented, had occurred.

[Correspondent] Fedor Ivanovich, recently I had to perform an unpleasant mission—to submit to the commission for party control under the party obkom the party membership card of Nikolay Grigoryevich Usenok, who had mailed it to our editorial office. I admit, the feeling I got as I was doing this was as if I was sending someone off to their final journey.

[Klyukach] Well, that is right. There was one less communist. After this demarche, the party organization of the communal-housing administration of the "Beloruskaliy" production association excluded Usenok from its ranks. It is not for nothing that the party card is called the personal standard of the communist. He who values it carries the booklet with the dear silhouette of Lenin close to his very heart. However, a fighter who has fallen into desperation and panic, and particularly one who has sent his "standard" into a stranger's hands, is no longer a fighter, but rather a traitor to that Leninist cause which he had chosen to serve.

[Correspondent] Let us try to understand what leads to such a step. Let us begin with N. Usenok. Explaining his action in his letter to the editors, he writes: "I consider it useless to continue the struggle. You cannot chop wood with a pen knife. The anti-perestroika forces are not only not yielding their positions, but they are strengthening them. One gets the impression that our almighty bureaucracy has very quickly adapted to glasnost and is reacting to everything according to the old eastern adage: The dog is barking, but the caravan goes on. I have come to understand that such communists as I are not needed. The old folk saying is true: If you have lost money, you have not lost anything. If you have half-lost a friend, if you have lost faith—you have lost everything. Thus, for the present moment I have lost all faith in justice and hope for a change for the better in the processes of perestroika processes. Based on this, I have decided to leave the ranks of the CPSU".

[Klyukach] I got the impression that this person found himself in the party not because he wanted to give more. He worked as a foreman and was promoted to section chief. After his retirement, he continued to work in various official capacities, lately at the housing-communal administration. ZhKU [housing-communal administration] Chief N. Metelskiy gave him a third-level classification and directed him to work at the housing administration's carpentry-sanitary technician brigade No 1 without their approval. Usenok did not fit in in the brigade. Not having the skills of a carpenter, he also allowed certain violations of discipline and did not complete his job assignments. He was transferred to a lower paying job as a groundskeeper, and then with the consent of the trade union committee he was dismissed. The ZhKU party organization issued him a strict reprimand for his systematic non-fulfillment of duties under his labor agreement and labor regulations without valid reasons, and this reprimand was entered into his work record card. The "Beloruskalya" partkom buro upheld this disciplinary action.

N. Usenok appealed to the commission for party control under the Belorussian CP Central Committee. The appeal was forwarded to the obkom. Several times our workers went to Soligorsk and thoroughly studied the circumstances surrounding the matter. They found no evidence of a prejudicial or improper attitude toward him. And although the communist acted insincerely and denied his fully obvious guilt, the members of the party commission nevertheless tried to have a humane attitude toward him. They took into consideration the fact that he had been in the party ranks for over a quarter of a century. They took into consideration the fact that the worker had been strictly punished for the same sins along an administrative line. They gave the following recommendation: To change the decision of the "Beloruskalya" association partkom buro for his violation of labor discipline and exhibited rudeness, and to issue N. Usenok a reprimand. That is, to reduce the punishment. However, no sooner had the obkom buro reviewed this proposal than the party membership card was sent from Soligorsk to the editorial office.

N. Usenok's appeal, I believe, is nothing more than a smokescreen. The man himself did not want to remain in the party, and was seeking a reason for leaving it.

[Correspondent] During a business trip to Soligorsk, I met with Nikolay Grigoryevich. He gave me the impression of being a non-synonymous, overly categorical person. Here is what gave me an unfavorable impression at the time. He decisively stated that there had been no complaints against him while he was in the party. Yet the next day in the party gorkom I learned that the primary party organization of the House of Young Pioneers had issued him a reprimand for non-fulfillment of a party assignment.

How could he not have known or forgotten about the reprimand, if he himself had written the appeal to the superior party committee? I might add, the appeal was not upheld. The gorkom buro agreed with the decision of the primary party organization. When during a second meeting I asked Usenok to explain himself on this matter, he announced that he does not recognize that reprimand.

[Klyukach] What can you do if his painful perception of criticism addressed at him was combined with arrogance, disregard for the opinion of his comrades, or, for that matter, anyone at all on his part? He tried to get out of doing work himself, but he liked to tell others what to do.

[Correspondent] In speaking of his long-term membership in the party ranks, he reported with pride, I believe, that he helped his son and three brothers to become communists, and that his father had also been a member of the CPSU. Yet at the same time he broke this good family tradition. He admitted that he advised another son against entering the party.

And how do you perceive Usenok's letter to the editors?

[Klyukach] I fully admit that the former communist feels offended. Yes, there are many cases of social injustice and bureaucratism which many of us must still encounter. Yet we must fight, and not demonstratively step aside. Such a position does not flatter anyone. I believe that he sensed fully how the responsibility and exactingness toward every party member is increasing lately. That is why he preferred to step off to the side of the road.

[Correspondent] Recently I spoke with the chief organizer of one of the party raykoms. He categorically proclaimed: "There cannot be 20 million people in the avant-garde!" That is, the ranks of the party members, in his opinion, had grown excessively.

[Klyukach] I believe the avant-garde may be even more numerous. After all, there are many more good and honest people than there communists. All of them can replenish the party ranks. It is another matter that our approach up until recently has been incorrect. If you wanted to become a leader, you had to join the party. So

the office-seekers and opportunists strived as best they could to earn the right to a party membership card, and used it to gain high positions, privileges and benefits for themselves. Today we have finally understood that a manager does not necessarily have to be a communist. Moreover, the former order for acceptance to the party also no longer exists.

[Correspondent] But why is it, then, that some comrades part with their party cards at their own initiative?

[Klyukach] I believe that the cause of all this, as a rule, is dependency and mercantile interests. In one case someone, in his opinion, does not receive housing for too long. In another someone is "shortchanged" of something else. For example, P. Znak, an electrical assembler at the Minsk "Termoplast" Plant, gave up his party card as a sign of "protest" against non-payment of bonuses. Many believe that by paying their party dues they are losing money for nothing. Others do not want to attend the meetings or fulfill party assignments. However, not many will admit this honestly. Most of them motivate their "departure" from the party by references to negative facts and phenomena in our life.

Let me present a characteristic example. I. Yushko, a 50-year old churner at the Molodechnenskiy Confectionery Factory, wrote the following announcement to the party bureau:

"I ask to be excluded from the party for personal reasons. I support the CPSU line toward perestroika, democracy and glasnost. However, I cannot agree with the fact that there are many people within the party ranks who have no honor or conscience. They do not know any limits to distorting its line. They are responsible for mark-ups and violations of the law, etc. Yet despite all this many know how to be right, no matter how they discredit the party and our people. They do not voluntarily leave their positions, their 'warm chairs', but only harm the cause of perestroika. Therefore, I am going away from such communists".

Yet what is the real reason? To a member of the commission for reviewing his personal case, engineer L. Kozlovskiy, Yushko announced without mincing words: "I would rather buy a bottle of vodka or a piece of sausage with the money I spend on my party membership dues".

I. Yushko paid dues in the amount of around 9 rubles. At one time he served in the army, and receives a pension of 141 rubles. On top of all this, he supplements his income at the factory—a sizeable sum adds up. He felt sorry to deduct a note or two from this sum, so he made up a reason.

At the party meeting they asked Yushko to specifically name the members of the party organization who engage in mark-ups and thievery. He could not name them. It is no accident that laboratory technician Z. Lesked, engineer V. Savich and others, thinking at the meeting about the reasons for the "departure" of their former comrade

from the party, came to the conclusion that such a finale was predictable. In the few years that Yushko worked at the enterprise, he never once went to the farm which it supported, and never participated in Saturday work days. He categorically refused the party assignment of serving as a member of a volunteer people's brigade.

How could a person with such a dependent attitude lead others? How can those who do not want to spend money for party dues remain in the avant-garde?

[Correspondent] In former years we became accustomed to seeing a communist excluded from the party if he grossly violated the CPSU Charter. Yet a voluntary abdication of one's responsibilities—that is a generally new phenomenon.

[Klyukach] Our department has thoroughly studied the situation which has recently arisen. Numerous meetings and talks with CPSU veterans and the party active membership have helped to clarify the basic reasons. And here I will be forced to cast a stone into the garden of the press.

Under the influence of numerous publications in newspapers, journals, and radio and television broadcasts about the negative activity of a number of high-ranking party and state leaders, a considerable part of the workers have formed the opinion that in the party there are more people who have compromised themselves than there are real, honest communists. Yet, I dare to assure you, this is an erroneous opinion. Most party members are worthy of this calling. At the same time, very few materials are printed about communists who are indeed promoting perestroika, who are really showing concern about the people and about the conditions of their work and their life.

[Correspondent] I will not argue with this collective conclusion, judging by everything. Yet there are probably also other reasons as well?

[Klyukach] Of course. The transformations which are being implemented in the economy and in the social sphere as yet are not giving noticeable results. People are expressing their dissatisfaction at the erosion of the supply of cheap products which are in everyday demand, at the increased deficit, and at the shortage of food and industrial goods. This is associated by a certain part of the workers with the inability of the party to effectively manage the processes which are occurring.

Serious miscalculations have been allowed in the upbringing of the youth. Consumer attitudes are growing among a considerable part of the young people. Some are doubting the ideals on which more than a generation of Soviet people have been raised. They are directly or indirectly formulating in the youth a mistrust of the older generation, and of the correctness of the decisions made by the Soviet organs.

The party oblast committee is performing a detailed analysis of the processes which are taking place and the

situation in the labor collectives and primary organizations. We have outlined a number of measures for strengthening political and enlightenment work among the masses and increasing the authority of the party. This was largely facilitated by party meetings which were recently held at the primary organizations, where an exacting discussion was held regarding the avant-garde role of communists and their influence on the affairs of the collective.

[Correspondent] Yet the meetings have also been different—dull, inexpressive, and not fulfilling that mission which had been placed upon them. I am not speaking of this in vain—I had occasion to be present at them.

[Klyukach] In fact, at a number of party organizations the discussion for which the time was so right did not come about. In the "Timkovichskiy" Sovkhoz of Kopylskiy rayon the communists merely summarized the facts and tried to find those guilty for various shortcomings and omissions on the side. Neither the speeches nor the debates made hardly any mention of the role of communists in political work. At the meeting in the party organization of the "8 March" Kolkhoz in Logoyskiy rayon, the speaker dealt primarily with production questions.

All the communists of the Soligorskiy Truck Motor Pool who spoke at the meeting limited their criticism to remarks addressed to the superior party committees. I fully admit that there were reasons for this. Yet criticism should not be, as they say, one-sided. Without a strict and exacting attitude toward ourselves and our party comrades, we will not go far, and will not be able to rid ourselves of the ideological looseness which has penetrated into the ranks of the party organizations. It is time to make this clear to everyone. However, many communists prefer not to "stand out", so as not to complicate their lives.

[Correspondent] About the problem which you and I analyzed in our discussion, writer V. Rasputin, speaking at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, said the following. "In the course of the electoral campaign, the attitude of certain groups was detected by some candidates with the precision of a barometer. One of them had only to lay down his party ticket, and popularity would sweep him up as if on wings. I am not a party member and consciously did not enter the party, seeing how many self-interested people made their way into it. To be a member of the party was beneficial. That is why it has lost its authority. Today it has become unbeneficial, moreover dangerous, to be a party member. And to leave it at such a moment is certainly not an act of courage, as unknowing people are led to believe, but rather an expression of that very same calculation which led them to the party in the first place. It would have been courage 10 or even 5 years ago. Only have you not abandoned the ship too early? Do the senses of those who believe the ship to be doomed deceive them?"

[Klyukach] We have only one path to follow. Let us act, proclaiming the process of increasing the social activity

of the people. The cause of perestroika will go farther along the outlined course, and the party will receive great support on the part of the workers. If we lose our initiative and allow ourselves to lag behind—then the cause of perestroika will be dealt a serious, if not an irreparable, blow.

It is specifically from such an understanding of the avant-garde role of the party that we must today proceed. Yet for this **the party itself must constantly develop on Leninist principles, learn to live and work under conditions of democracy, placing its wage on the living bond with the people, on the development of an on-going dialogue with all the social forces. We must strive toward unity of word and deed.** It is specifically toward this end that the party orients us.

[Correspondent] And every communist must seriously think: Why does he carry the little red book? For what purpose does he want to tie his life with the party?

[Klyukach] The party is in great need of morally healthy, initiative-filled replenishment. It knows how to value not only its leaders, but also its rank-and-file members, who by their specific actions are moving perestroika ahead. Recently the Molodechnenskiy party raykom buro accepted a young hog raising operator at the Kolkhoz imeni 50th Anniversary of October, Olga Rinkevich, as a candidate member. The buro members were interested in why she decided to join the party at a time when some people would not mind leaving it. "Specifically because I have decided to become a communist, because I want to really help the party and perestroika in a difficult time".

These are not just pretty words. O. Rinkevich has earned her right to be in the avant-garde. At one time she completed the tekhnikum and worked as a technologist at an alcohol-making plant. Yet she exchanged this job for one that is considered by many to be non-prestigious. Olga herself is very happy with it. It is wonderful to work, and to perform a great social task. She is a deputy of the rayon soviet and a member of the collective labor soviet and the women's soviet. She has a good family. Her two little daughters are growing up. Her husband is a party member and is studying at the institute. With such a party replenishment we will be able to accomplish much. Such devotees of perestroika, I am sure, will never reject their party membership cards.

The Belorussian CP Central Committee Plenum conducted an in-depth examination of the question, "On strengthening the influence of party committees and organizations on the socio-political situation in the republic at the current stage of perestroika". The questions of the quality of the party ranks were also discussed in detail. It was noted that we will not achieve true combatancy of the party organizations if we do not increase our attention toward intra-party work, and toward membership in the CPSU. A number of new phenomena have been noted here, to which we are unaccustomed. Last year there were 5,000 less people

accepted as CPSU candidate members than there were in the previous year. For the first time in the Belorussian CP—and there are over 700,000 people in its ranks—the number of worker-communists declined by almost 2,000 people. This tendency is being retained also in the current year. The number of people leaving the party for non-payment of membership dues and loss of connections with the party organizations is increasing. There are also cases of voluntary departure from the party. To those who entered the CPSU for careerist convictions and those who are burdened by the fulfillment of party responsibilities we must bid farewell without the slightest regret. Here we must unswervingly follow the advice of Lenin: "Good riddance! Such a reduction in the number of party members is a huge increase in its force and weight".

However, the plenum stressed that those who motivate their action by the unsatisfactory pace of perestroika, by the inaction of the primary party organization, and by the gap between word and deed of certain leaders, deserve a different approach. We must work with these people, hold an honest and frank dialogue, and effectively react to their just critical comments and proposals.

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Need for KGB Today Supported

90UN0156A Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by V. Golovchenko, hero of the Soviet Union and hero of Socialist Labor: "Without a 'Secret' Stamp: An Open Letter"]

[Text] Don't look for any kind of revelations—I am not an intelligence officer. I simply consider it unjust that we are now speaking the truth about the barbarity of Stalinist times but seldom find words for those chekists who served and are now serving their cause honestly, with high principles, and bravely. It is true that articles have recently been appearing "in defense" of KGB workers, especially following the "Thunder" [Grom] operation, which the whole country knows about, but this is little, very little...

The fortunes of the VChK - OGPU - NKVD - KGB have included all kinds of things: struggling against counter-revolution and banditry, countering foreign intelligence services, protecting our state borders. Yes, there were also years of repression... Yagoda, Yezhov, Abakumov, and Beria, with their assistants "shouted" from the pinnacle of the punitive pyramid and the weeping and groans echoed throughout the whole land. But how many honest chekists there were, ones who demanded that the axe of repression be restrained! In the best of cases, they were not heard; in the worst, they shared the fate of the Stalinism's victims: In percentages, the chekists suffered hardly less than any other social group within our society.

...There is much that binds me to the KGB directorate for Krasnodar Kray: I visit there as a former front-line soldier, I speak before the employees of the Committee, and I am friends with many of them. But are there many citizens of Krasnodar who know why one of the streets in their city bears the name Atarbakov? Indeed this chekist, along with others—Kotlyarenko, Vlasov, Paluyan—fought to establish Soviet power in the Kuban. During the Great Fatherland War, seventy-four intelligence and sabotage groups comprised of chekists operated in the territory of the kray that was occupied by the fascists. They were not combatting mythical "spies" but German agents, about 750 of whom were arrested. The guilt of the enemies was completely proven—and was reconfirmed during the process of rehabilitation. When retreating, the enemy left behind a new agent network—it too was uncovered. Following the war, 118 bandit groups were rendered harmless.

Well, and so, to the present day: Has the struggle against foreign intelligence services been completed? No, and this is not likely to happen soon. The card files of the Krasnodar chekists contain the names and photographs of people who have been arrested for espionage in very recent times. Some of them we can talk about, such as Luigi Primari, a "mechanic" aboard a merchant ship, who was caught red-handed; others still remain secret.

The collaboration of our enterprises with foreign firms is adding a new dimension to the work of the chekists. Not all of our foreign partners sincerely want to assist perestroika, not all their plans are aimed only at mutual economic benefit. And the KGB directorate has already helped to save several million rubles in this area.

And there is more. I am sure that, had the KGB not involved itself in the struggle against the mafia, organized crime, bribery, and corruption, the scale of these would be more threatening today. It is not necessary to look far to find examples: The sensational case of "Iron Bella"—B. Borodkina, the "mother" of the Gelendzhik mafia is, as they say, fresh in the minds of many. For many years she enmeshed the city in a net of bribe-takers and plunderers, but the Krasnodar chekists put an end to all that. As a result of this case almost 70 people were brought to trial and the value of valuables seized in the course of this operation alone came to about a million rubles. And the "cotton" case, and the many arrests of racketeers in recent times?..

For today's young people, dreaming about real masculine pursuits, the prestige of the chekist remains high. Even today some hotheads are asking whether we need a state security service. I answer this with a question: What? Have the enormous amounts allocated for subversive work against the USSR and the countries of the socialist commonwealth really disappeared from the budgets of foreign intelligence services? And if millions have been allocated, they must be spent as directed. This is axiomatic. And they need to have cadres.

I would like to hope that I am writing for the common benefit. Under conditions of glasnost a possibility exists to publicly evaluate the activities of the Committee. It is necessary to think about the problems of this department. Thus, it has seemed to us that the KGB is equipped with the latest word in technology. In some part, certainly, this is how it is. But, when showing me a confiscated printing press which had been carried into our country in parts, the Krasnodar chekists lamented that they do not even have a copying machine and that they are not able to make use of use audio and video recordings in their investigative work. And the "civilian" lives of the KGB workers? Despite conjecture, they have no special benefits; they live on Armenian wages and in accordance with Armenian law.

Do we know much about the work of the chekists? In the movies, we see the spirited chases and resourceful "moves" of our intelligence people, and we read the same things in books, but, indeed, the daily existence of the state security workers is both more prosaic and more difficult. I was convinced of this once again when I

visited the museum of the Krasnodar chekists. I saw there such an abundance of evidence of dramatic and heroic events that I was pained and sorry: Why can't the residents of our city, especially the young people, not know about the work of these people?

Be so kind as to tell me, what is secret about this? If it were up to me, I would collect materials within the museum not only about the exploits of the chekists, but also about the prosaic side of their lives. But what's the use of this? Indeed, this museum, like the multitude of ones similar to it in the cities and villages of our country, is accessible to only very few. But such museums need to be made open to everyone who wants to learn how these people live and work and about the risks they take. Incidentally, both the chief of the KGB directorate for Krasnodar Kray and his comrades are in favor of such a solution. And this is no accident: Perestroika is intensifying within the Committee for State Security. Collegiality, democracy and, to an appropriate degree, openness and glasnost are gaining a foothold there.

Opinion Poll on RSFSR Draft Laws

90UN0135A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in
Russian 22 Oct 89 Second Edition p 2

[Article by V. Ivanov: "What Is Your Opinion? How Participants in the Sociological Poll of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences Center for Studying Public Opinion Assess the New Draft Laws."]

[Text] In several days, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR will consider draft laws on changes and amendments to the constitution and on elections of people's deputies and local authorities. These draft laws are extremely important to the future development of the Russian Federation and to improving its state structure. Discussion of these documents took place with great activeness and interest.

On the whole, what is the attitude of the people toward the new draft laws and to individual sections and chapters? How are those innovations perceived which are being proposed for implementation in state activities? In order to find out more about the general tendencies and assessments, the editorial staff of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, jointly with the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences Center for Studying Public Opinion, conducted a survey by questionnaire in early October in various regions of the Russian Federation. During the course of the study, accomplished under the direction of the center's scientific workers V.T. Davydchenkov, V.P. Rodionov, and V.A. Afanasyev, 1,128 people answered the questionnaire, representing various categories of the population. The geography of the survey includes Moscow and Abakan, Kaliningrad and Krasnoyarsk, Vladimir and Kemerovo, Gus-Khrustalnyy and Tynda—a total of 12 cities, and also rural areas, kolkhozes and sovkhoses.

What did this section of public opinion, supplemented by an analysis of letters to the editor, reveal?

Lately, quite a bit is being said and written about expanding glasnost and democratization of our life. The external aspect itself catches the eye. It is much more important to examine the internal process of moral restructuring that is taking place under the influence of glasnost and democratization and is being expressed in changes in the position of people, their behavior, and ability to perceive differently those social obligations which yesterday were considered a given formality.

Discussions of certain state documents were also practiced from time to time before, and "impressive" figures of responses to them also existed. So, why do we still draw a sharp distinction between what was done yesterday and what is being done today? The very approach to the discussion of issues disturbing society has changed (more accurately, is changing). When we observe on a daily basis the heated squabbles over new the new draft laws at meetings of the nation's parliament, we become increasingly aware that there is something more behind these arguments than the desire to defend one's wording and one's proposal. The obedience and indifference,

which until quite recently reigned absolutely in those same Kremlin chambers, are becoming a thing of the past, and a spirit of a high degree of interest and responsibility is becoming established more and more strongly

There is an increase in political activeness in the society; this is finding confirmation in many aspects of life. But is this process going deep enough? Are the consequences of that era of stagnation when formalism in executing civic duties gave rise to a lack of faith and public apathy still having an effect?

The following questions was among those on the questionnaire: "How familiar are you with the draft laws on elections of people's deputies of the RSFSR and deputies of local soviets, and with materials of their discussion?" Four answer choices were provided. What was revealed as a result? Let us turn to the materials of the study.

Only 35.7 percent of those surveyed could confidently confirm that they were familiar with the draft law on elections of people's deputies of the Russian Federation. Considerably fewer—only 26.1 percent—were familiar with the law on elections of deputies of local soviets. Of those taking part in the survey, 65.1 percent answered that they were familiar with materials of the discussion from newspaper articles and radio and television reports; 10.5 percent stated that they were not at all familiar with either the draft laws or the materials on their discussion.

We will not make these data absolute. But it is obvious that some portion of the population remains uninformed and indifferent to important steps of political reform.

The drafts of the new laws submitted for consideration to the session of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR contain many not simply innovations, but fundamentally different conceptual precepts and approaches based on real life and today's conditions. The pages of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA have already talked about the most important changes over, which the debate has unfolded, and has reported on the typical differences in their assessments. Now let us look at these tendencies through a prism of the sociological study conducted and see how much its data confirm or, on the contrary, refute the preliminary conclusions. Let us begin with a group of questions related to the principles of formation of state power in the republic.

The Congress of People's Deputies, according to the draft laws being discussed, is to become its supreme body. This statute encountered overall support and approval, since, in the opinion of the majority of the participants in the discussion, the Congress with broad representation of those chosen by the people will make it possible to take into account and combine the diverse interests of the residents of the Russian Federation and of the many nations and nationalities. But what should its composition be? The draft law specifies the figure of 1,088 people's deputies. During the course of the study,

this question was asked: "Will this number of people's deputies make it possible to conduct effective work at the congresses?"

Let us say right away that this question proved to be complex for many of the survey participants—30 percent of those polled stated that it was difficult to answer; 38 percent of them believe that the Congress can work effectively and fruitfully with this number of people's deputies; and 32 percent are convinced that the overall composition of the Congress of People's Deputies should be smaller. Such a difference of opinions is quite explainable. The new structure of state power in our country is just beginning to take shape, and the experience of the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies, on whose work the assessments are naturally oriented, does not provide a clear answer. It is obvious that only the practical activities spread throughout the localities.

The participants in the survey as well as the authors of letters received by the working commissions of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR stated their opinion more definitively concerning the proposed procedure for forming the Supreme Soviet as the executive body of the Congress, its two-chamber composition (as we know, up to now there has not been such a division in the current Russian parliament), and the principle of electing members of the Supreme Soviet.

Among the survey participants, 44 percent stated unequivocally their conviction that such a two-phased system of forming the Supreme Soviet is fully justified. The total number of those who reacted negatively to such a structure was 51 percent; in this group's opinion, the population of the Russian Federation should be given the right to directly elect members of the Supreme Soviet. This thought, as we will remember, was also brought up at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

Incidentally, one aspect of this debate, which also evoked heated arguments at the first Congress, was the question on the procedure for electing the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It also came up during the course of discussing the draft laws in the Russian Federation. A supplementary poll showed that 48 percent of those participating in the survey favor direct elections of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR by all the republic's population, and 42 percent supported the provision of the draft law on his election by the Congress of People's Deputies.

It is interesting to compare these data with the percentage ratio of answers to another survey question: "What do you think of proposals to hold direct elections of the chairman of the executive committee (ispolkom) of the local soviet by the population of the city, rayon, or village?" The position here is clearly unequivocal: 76.5 percent of those surveyed favored such a procedure, and only 19 percent favored electing the chairman of the ispolkom only by the deputies of the local soviet. The logic of such a variant is quite natural—in a city or village, where every person is in the public eye and where

it is always possible to make a judgment directly about the personal qualities of a candidate for the post of head of the local power, with such a procedure it is easier to avoid mistakes and put at the helm a person who is actually respected and efficient and whose capabilities for such activities the voters have been able to see for themselves.

Now about the assessments of the proposal to have two equal chambers in the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR—the Soviet of the Republic and the Soviet of Nationalities. Let us recall what dictated the idea of this innovation.

From the very beginning it was emphasized that this proposal is by no means a copy of the union body of power. Its introduction is directly dictated by the nationality and territorial peculiarities of the RSFSR, which has in its composition 16 autonomous republics, 5 autonomous oblasts, and 10 autonomous okrugs and where representatives of about 100 nations and nationalities live. The proposal to introduce such a structure of the supreme bodies of power of the Russian Federation corresponds to the concept of expanding in every possible way the rights of autonomies, ensures supremacy of the law and a harmonious combination of the interests of the federation and the autonomous formations, and gives guarantees of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens. At the same time, the draft laws grant the right to autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs to determine for themselves the structure of their representative bodies.

These initial motives, corresponding to the basic directions of the nationalities policy developed by the party, met with understanding and support. This is also indicated by the proposals in the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR; this was also confirmed by the questionnaire survey data. The majority of the survey participants (61 percent) supported the need to have two chambers in the Supreme Soviet and believe that the Soviet of Nationalities should have the same rights as the Soviet of the Republic; 16.5 percent of those surveyed, also supporting this proposal in principle, stipulated that the "Soviet of Nationalities should exist, but its rights need to be limited;" and only 12.9 percent did not see any need to create two chambers.

Opinions differed somewhat more regarding the proposal to hold for the first time elections of RSFSR people's deputies according to territorial and nationality and territorial districts. Thus, 49.9 percent believe that creating nationality and territorial is necessary; 37.8 percent believe that "it is quite sufficient to hold elections of people's deputies only according to territorial districts;" and 12.3 percent stated that it is hard to say which way is better.

Readers of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA could not help but call attention to the polemics that have unfolded over the proposal of Leningrad workers to change the procedure for elections to local soviets and hold them primarily according to electoral precincts created at enterprises and in organizations. Substantiating their proposal on the

pages of the newspaper, they said that in critically interpreting the results of the elections of USSR people's deputies, one must admit frankly that the voice and opinion of the workers and peasants were represented less in the country's supreme bodies of power than even during the era of stagnation. "We are worried that the same thing will also be repeated in the elections to the local soviets!!!"—they reflected. It was proposed to implement this variant initially only as an experiment so the example of elections to the local soviets in Leningrad can be used as an opportunity to judge the actual social and sociopolitical effect of implementing the proposed election procedures.

Sharply opposite views were immediately revealed with respect to the Leningrad workers' initiative. On the one hand, a great number of readers responded (and we published their letters) who actively supported the idea of the Leningrad workers; on the other hand (and there were also quite a few of these letters), there were decisive opponents of changing the election procedures.

Regarding these polemics, it is quite interesting to see how the survey participants perceive the idea of the Leningrad workers. For clarity, we present the distribution of opinions in the various social groups in the form of a table. Table 1 shows how the answers were distributed.

Table 1.

	Workers	Kolkhoz Farmers	Office Workers	Engineering and Technical Personnel	Intelligentsia	Pensioners	Students
Production electoral districts should be created	46	65	42	36	30	23	36
Production electoral districts should not exist	26	19	42	42	49	56	39

Of course, one cannot draw definitive conclusions about the overall tendency of public opinion regarding this complicated problem, but there is no doubt that the proposal of the Leningrad workers touched a sore spot and that their arguments and reasoning, incidentally, also supported in many other worker collectives of the Russian Federation, cannot simply be dismissed.

The data from the questionnaire survey associated with the attitude toward the right to nominate candidates also

confirm the fact that people are worried about the representation of the working class and peasantry in bodies of power. This right, as recorded in the draft law, is set aside for labor collectives, public organizations, collectives of students, meetings for place of residence, and meetings of service members for military units. It would seem that in this case one could expect a certain unanimity. But in actuality, here we also see various positions of public opinion. We will again resort to detailed data.

Table 2.

	Should have right to nominate deputies	Should not have right to nominate deputies	No answer given
Labor collectives	89	2	9
Meetings for place of residence	70	15	15
Meetings of service members for military units	65	17	18
Collectives of students	62	19	19
Public organizations	52	27	21

As we can see, only the principle of nominating candidates from labor collectives received the absolute support of the voters. Some voters have doubts about the authority to nominate candidates from educational and military collectives, meetings for place of residence, and especially from public organizations. Thus, this fact also indicates that the proposals of the Leningrad workers make some sense, and the problem of representation itself touches upon fairly complicated phenomena that are felt in our life.

At the beginning of our conversation, we limited the topic to the most debatable aspects of discussion of the new draft laws. Of course, the materials of the study contain much interesting information on other positions, too. The draft law, for example, does not provide

for elections of deputies directly from public organizations—the CPSU, trade unions, the Komsomol, creative unions, etc. This is one of the fundamental differences from elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Does everyone agree with this change, despite the large amount of criticism concerning this? Here are the results of the survey: One out of five people surveyed believes that all public organizations should be giving this right; 13 percent are inclined to grant this right only to individual public organizations. The majority—53 percent—deny public organizations the right to elect their own deputies.

Another thing. The draft law prohibits restricting voting rights of citizens of the RSFSR depending on ancestry,

social and property status, race and nationality, sex, education, language, attitude toward religion, time of residence in a given locality, and the type and nature of employment. However, no thoughts were expressed about the expediency of introducing some of these restrictions (in individual republics, we know, they have already been incorporated into the draft laws). The vast majority of those surveyed—87 percent—have a unequivocal opinion on this fundamental issue: There should be no restrictions.

It is known that during the elections of USSR people's deputies, pre-election district meetings where decisions were made on limiting the number of candidates played a large role. In the elections of RSFSR people's deputies, it is planned to limit their functions and convene them only when more than 10 candidates have been nominated for a district. An analysis of the information received shows that 45 percent of those polled believe that the pre-election district meetings should not be held at all—"all candidates nominated, regardless of their number, should participate in the elections."

In summary, the sociological survey conducted confirmed very gratifying changes in public consciousness. It showed that from now on law-making will no longer be a sphere of activities of only legal specialists and that the people have firmly announced their right to participate in drafting the laws by which they have to live and work.

Estonian Readers Comment on Draft Laws

90UN0272A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 31 Oct 89 p 1

[Commentary: "In Principle, I Agree, But...: Discussion of New Estonian SSR Draft Laws"]

[Text] "In connection with the discussion of the draft law on the principles of local self-government in the Estonian SSR, I suggest that members of the newly elected Soviet in their work turn to local inhabitants for assistance. I am confident that voluntary helpers will be found. They will know what aid is needed by the residents of houses which are within the sphere of their influence. They will be able to 'take charge' of one or more houses, where they will monitor cleanliness and good order, as well as the economical use of water and electric power. They will be able to report all shortcomings to the members of the Soviet." (D. Arkhipov, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Keyla).

"I have attentively read through the draft law on elections to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Basically, the draft seemed to be quite well thought-out and balanced. It seems to me, however, that the residence qualification for candidates to the office of deputy should be more extended—about 10 or 15 years.

"I was perplexed by Article 8, Paragraph 1. Why should military personnel vote or be elected? After all, they play

practically no part in the republic's life. In civilized countries military personnel do not participate in elections." (A. Orlov, engineer, Tallinn)

"On the whole, the draft law on elections to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet causes no objections. But the one thing that is not understandable is why military personnel are accorded privileges. As you know, in other countries they do not participate in elections. After all, they comprise a temporary contingent. And why is the provision concerning citizenship and residence qualification not extended to them?" (O. Reshovskiy, engineer).

On 13 October the republic-level newspapers published the Estonian SSR draft law entitled "On the Nationality Rights of Estonian SSR Citizens." In order to conduct a more fruitful discussion, it would be useful to reveal and explore certain complex concepts which are contained in this document. Let's take, for example, the introductory portion of this draft law. It states the following in particular: "The guarantee of nationality rights of all citizens of the Estonian SSR can be only the right of the Estonian nation, as the indigenous nation, to its own ethnic territory and to self-determination."

I am leaving aside many, in my opinion, disputable formulations in this section. We can speak and argue about them somewhat later. But as a beginning, I would suggest that the following questions be examined:

What constitutes the ethnic territory of an indigenous nation nowadays under the conditions of our multinational state?

How was the ethnic territory of the Estonian nation formed historically, and how were its borders changed? How have they been consolidated?

It would be a good idea to peer deeply into the centuries past and find out about the status of the ethnic territory comprising the islands of the Moonzundskiy Archipelago. Perhaps the Swedes also have certain rights to this territory.

Does the ethnic territory of the Estonian nation extend beyond Narva right up to the present-day Kingisepp in Leningrad Oblast and the land of the Pechora region in Pskov Oblast? Does the Estonian nation have rights in these areas?

It would be a good idea for the newspaper to publish a map which would clearly show the outlines of the Estonian nation's ethnic territory as of the present day. After this, the discussion on the topic of ethnic territory would be much more objective.

It would be extremely important, in my opinion, to list by name the authors of the draft, along with an indication of their official positions. And it would be best of all if they were to reply to the questions which have been posed. (E. Oynus, Tallinn).

I have attentively read through the Estonian SSR draft laws entitled "On the Principles of Self-Government" and "Statutes on People's Enterprises," and, to put it mildly, several fundamentally important factors have caused bewilderment. Specifically the following:

What is included in municipal property? The same things as before: bathhouses, barbershops, beauty parlors, and other low-capacity, low-profit enterprises, which frequently operate even at a loss. Moreover, most of them, according to another draft, would become people's enterprises and, to a considerable extent, get out from under the monitoring controls of the local soviets. From the draft law it follows that all more or less large enterprises would be subordinate to the republic, all deductions would be contributed to the republic-level budget, and from there, depending upon the kindness of the higher authorities, something might trickle down to the territories as well.

As we can see, there is nothing new here; the local soviets have no motivation to develop or improve the work of the enterprises situated on their territories, whereas the enterprises cannot contribute money to improve the infrastructure of a city where their staff members live. Again everything depends upon the ability of the soviet chairman to request and get allocations from the republic-level bureaucrats.

Formerly, the chairman of an ispolkom could be only a person elected at a session; but now he must be approved by the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, submissions for approval may be made only twice, and then the Supreme Soviet itself may appoint a chairman, without taking into account the desires of the soviet involved. This enables the republic-level organs to appoint only those persons they wish, without taking the opinions of the soviet and the voters into consideration. As the saying goes, that's the limit—democracy turned inside out.

The two drafts, where necessary and where unnecessary, prescribe strict observance of the Estonian SSR laws. Nowhere do you come across references to Union-level laws, or have they already become invalid on the territory of Estonia?

In Moscow people are now developing and discussing more progressive and democratic laws with regard to these same problems. We cannot ignore them, no matter how much certain persons would like to. And what would happen if, for example, Narva wanted to ignore the republic-level laws and follow those at the Union level instead?

And lastly, what about the uyezds, volosts, etc.? Is there a desire to separate out, a desire to redraw all the maps, atlases, and globes? It must be said that this would be an expensive pleasure. And for what purpose? Would we begin to live any better because of this? (V. Yefimov, Narva).

The Presidium of the Coordinating Council of the Estonian SSR International Movement of Working People has discussed the draft of the Estonian SSR law entitled "On Elections to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet" and considers certain statutes of this draft law to be unjustified, against the law, and requiring changes and additions.

In an interview for the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA of 5 October A. Ryuytel declared that the "decisions which were adopted by this republic's highest organs of authority twice in less than a year contradicted the Union Constitution—not only in part, but on the basic problems...." Now the draft law on elections to the Supreme Soviet of this republic also contradicts the Union-level Constitution and human rights; it demonstrates again a scornful attitude toward the decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decisions and the norms of international law, as well as an ignorance of the USSR Constitution. The draft law also contradicts the existing Estonian SSR Constitution. Thus, for example, Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the draft law establishes the residence qualification of a candidate for the office of deputy as 5 years.

An ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has already specified that the introduction of a residence qualification is a violation of the USSR Constitution and the international-rights acts which have been ratified by the USSR.

The residence qualification violates Article 46 of the Estonian SSR Constitution, which states that citizens of the Estonian SSR shall have the opportunity to vote and be elected to the Soviet of People's Deputies without regard to any residence qualification.

We propose that the residence qualification for candidates to the office of deputy be excluded from the draft law.

The Estonian SSR is a multi-national republic. We propose that, in order to protect the interests of this republic's citizens of diverse nationalities, an Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet be formed to consist of two chambers: a Soviet of the Republic and a Soviet of Nationalities. Elected to the Soviet of Nationalities would be 9 representatives each—as representatives of nationalities numbering 30,000 or more citizens (2 percent of this republic's population). The chambers of the republic's Supreme Soviet should have equal rights.

Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the draft proposes that elections be held in single-seat and multiple-seat election

okrug. We know how, when elections to the local soviets are held, such a provision has made it possible to create okrugs which are sharply different as to the number of voters for one seat (as much as 60 percent).

Article 11, Paragraph 2 of the draft proposes two variants for forming election okrugs. Both variants, without any grounds or explanations, restrict the number of deputies to be elected from the cities of Tallinn, Narva, Kokhtla-Yarva, and Sillamäe. Thus, the residents of Tallinn, who comprise 33 percent of this republic's voters, would have to elect, according to the best variant, 24 percent of the deputies.

This same article proposes the formation of a republic-level Supreme Soviet to consist of 105 deputies. Such a sharp reduction in the number of deputies (there were 285) sharply reduces the share of the people's participation in governing the state, and it violates the principles of democracy.

We consider that Article 11 of the draft infringes upon this republic's Russian-speaking population.

We propose that 145 deputies be elected to this republic's Supreme Soviet. Elections should be conducted in single-seat election okrugs with an approximately equal number of voters (10 percent).

Article 43, Paragraph 2 of the draft proposes that, when making out the ballot, numbers 1, 2, 3, etc. be placed opposite the last names of the candidates. This would be done with a view to transferring the vote "in case during the distribution of the seats there should arise the necessity of transferring the vote". But the draft does not specify when or under what conditions the necessity of transferring votes would arise. This creates the conditions for manipulating votes during the tally. We propose that the method of transferring votes be excluded. The ballot should retain the last name of the candidate for whom the voter is voting; the remaining last names are to be deleted.

Article 44, Paragraph 1 of the draft writes that the district commission shall tally up the votes for each election okrug. But Article 12, Paragraph 1 establishes that a district must be in one okrug. There is an obvious contradiction here.

Article 45 of the draft concerning the results of elections for election okrugs states nothing about how to determine these results. In general, the election law does not precisely stipulate who should be considered as elected. This is to be established not by the law but by a commission, and this is inadmissible in a democratic state. We propose that it be written in Article 45, Paragraph 1 that the candidate for the office of deputy be considered as elected who has received the greatest number of votes, but at least 50 percent of the number of voters on the lists for the election okrug in question. Provision should be made in Article 47 of the draft for holding repeat elections from among the two candidates for the office of

deputy who have received the greatest number of votes (at least 50 percent of the number of voters in the okrug).

Article 48 of the draft proposes to replace deputies who have withdrawn or been removed from office by organizing elections in the "given election okrug" and holding them every year on the third Sunday in March. But what if a deputy has withdrawn or been removed from a multi-seat election okrug? And if a deputy withdraws or is removed on the fourth Sunday in March, does that mean that the voters would not have their own deputy to a high organ of authority for an entire year? Once again we propose that elections be held in single-seat election okrugs. To replace a deputy who has withdrawn or been removed, a new deputy should be elected not later than 5 months after the day on which the last one left office.

Latvian SSR SUPSOV Report on Constitution, Electoral Draft Laws

90UN0149A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
7 Oct 89, pp 1, 2

[LATINFORM report on speech by A.V. Gorbunov, deputy chairman, Commission for Drafting a New Edition of the Latvian SSR Constitution and the Law on Elections, at the 11th Convocation 13th Session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet: "On the Latvian SSR Draft Laws, 'On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Latvian SSR' and 'On Election of People's Deputies of the Latvian SSR'"]

[Text] Esteemed deputies! At this session we are faced with resolving one of the most important questions in the life of the republic: What should the highest organ of state power be like, and what should its structure, functions and jurisdiction be? Three versions of draft laws, "On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Latvian SSR," and "On Election of People's Deputies of the Latvian SSR," have been distributed today for your examination. The Supreme Soviet Presidium is taking into account the right of legislative initiative by both USSR People's Deputy Andris Plotnieks, and by the Latvian Jurists Society. In spite of the fact that all the features which found expression in these drafts have been discussed from all angles, we have not yet arrived at a unified opinion. Therefore, your task includes discussion of these drafts, and in the final analysis drawing up and adopting the optimal laws.

And, to go on, let me also express to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium my own opinion on the questions under discussion; an opinion which recently was completely supported by the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium. The Supreme Soviet Presidium believes that in the given complex economic and political situation the only way to return normalcy to the life of our society is—the way of democratic transformations. And here the most important thing is that we are promoting democracy not as an end in itself, but as a

means for the most effective organization of the life of society. Undoubtedly, one of the most important steps in this direction is drawing-up and adopting a democratic Law on Elections. The Supreme Soviet Presidium has spoken out in favor of our creating a Latvian parliament through democratic elections. But such elections can be assured only by observing the principle of general, equal and direct elections. This means that all citizens in the republic must participate on the basis of complete equality, organizing electoral districts with exactly the same number of voters, and providing for direct election of people's deputies to the highest organ of state power.

The results of popular discussion of the draft laws, discussions in the working group and on the Constitutional Commission, as well as work experience at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and in the Supreme Soviet, have strengthened my conviction that it is possible to provide democratic elections in practice only after creating a single supreme organ of state power—the republic Supreme Soviet. I will cite what are in my view the most important arguments. It goes without saying that two-stage elections, when the Congress of People's Deputies forms the republic Soviet, appears at first glance the most attractive. At the congress, 260 deputies are elected, representatives of various social groups; and of these, it would seem that the best of these—the most respected, and the most professionally-trained members—would be elected to the republic Soviet, the permanently-operating parliament. But right away a problem arises. How shall we create the republic Soviet? The second version of the draft law stipulates that election of members of the republic Soviet takes place in delegations from the administrative-territorial units. If an administrative-territorial unit is represented by three or fewer deputies, they are automatically included in the membership of the republic Soviet.

The membership of the republic Soviet is confirmed by the Congress. But can we be certain that those who make up a republic Soviet created in such a manner would truly be the very best and the most deserving people? Moreover, the Congress would always have the last word, but its point of view might not always coincide with the opinion of this or that delegation of deputies. Thus the process of forming a republic Soviet could be endless. And if at first we would nevertheless manage to form a balanced republic Soviet, then what would it turn into as the result of annual rotation of deputies?

Nevertheless, the most important thing here in my view is the fact that multi-stage elections always reserve to various powers the possibility of influencing the election results, thereby distorting the will expressed by the deputies, and ignoring the principles of direct elections. A directly-elected Supreme Soviet would in all circumstances express the views and interests which prevail among the electors, and any violation of the natural equilibrium in favor of this or that social group would lead to the adoption of such laws and resolutions that would not support the solution of the republic's actual problems.

The economic and political reforms being carried out in our country require very energetic and qualitative preparations, and the adoption of new laws.

This requirement gives rise to a new question—on the structure of the highest organ of state power. The effectiveness of its activity, of course, will strongly depend on the kind of individuals elected as deputies, but we can discuss the main parameters already today.

First: This must be a continually-operating parliament.

Second: The mechanism for adopting laws depends upon the structure of the highest organ of power, which influences both the quality of the laws, and their effectiveness. The optimal variant of the mechanism's activity would be as follows: Legislation would be initiated, and the draft law discussed by the appropriate commission of deputies; next, discussion of the first reading at a session; next, publication for popular discussion; finally, discussion and adoption of the draft law at the second reading. It goes without saying, but it should be kept in mind, that here we are speaking about laws of cardinal importance, and not about resolutions.

Both the first and the second condition once again permit drawing the conclusion that the most acceptable variant is a legislative organ chosen by direct election and not by multi-stage elections, as it would be in the variant with the Congress.

One could cite other arguments as well, but I have already expressed my thoughts in an article published in the newspaper TSINYA. I believe the deputies are familiar with it. The Supreme Soviet Presidium is also aware of the fact that the Latvian CP Central Committee Buro, the Duma of the Latvian People's Front, the leadership of the International Workers' Front, the Latvian Society of Jurists, and other social organizations are all in favor of this variant.

One of the questions which was the subject of discussion and gave rise to various points of view is the question of the size of the highest organ of state power. Here too, unfortunately, the Presidium has neither definite criteria, nor convincing arguments. If we would but remember our history, we would see that the Sejm of the Latvian Republic consisted of 100 deputies, who represented many political parties. We have proposed three criteria for resolution of this problem:

First of all, that there would be assurance of the required number of deputies on the commissions; secondly, that the principle be observed that every rayon and city of republic subordination and every urban rayon would be represented by at least two deputies; and thirdly, that the electoral districts must be formed as much as possible with an equal number of voters (such that the differences would not exceed 25 percent).

It would appear that a number of 160 to 200 deputies would best meet the requirements set forth. It goes without saying, yet must be taken into consideration,

that with a large number of deputies the most varied socio-political currents would be more widely represented. But we cannot endlessly increase the number of deputies, since this principle can operate effectively only up to a point.

The interests of the electors are expressed in the Supreme Soviet by the deputies they elect by virtue of their platforms of economic and political views. It goes without saying that there are no other possibilities nor mechanisms. We must remember that the views which bring together both citizens and deputies in various organizations are political views. And nevertheless the question of how to reconcile the interests of the various social strata is a very important one, since their numerical make-up differs, and therefore the number of deputies who will represent them will be unequal as well.

Doubts were raised during the popular discussion: Having elected only a Supreme Soviet, will we be able to guarantee the activities in it; for example, observing the interests of our farmers, if in equal elections the rural rayons receive fewer mandates in the Supreme Soviet elected, than Riga and other cities of republic subordination? In search of a positive answer to this question the authors of the second variant of the draft law therefore stipulated the formation of a republic Soviet based on identical norms of representation from every administrative-territorial unit. But in trying to ensure the priority of the rural area, are we not being inconsistent and are we not consciously ignoring the fundamental principle of democratic elections—the principle of universal, equal and direct elections? Additionally, while maintaining a policy of direct elections, we cannot speak of advantages at the polls of one social group over another; on the contrary, we should speak of equal rights. Although, based on my own experience, I would like to assure you that in the process of voting at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, political views do have a certain importance; but not social or national identity—although the latter cannot be altogether ruled out. In the USSR Supreme Soviet the interests of the various nationalities, or more precisely, republics, are represented in the Soviet of Nationalities. But that is not suitable for us, since we have no national-territorial entities. Therefore, the Presidium proposes supporting the proposal of the Forum of the Peoples of Latvia on the formation of a Consultative Soviet of Nationalities.

It order to draw up quality laws concerning the most varied areas of our lives, the newly-elected Supreme Soviet must strictly regulate the work of the commissions. For example, looking into the future, we see that not a single law which does not coincide with the interests of rural citizens can be adopted if, for the sake of argument, an agrarian deputy commission objects to it. In case of a conflict between this agrarian deputy commission and a commission of industrial deputies, once again for the sake of argument, a conciliatory commission made up of an identical number of deputies from both interested sides could come to their assistance. It goes without saying that one could object, that

this mechanism is imperfect, since the various administrative-territorial formations, as we know, would be represented by differing numbers of deputies. In my view it will never be possible for absolutely everything to be equal; what's more, that's not necessary. The main thing is that every deputy be able to carry out his respective, difficult task. But he can do this only when he is able to understand and express both the interests of his own region, and the interests of his republic as well.

The question of voter qualifications gave rise to many discussions. If we already had in effect a Law on Citizenship in the Latvian SSR the problem would then be much less acute. As we speak out for establishing a democratic electoral system, we must take into consideration the fact that if we deprive 10,000 citizens of the possibility of running for office, we might encounter a situation in which hundreds of thousands of Russians and citizens of other nationalities would vote for this or that deputy, not on the basis of his professional or political capabilities, but in consideration of his national origins. And the newly-created Supreme Soviet would come off the loser. Perhaps in the transition period the deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet would be wise not to stipulate any voter qualifications in the Election Law, and would continue to work on preparing a Law on Citizenship.

And today I would ask the deputies to refrain from political confrontation in resolving this question—since confrontation would have an extremely adverse affect on the political stability of the republic; and, moreover, would damage its economy. But it is precisely toward solution of economic problems that all our efforts and energy should be directed, because our standard of living is declining catastrophically. Therefore it is very important for us, having heard various arguments, to strive to find a joint solution to these questions. As before, there are conflicting opinions among the public with respect to participation in elections by military personnel stationed in Latvia. Various proposals have been received; both from the servicemen themselves, and from local Soviets and jurists.

The variant which stipulates formation of separate electoral districts for military servicemen, with a guaranteed number of deputies, not only does not solve this problem; on the contrary, it makes it worse.

Some decided that this is an unnecessary privilege for the military servicement, since no other category of the populace is guaranteed a definite number of seats in the Soviets. Others interpreted this variant as discrimination against military servicemen, since it deprives them of the possibility of taking part in elections at their place of residence.

Whereas in the case of elections of local Soviets the distribution of deputy mandates did not cause any serious problems, it turned out to be much harder to resolve this question at the highest organ of state power in the republic. Here, not only were the interests of the

military district in general manifested, but also the interests of almost all branches of arms and even individual military units. Obviously, the more complex the system we create, the more tensions and problems it causes. Therefore, the Presidium proposes that, just as at the time of the election for People's Deputies of the USSR, military servicemen and members of their families would take part in the election of People's Deputies of the Latvian SSR on a common basis. In such cases the electoral districts for military servicemen would become part of the common electoral district and the course of the elections would be subject, just as everywhere else in the republic, to public control.

And in conclusion, on the draft law presented by the Society of Jurists, which concerns the section on direct election of the president of the republic: the Supreme Soviet Presidium will today introduce this draft for examination at the first reading. This is a question which requires very significant changes to the Constitution. And before we accept it as a law, we should present it for broad public discussion, since the problem undoubtedly needs extensive discussion. Contradictory aspects can be discerned here as well. Today we are striving to actually put into effect the principle of "All Power to the Soviets." Does not the great authority of the president partially limit the sphere of action of this principle? In addition, at the stage of development in which we find ourselves today, we are not yet familiar with the status of the president. After all, for decades we have become

accustomed to the style of collective leadership. Since a president is nevertheless granted a considerable amount of power, we should elaborate these questions to a significant degree in our legislation: such as, for example, the authority and functions of a president; nomination and procedure for registering candidates for president; and a recall mechanism. But all the same, we must not fail to take into consideration the fact that direct election of a president would promote the unification of the populace in the republic, and would to a certain extent provide greater effectiveness to the actions of the highest organ of state power.

Thus, this is one of the questions which requires wide exchange of opinions, with the participation of the very widest sectors of the public, both individually, and in the person of social organizations.

And in conclusion I would like to say that, in characterizing the political situation of today, the Supreme Soviet Presidium is pleased to note that in the course of discussing the draft laws, all social organizations in the republic and the citizens as well were guided by fundamental democratic principles; therefore, no attempts were noted to bring pressure to bear for the adoption of one law or another, by force or by naked political pressure. This testifies to the fact that we have taken the first steps in the proper direction. The process of democratization of our society must continue through the efforts of all the progressive forces in the republic.

Belorussian CP CC Secretary on Democratization, Other Issues

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[Interview with V.A. Pechennikov, Belorussian CP CC secretary, by Z.K. Prigodich, SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA editor: "National Rebirth: Paths and Crossroads"]

[Text] [Z. Prigodich] Valeriy Andreyevich, one observes today in the ideological sphere—as, incidentally, one also does in other spheres of social life—a rather large number of serious and painful problems. But one problem that is probably one of the most acute ones that sometimes take on a dramatic nature is the problem of interethnic relations. As a practical worker who has access to a large volume of various kinds of information, what could you say about the reasons for the increased sharpness of these relations in our country and about their manifestation in Belorussia?

[V. Pechennikov] To a large extent, the answer to that question has been given in the materials of the recently held September CPSU CC Plenum, in the course of the pre-Plenum discussion of the CPSU Central Committee platform in the party organizations, in the labor collectives, in the commissions of USSR Supreme Soviet and the local Soviets, and in the periodic press. The problems of interethnic relations, as everyone knows, have also been dealt with in the statements made by participants of the first Congress of People's Deputies, at various kinds of scientific conferences, round table discussions, etc.

Speaking for myself personally, I can say that this is by no means a simple question, and our social scientists have not yet said their last word here. However, a major step forward has been taken in scientifically analyzing and interpreting the real-life situations that have developed and in defining policy as applicable to the present-day stage in perestroika. The CPSU CC Plenum, in my opinion, convincingly pointed out those positive features that have been achieved during the years of the Soviet authority in developing nations and nationalities, and in creating new relations among them that are based on friendship, cooperation, and mutual trust. Simultaneously it threw light on those negative features that caused the deformation of socialism and led to phenomena of stagnation in our society.

These deformations include the serious distortion of Leninist national policy. Wherein is this expressed? Primarily in the administrative-fiat, departmental approach to the needs of national development, to national conditions and traditions, in the limitation of the republics' sovereignty and independence, and in the mass repressions that affected entire nations and, to a considerable degree, the party and Soviet workers and the national intelligentsia.

Another factor that played its role was the underestimation of the real-life social processes, the lack of their

analysis and consideration in policy. We might recall, for example, our recent assertions concerning the complete resolution of the national question and the lack of any national problems.

All that occurred. A similar phenomenon also affected our republic, and has played havoc with living people and their fates. There is nowhere to go to get away from the past. It is on the critical reinterpretation of that past and on the taking into consideration of today's real-life situations that our present approaches are based.

Despite the overall roots of the deformations, the national contradictions in each individual region have their own specifics. In each republic one can discover the specific Gordian knots, the untying of which requires concrete analysis and just as concrete actions. The use of stereotypical solutions here would only be detrimental.

[Z. Prigodich] If you do not object, I'd like to speak a bit later about these actions. But first I would like to know your personal feelings with regard to the processes that are occurring today in our republics. What features in these processes please you, and what features alarm you?

[V. Pechennikov] I shall admit freely that my feelings are mostly ones of alarm. Every time that you turn on the television program "Vremya" or you read the fresh copies of newspapers, you find yourself wondering, voluntarily or involuntarily, "What kind of surprise will they be giving us today?" And I am not the only person with that feeling. Moreover, the situation could not be otherwise, inasmuch as certain national problems develop into interethnic conflicts, up to and including the use of weapons, or into political strikes and blockades. Putting it outright, I shall say that there is food for thought here. Let's analyze, for example, the situation that has developed among our neighbors—in the Baltic republics, in Moldavia. Because the intention there to introduce a number of new laws dealing with questions of the state nature of the language, citizenship in the republic, and the residency qualification led to a worsening of the political situation and to sharp confrontation between the indigenous and the Russian-speaking population.

That developed into a conflict on two fronts—the national and the international. In addition to them, the participants in the political struggle include dozens of associations that call themselves "parties"—the "national independence party," the "democratic party," "the national-democratic party." One sees actions being taken by various unions—the "democratic union," the "Christian union," the "Christian-democratic union," the "workers' union," the "nation, independent youth movement," ... There are also "salvation committees," "freedom leagues," "citizen committees," "independent forums and detachments," and even an "independent free youth column."

In general, one gets the feeling of a "frontline" situation both in the figurative and literal sense of that word. The complexity of the question consists in the fact that all of

this is occurring in close intertwining with the social contradictions that have come to a head. The conversion of production to intensive methods, to technological schemes that save resources and that are ecologically harmless, has been proceeding slowly. Added to this are the shortages in the consumer market, the growing increase in prices, inflation, the disappearance of inexpensive commodities, the speculative machinations of Mafia groups and cooperative members, and the growing crime rate. Under such conditions one begins to see with increasing clarity the social dissatisfaction of a considerable number of people—retirees, disabled individuals, young people. Hence the embitterment, the impulsiveness, and at times the tendency to use extreme actions, all of which are frequently used parasitically by political adventurers who encourage people to engage in illegal actions and interethnic conflicts.

[Z. Prigodich] To what extent is all this typical of Belorussia?

[V. Pechennikov] Much of what we have been discussing just now is also typical of our republic. I want to emphasize: much, but not all. Against the background of certain parts of the country, our situation is relatively stable.

But let us, nevertheless, take a realistic look at things and let us not delude ourselves on this score. The situation is a concept that changes, and in the final analysis it is all of us who will determine the direction in which the pendulum will swing. And, in my opinion, there is no doubt that there are forces that are stubbornly pushing it in the direction of destabilization. I feel that in this complicated situation, in our complicated, critical time, it is necessary to refer more frequently to the history of our republic's party organization.

Recently I was examining the stenographic report of the Belorussian CP CC Plenum that was held in July 1953 and my attention was caught by the statement made by Sergey Osipovich Pritytskiy. He said, in particular, "If we are talking about the depth of the case, then I shall report to the Plenum. When Tsanova and Frolov were unable to sit on the neck of the party's obkom... (he was discussing the Grodno OK [obkom] of the Belorussian CP), Tsanova decided to turn the head to Pritytskiy. To do what the Polish fascists had been unable to do. I feel that if, against me, the enemies of our party and our nation are fabricating cases, then that means that I am standing firmly on party positions which I shall not change for my personal well-being."

Of course, we are working today under completely different conditions and we are on the threshold of a completely different era. But even today the situation requires of each of us the precision of our position, personal bravery and willpower, and devotion to the party's cause and to our goals and ideals. We must take our example from such people as S.O. Pritytskiy, we

must remember them, and must develop the best of what our predecessors contributed to the practice of party work and public life.

Well, as long as I have touched upon a historical topic, I would like to continue it slightly. About two years ago, in an interview in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Kirill Trofimovich Mazurov said that he, and many other party workers in Belorussia, had been fortunate with regard to their teachers—persons who could think in state terms, persons who were intelligent managers and good people. Sharing his point of view, I would like to add: despite all the variety of the personal qualities of these people, and their merits and shortcomings, many of them were united by one very typical feature: when faced by all kinds of situational changes in policy and in economics, they attempted to do everything possible to prevent people from dashing from one extreme to another, although they did not always succeed in doing so. All one has to do is to recall the corn campaign of that time, the struggle to eliminate private plots, peasant homes, etc.

And if today, against the background of other regions, with all our shortcomings and difficulties, we appear to be somewhat better with regard to individual specifications, if the period of stagnation did not exert a deeply pernicious effect upon us, then I feel that a large amount of credit for that goes to those people, those party committees and organizations, and labor collectives that we came to replace. Our predecessors left us a base, a foundation, by resting upon which, and by using their experience, we would be able to withstand that complicated situation. Moreover, it is necessary to set off decisively on the path toward perestroika. It is precisely in this that I see, first of all, the meaning of our work today.

[Z. Prigodich] The republic's movement ahead along the path of perestroika would probably have been more successful if the tragedy at the Chernobyl AES had not occurred...

[V. Pechennikov] Of course the misfortune that came to Belorussia together with that accident, and the consequences of that accident, cannot be expressed in figures, in concrete amounts. The accident has already required many spiritual and physical efforts, funds, and investments, and it will require many additional ones in the subsequent years. This is yet another very serious source of the social and psychological strain in the republic.

It will be necessary to carry out an additional resettlement of people and a new set of measures with a total cost of more than 17 billion rubles. Our republic is not capable of resolving this with our own efforts. The Belorussian CP Central Committee, the government, and the Belorussian public are persistently raising the question of intensifying the center's attention to this problem.

In July 1989 a session of Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet considered the draft of the State Program for

Eliminating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Tragedy in 1990-1995. The draft was handed over to a USSR governmental commission in late August and, on instructions from N.I. Ryzhkov, is being developed by central economic agencies, the interested ministries and departments, and USSR Academy of Sciences. Our comrades are also taking active part in this work. After modification, the program will be reconsidered at the next session of Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

At the present time, a procedure has been defined for resettling people from rayons where it is impossible to obtain pure agricultural produce, and, practically speaking, the question of freeing Belorussia from executing construction operations in other parts of the country except Armenia has been resolved. Belorussia's meat and milk shipments to the union fund have been reduced, and this will make it possible to improve the supplying of the food products to the population in the rayons that have suffered.

There is apparently no need today to dwell in detail on all the aspects that constitute that document, since, after it has been enacted, it will be published in entirety in the press.

[Z. Prigodich] Recently we have heard emanating from various rallies statements to the effect that the republic leadership failed to undertake the proper measures to resolve the problems arising from the accident at Chernobyl AES. What can you say in this regard?

[V. Pechennikov] The necessary explanations of this question have been given repeatedly both in the press, and over television and radio. A detailed discussion of this topic was also included in the report at the recent session of Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

But you are right when you say that the question continues to be inflated, and to an increasingly active extent. Consequently, it is needed by someone, and in precisely this packaging. Therefore I have a specific proposal to make to your newspaper—pick up all the documents of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, the governmental commission, the party's obkoms and oblast ispolkoms, study the state of affairs locally, and provide your own answer to the question that was raised. If this proposal is accepted, I shall give it my complete support.

[Z. Prigodich] It is accepted. And now a question of a somewhat different kind. To what degree is the combination of the national and interethnic interests guaranteed by the version of republic cost accounting that is being introduced in Belorussia in 1990?

[V. Pechennikov] I shall cite specific figures and facts. At the present time on the republic's territory there are 288 enterprises of union subordination, which employ 58 percent of the total number of persons working in industry. But the contribution made to the budget by those enterprises is equal to 8.5 percent. At the same

time the enterprises of republic subordination produce only 7 percent of the industrial output.

Cost accountability will give us the opportunity to expand the sphere of the republic's management and to increase the republic's independence in administering socioeconomic development and in reinforcing the financial base. As is already known, it has been planned to transfer to the republic's jurisdiction 50 enterprises, organizations, and institutions of union subordination, and five Belorussian SSR union-republics ministries and committees, and republic agencies have been reorganized into the corresponding republic agencies. This work will be continued. In our republic the share of industrial output for the enterprises that are changing over to republic property will constitute approximately half, and subsequently will reach 70-80 percent. The republic will plan independently almost two-thirds of its capital investments.

The republic's budget will be formed from payments from the income received by enterprises and organizations of the subordinate management, and the entire amount of payments for land, for water, and labor resources from enterprises and organizations situated on the republic's territory, and proceeds from local taxes and levies from the public.

The stipulated measures, I will repeat once again, will substantially expand the republic's economic independence, will fill its sovereignty with real content, and will promote the more consistent carrying out of the principle of social justice. Whoever works better will also begin to live better. And this does not contradict internationalism, which does not have anything in common with the psychology and policy of people with a dependent's attitude.

[Z. Prigodich] Valeriy Andreyevich, what is your attitude toward the decision made by the September CPSU Central Committee Plenum concerning the independence of the communist parties operating within the confines of sovereign union republics?

[V. Pechennikov] I take a positive attitude. We support it and we shall implement it in our practical work. Incidentally, if you may have noticed, at the last plenum of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, which made the decision to convoke the next 31st Belorussian CP Congress, a commission to prepare the program of actions of the Belorussian CP was created. This is already a real step on the path of expanding independence.

At the same time we do not share the proposals concerning the introduction of federalist principles into party building that were rejected as early as the creation of our party. We view as pharisaical the statements made by those "champions" of "uncurtailed sovereignty" who, instead of engaging in a dialogue, rush to organize pressure on the republic leadership from the pages of certain central and Baltic publications, and even the foreign press, calling that leadership "Kremlin proteges"

and "Moscow litter," and attempting to deprive that leadership of its independent choice in resolving domestic problems. The pressure is made with the aim of weakening the anticommunist, separatist elements that are creating political structures and organizations that are oppositional to the Belorussian CP, and are operating along the lines of destabilization, thus threatening both perestroika and the national rebirth.

It seems to me that many processes that are occurring in the real world lie in a broad range which, in general form, can be outlined by such boundaries as "national nihilism" and "nationalism." These are the two extremes, the two dangerous boundaries, the crossing of which can have the most unexpected and most unpredictable consequences, and the ones that are most difficult to correct.

We have already been in the state of national nihilism and we are beginning only now, and just barely, to overcome its consequences, by taking the difficult path of national rebirth. And immediately certain "hot heads" are attempting to resolve the complicated questions by resorting to power methods, and dashing around from one extreme to another. They are attempting to deny radically internationalism and to replace the recent national nihilism with extremism and even modern nationalism.

This is a complicated situation and it is extremely important here to preserve one's restraint, responsibility, and political maturity. And this pertains first of all to Communists. We must not play up to extremist emotions, we must not fall into ideological torpor, but we must firmly carry out the principle of the unity of the national and the international. Internationalism today does not deny the national, but presupposes the national rebirth of large and small nations, their development, the filling of their life with new content.

[Z. Prigodich] When talking about national processes, we frequently use such concepts as "national self-awareness" and "national feeling." And yet, quite recently, we attempted not to use these concepts. We avoided them...

[V. Pechennikov] Yes, that did happen. But this is what I want to tell you. When an honest, progressive-minded person is called a nationalist, that is, of course, a label. But when a person's national dignity is insulted, when there is an attempt to accuse the representatives of another nation for one's own misfortunes, to falsify the past, and, in order to prove one's own national exclusivity, to preach self-isolation and separatism, this is now pure nationalism, rather than the applying of labels. And one should not be afraid of calling things by their own names.

I have already said that for many years we lived in a state of national anabiosis, considering the national questions to be resolved once and for all, and failing to notice the accumulated problems or the increasing national nihilism. Hence the completely natural awakening in the course of perestroika and the democratization of the

national self-awareness. Moreover, at the initial stage that growth was an important motivating factor for renewing society. However, that process has been occurring in different ways in various regions. In some places it has been traveling along a healthy path that is free of national intolerance and exclusivity, and in other places it gives rise to national confrontation and interethnic discord. In any instance we have all been convinced already—and this was also noted in the CPSU Central Committee platform—that national feelings are a very important factor that absolutely must be considered. The question lies in how we must act in the future to assure that the implementation of these feelings will not infringe upon the basic rights and freedoms of people of another nationality.

The process of national rebirth always begins with an analysis of the past, with the rebirth of progressive traditions and customs, with the restoration of historic awareness, culture, etc. It is necessary to follow this path. But, having taken that path, one must not forget the fact that national problems produce different offshoots. It is on that ground that various "weeds" sometimes begin to grow. Take, for example, such concepts—which in a few places have become very fashionable—as "migrant," "occupying force," "nonindigenous population," etc. Introduced into them is a subtext that prevents every Soviet citizen from feeling that he has completely equal rights anywhere in the Soviet Union.

Certain "informals" of extremist persuasion are eager to exist parasitically on the aggravated national feeling, on the "unexplored areas" of history. In this regard I would like to direct attention to the fact that our historians for the time being are greatly in debt to the readers. In the perestroika years that have elapsed, there have appeared a rather large number of articles illuminating various aspects of the history of Belorussia, its culture, etc. But these articles are by no means of equal value and in most instances were prepared by writers, rather than professional historians, and therefore they sometimes are weakly documented. A number of historians, apparently, decided to go out into the bushes and stay there until things quiet down, to sit things out, without engaging in the discussion of moot questions. Meanwhile those questions have been raised, so to speak, by life itself and we need to take a serious professional approach to them.

In our opinion, the time has come to create fundamental works dealing with the problems of the origin of the Belorussians, the origin of the Belorussian nationality, and its development as part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. There is a need, from positions of modern science, to carry out a thorough analysis of the specifics in the development of the Belorussian nation as it made the transition to capitalism. Another question that requires new approaches is the question of the correlation and the reciprocal influence of the revolutionary-democratic current and the Marxist current in the national-liberation movement, and the question of the evolution of the Belorussian populist intelligentsia toward toward Marxism, toward the acceptance of the

Soviet system, and toward cooperation with the Communist Party. It is necessary in a thorough manner, rather than in a fragmentary way, to analyze the development of the Belorussian nation and the peoples populating the republic, under the conditions of the building of socialism. And there are other important questions.

The conducting of a well thought-out national policy will require the serious carrying out of sociological research. At the present time, on the base of Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, a sociological center is being developed, and specialists will be trained within the walls of Belorussian State University. The development of sociological services will help to overcome the speculative approaches and to assure that the decisions being made are based on a more solid scientific foundation.

[Z. Prigodich] Is there a danger that nationalism will expand and there will be a further complication of the national relations?

[V. Pechennikov] It is difficult to give a completely unambiguous answer to that question. First, these processes are occurring in different ways everywhere; secondly, there is already a party platform on national policy under present-day conditions, which platform provides landmarks for constructive work that undermines the ground under the nationalistic elements. The fate of socialism, the territorial and economic integrity of the Union, and the carrying out of the vital interests of Soviet citizens largely depend upon the state of affairs in our economy, upon the resolution of the food problem, the saturation of the market with commodities that we produce ourselves, upon the harmonizing of national relations, and upon the introduction into legal confines of the democratization that is overflowing its banks. Because it is no secret that the lagging behind in the legal regulation of the perestroika processes, the weakness of the legal protection of the internal forces and the militia, and the sluggishness of the local courts in a number of instances, together with other factors, have led to human sacrifices, to outbursts of terror on nationalistic grounds, and to misfortunes and sufferings inflicted upon people as a result of nationalistic insanity.

Democratization is not equivalent to weak authority—it is one of the forms of the state and is possible only within the confines of the state organization of any society. Democracy cannot be authorized. While guaranteeing rights and freedoms, it must regulate in detail all aspects of sociopolitical life. A very important pledge of democracy is the precise legal regulation of legislative procedure and the existence of discipline and political culture among the population.

The law must not only authorize something, but must also regulate in detail the specific question with a consideration of the domestic situation and the international legal standards.

[Z. Prigodich] It is well known that many countries have special legislative acts that protect society and the state against a schism and against national warpings, that

protect the rights of the national minorities, and that define the measure of responsibility for inciting interethnic enmity. Are we studying this legislative experience?

[V. Pechennikov] Any state, if it wants to be called a law-governed one and if it wants to guarantee in a real way the observance of the rights of its citizens, has laws like this. And certainly it would be foolish not to study their experience. For example, the final document of the Vienna meeting of the states participating in the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe proclaims the protection of the state's territorial integrity, recommends annexation to international pacts concerning human rights, and in sufficiently definite terms also mentions the rights of national minorities. "The participating state," the document reads, "guarantees the protection of the rights and basic freedoms of the persons belonging to national minorities on their territory."

It must also be noted that the domestic legislation of a number of countries stipulates responsibility for instigating interethnic enmity (United States, England, France, West Germany, Sweden—with punishment terms from one to five years); for insulting state symbols (for example, in Italy and West Germany this is punishable by incarceration for a period of up to three years); etc. We have been carrying out this analysis. In my opinion, this is a very interesting topic for discussion between journalists, on the one hand, and jurists and specialists on state law, on the other.

[Z. Prigodich] One cannot fail to agree that legislation today has become one of our most vitally important problems. For example, the discussion of the laws governing the state nature of languages, as has already been pointed out by practice, can develop into serious confrontation and even into strikes. How has the republic been preparing for the adoption of such a law?

[V. Pechennikov] As life demonstrates, the question of the status of languages today is no longer a question of the paths of national rebirth or the language in which we will write documents and speak at rallies. It is already a political question: how are all of us going to live and work in the future—as a single community, as a single harmonious family, or individually?

The experience of other republics indicates that, in the question of the status of languages, one-sided privileges or limitations are inadmissible, and coercion is even more inadmissible—all this will inevitably lead to a schism and to conflict situations. We also have already approached that stage when responsibility for decisions that are being made and for their consequences has greatly increased. This stage consists in that, in the linguistic problem, we are changing over from discussions to the making of decisions that will be of a profound and long-lasting nature. Therefore every inhabitant of the republic—whether he be a laborer, kolkhoz member, representative of the creative intelligentsia or deputy, party worker or an activist in an

independent associations—that is, all of us together, must be, first of all, people with common sense.

Belorussia is a multinational republic; its population according to the 1979 census was 79.4 percent Belorussians, 11.9 percent Russians, 4.2 percent Poles, 2.4 percent Ukrainians, 1.4 percent Jews, and 0.7 percent other nationalities. Nor can one fail to take into consideration the fact that every fifth family in our republic has mixed nationalities. In addition, in the history of the republic in the 1920's there already was a period when there existed four state languages—Belorussian, Russian, Polish, and Jewish. Our history has also had experience in "Belorussification," the lessons of which were broadly discussed in the mass media.

The republic's inhabitants already know from the press that, for the purpose of preparing recommendations concerning the legislative regulation of the status of languages, a commission of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet was created in July 1989 under the chairmanship of N.N. Mazay, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.

The commission's task is to study the situation, to analyze all the materials and views with regard to this question that have been received both from individual citizens and from public organizations and the mass media, and to make recommendations to the Supreme Soviet's Legislative Proposals Commission. In general, the legislative work is beginning, and the culmination of that work will be the nationwide discussion of the Law draft and its discussion and approval at a session of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

[Z. Prigodich] Won't it turn out that our new laws governing elections or the status of languages will lead to the appearance of so-called "deprivees," that is, persons who have been deprived of certain rights?

[V. Pechennikov] I do not think that this can happen here. One person, or a group of people, can, of course, make a wrong decision, but one would scarcely think that this could be done by an entire nation, particularly our Belorussian nation. It is, of course, important here to assure that no organizations, movements, or "fronts" usurp for themselves the prerogative to act in the name of their nation, to assure that they do not reject or trample upon the constitutional rights. The party and Soviet agencies and all the public organizations must operate within the confines of legality, rather than take the attitude to the Constitution, "The law is like a carriage shaft..." Then there will not be any "deprivees" in our republic, nor will any of the national persecution or squabbling that V.I. Lenin mentioned in his time will be allowed.

The problems of the rebirth of a language and a national culture were raised in a very acute manner by our creative intellectuals and the mass media. They were thoroughly studied and reviewed in the Ideological Department and the Ideological Commission of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, in the republic's

ministry of public education and ministry of culture, the Academy of Sciences, and commissions of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. Moreover, the most diverse aspects of this complicated question were reviewed: historical, national, legal, social, and economic.

Consideration was also taken of questions of the linguistic situation among the republic's Polish and Lithuanian population and people of other nationalities.

[Z. Prigodich] What is being done realistically in the republic to develop the sphere of use of the Belorussian language? What is your evaluation of this process?

[V. Pechennikov] Naturally, we take a critical attitude toward the situation, evaluating what is occurring as being only the first-priority steps. This pertains both to the linguistic problem and to the process of the rebirth of the national culture as a whole.

In any instance, the 10th Belorussian CP Central Committee Plenum was, to a definite degree, a crucial one. Its decisions were widely discussed in the party committees at all levels, at the republic's Council of Ministers, and in the ministries and departments. The measures that were planned by the plenum were brought up for nationwide discussion and at the traditional August teachers' conferences.

What has already been done from among that which was planned by the measures? The most important thing is that there has been a change in the psychological situation around these problems. There has been a change in public opinion. Party agencies, ministries and departments, agencies of public education and culture, and pedagogical collectives have faced directly the questions that have been raised.

Smooth relations are being established to assure their cooperation with scientists and with the creative intellectuals. In this regard, an important stimulus has been the creation of the Tavarystva belaruskay movy [Belorussian Language Association], and the conducting of the republic "People, Culture, Perestroyka" conference, which discussed the drafts of the "Rodnaya mova" [Native Language] and "Spadchyna" programs. Recently there was a so-called "alternative" board of the Ministry of Public Education, where, with the participation of a creative association of teachers and the republic council of school directors, various approaches to developing the republic's national school system were considered.

From the practical point of view, a large amount of work is being done to prepare new textbooks, teaching aids, and dictionaries; the BELARUSKAYA MOVA I LITERATURA and SPADCHYNA magazines have been created; works by the Academy of Science—"Belorusskiy yazyk dlya nebelorusov" [Belorussian Language for Non-Belorussians], "Kultura belaruskay movy" [Cultivating the Belorussian Language], and the six-volume "Bibliograficheskiy slovar belorusskikh pisateley" [Bibliographical Dictionary of Belorussian Writers]—have been prepared for publication; and associates at the Foreign

Languages Institute have prepared a trilingual (German-Belorussian-Russian) dictionary. Other trilingual dictionaries are being prepared. A series of books on scientific methodology have been published for Belorussian language and literature teachers, and the "Skarby movy" book series and "Narodnyya pismenniki Belarusi" have been published for school children. But these are only the first-priority measures.

The chief question is what is occurring in our kindergartens, schools, and institutions of higher learning. The changes in specifically this sphere will currently determine our forward movement. But for the time being, the situation remains complicated. As of the beginning of 1989 the republic's cities had only 32 preschool institutions where the instruction is given primarily in Belorussian; Belorussian language groups were working in 412 kindergartens. In schools in Minsk, Brest, Baranovich, Vitebsk, Grodno, Lida, Novogrudok, and Bobruysk, 145 classes with Belorussian language of instruction have been opened. At the same time, it must be noted that there are classes where only 10-13 school children are being taught. Another alarming situation is the fact that, for the time being, seven schools where all the first grades have Belorussian as the language of instruction have been opened only in Minsk.

In all the ordinary schools, Belorussian is currently studied starting with the first grade, and there has been a reduction in the number of school children who are released from studying it.

In institutions of higher learning, the question of expanding the use of the language in the teaching process was discussed at learned councils and one has seen definite shifts—an entrance examination on language is being used, the pedagogical institutions and the pedagogical tracks in the universities are changing over to the use of Belorussian so that the teachers in the various subjects can be fluent in it.

A large amount of attention is being paid to training the pedagogical cadres. Over a period of the past two years, the admissions to the philological schools in the specialty "Belorussian Language and Literature" has increased by 225 persons. A nighttime division in this specialty has been opened at Belorussian State University, and the admissions to the postgraduate program have been expanded. There has been an increase in the number of various courses in language teaching.

As you can see, despite all the complexities, real shifts have already occurred. I think that journalists have their own capabilities, together with the public education agencies, to study these questions more thoroughly and even to put under public scrutiny the fulfillment of the measures of the 10th Belorussian CP Central Committee plenum, as is being done, for example, by NASTAW-NITSKAYA GAZETA.

[Z. Prigodich] In this regard it is natural to ask about the way in which the questions linked with the interests of people of other nationalities residing in the republic are being resolved.

[V. Pechennikov] Here too, specific steps have already been taken. A Polish cultural-enlightenment society and a society of lovers of Jewish culture have been created, and societies of people of other nationalities are being formed. This is a completely natural process and it must be supported.

Take, for example, the needs of people of Polish nationality. At the present time, more than 300,000 of them are living in Grodno Oblast. During the past school year the study of Polish was organized in 25 schools and in two nonschool institutions, and this year, in 126 schools in various forms, more than 6000 school children are studying Polish. Grodno University has been training instructors in the specialties "Belorussian-Polish Language and Literature" and "Russian-Polish Language and Literature." This year alone, 58 secondary-school teachers underwent linguistic retraining with the participation of Polish specialists.

In June 1989 the question of organizing native-language study by children of citizens of Polish nationalities was reviewed at the Commission for Public Education and Culture, Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. Thus, not only have the problems being defined, but the ways to resolve them have been planned.

The recent September 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum is an important stage on the path to improving national relations in the Belorussian SSR and making them more harmonious. But it was unable to answer all the questions of interethnic life, especially as applicable to the country's specific regions. The tasks of the local party organizations, guided by the overall principles of the policy that was worked out at the Plenum, is to apply them creatively in the real situations, guaranteeing the harmonious operation of workers of all nationalities to renew our society, and raising to a higher level the cultivation of interethnic communication.

Arbatov Views Implications of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

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[Interview with Academician G. Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences USA and Canada Institute, conducted by ETA special correspondent V. Tsion: "Academician G. Arbatov: To Strive Toward the Leninist Variant"]

[Text] The regular meeting of the Commission of Deputies on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was held last Thursday in the Estonian permanent representation in Moscow under the chairmanship of USSR People's Deputy, Deputy Chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, and republic Gosplan Chairman E. Savisaar.

Unfortunately, journalists cannot conduct "direct reporting" on the work of the deputies, since they are simply not allowed at these meetings. Those are the

rules, and no one can violate them. There was only one thing left to do: To wait until the end of the meeting and to ask one of the commission members to comment on its work.

I will not conceal the fact that most of all I wanted to speak with USSR People's Deputy and Director of the USSR Academy of Sciences USA and Canada Institute, Academician G. Arbatov—a well-known man with a deep knowledge of the subject, an objective and unprejudiced man capable of deep historical generalizations. Yet Georgiy Arkadyevich left the meeting before it was over. He was hurrying to the Union Supreme Soviet and did not have a moment to spare.

"Call me at work," he said on the run, "but for now, excuse me. This is very urgent..."

I called the institute for several days, and only on Tuesday, on the eve of my departure from Moscow, was I able to get a meeting with G. Arbatov.

An old house standing by itself on Khlebnyy Lane, just a few steps from Kalinin Prospect—this is where the USA and Canada Institute is located. On the second story, in a spacious and cozy office, I heard the unhurried, calm voice of its owner:

[Arbatov] Unfortunately, it turned out that I was participating in the very beginning of the commission's work, and then I went on vacation, although I did leave written instructions. I was away for a month, and then again rejoined the discussions. Therefore, it is difficult for me now to give an objective and complete evaluation of the commission's work, even though I do have the materials on its activity. Specifically, I have the draft of the document signed by 20 of its members. I have also heard some complaints on this matter.

As I have already said, my personal point of view on the essence of the question is stated in my letter. In short, it consists of the following. Of course, there were secret protocols. I believe that the very expressions and concepts which were used in them—"sphere of interests" and so forth—contradict the Leninist principles of foreign policy. These are terms from the arsenal of a great power.

As for the agreement, here we must judge in the spirit of history, i.e., we must understand the conditions under which it was concluded. I believe that at that time the interests of survival were taken as the cornerstone. There was a desire to keep the forces of the potential enemy as far away as possible from our borders. Yet this in no way meant that we had to divide up spheres of interest and express pretensions on this matter.

I also understand that many mistakes were made later in regard to the Baltic republics, just as, I might add, they were made in regard to the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Transcaucasus republics, and any others. All of us, unfortunately, had to experience the same tragedy, and only today are we recovering from it. However, in

my note I objected to the effort to tie in the protocols and the agreement with the current state of affairs in the federation, and specifically with the current status of the Baltic republics and their currently existing boundaries. Because all this is not the result of some protocols or agreements with Hitler.

It is the result of World War II. It is the result of Yalta and Potsdam, and ultimately, the result of the Helsinki Agreement, which recognized the inviolability of boundaries as a necessary standard for peace in Europe.

This, approximately, is how my conception appears.

What can I say about the work of the commission? Some of its members have expressed their pretensions and, most evidently, will express them again very soon. The principle question is, I believe, the following: The commission, after all, is from the Congress of People's Deputies, and it must report on its work to the Congress. This moment, I might add, was discussed at the last meeting at the Estonian representation. I do not know how valid the demands of one of the Baltic representatives are for the Supreme Soviet to hear the report. Later I also thought about how justified the demands were that the report be publicized and approved by the commission even before it is presented to the Congress. However, this is a legal question, and must be precisely defined. This is about the work of the commission.

I will summarize: There have been protocols, protocols that contradict the principles of our foreign policy. Yet all this has no relation to the current status of the Baltic republics. That is, historically, of course, it does, but legally and politically—it does not. The present day, I will repeat, is the result of all of World War II, and the result of other agreements.

In this connection I must say that I understand the bitterness caused by the injustice which many people in the Baltic republics are experiencing. I can say too that this bitterness is felt also in other republics—bitterness over those crimes which were committed during a certain period in our history. Yet at the same time we must take a realistic view of the situation in which we live today. It seems to me that today all the hopes of every republic, including the Baltic republics, for national self-expression and sovereignty may be associated only with the success of the policy of perestroika. Therefore, it seems to me very imprudent when the policy of perestroika is undermined by emotions. We must keep all this in mind, just as we must remember that we cannot restore justice by creating new injustices.

We also should not forget that such an approach is ruinous to such a good cause as the strengthening of the independence of the republics and the transformation of the Soviet Union into a true federation, where each republic would be a sovereign state, delegating to the Union only certain rights which are associated with foreign policy and defense matters. This is the Leninist conception, which we have never yet experienced. Lenin expressed such a position, but in fact it was the Stalinist

conception of autonomization which won out. However, today we must strive toward the Leninist variant! I will say honestly: All the regions, including the RSFSR and Moscow, are pinning great hopes on the fact that the Baltic republics will pave the way for regional cost accounting and will show something that will be beneficial to all. There are many capacities here which must be utilized. Yet attitudes of confrontation may lead only to escalation of extremism.

However, I believe that Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are cool-headed, rational people with clearly expressed common sense. They will not succumb to such temptations, and will worthily pass through this period of very complex political changes. They will do everything that is in their interests and, I might add, in the interests of the entire Union as well.

In conclusion I will stress once again: All of our interests and hopes, as well as those of the Baltic, may today be tied only with the success of perestroika. Therefore we must measure our every step, our every action against this, and against the processes of renovation which are taking place in the country. There can hardly be some island remaining as a "heaven on Earth" if all around it there are raging hurricanes... We must understand this. And this concerns not only three republics. It concerns all of Europe, and ultimately, the entire world...

Estonian National-Cultural Association Profiled

90UN0246A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 21 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with Khagi Sheyn, president, Association of Estonian National-Cultural Societies, by V. Akimov: "We Are a Very Young Political Force"]

[Text] Our newspaper continues to publish materials providing some idea of the diversity of the political forces existing in this republic nowadays and participating in one way or another in preparing for the elections to the organs of local self-government. In three previous issues of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA you had the opportunity to become acquainted with statements by the representatives of the People's Front, the republic-level Council of Strike Committees, and committees of Estonian citizens. We hope that our readers will bear in mind the following: while according these interviewees the opportunity to set forth their own positions, the editors reserve for themselves the right not to share their points of view.

You can read the next interview in this series in the issue for Tuesday, 24 October.

[Kh. Sheyn] And it is precisely because we are still a very young political force that merely posing the question of a very active participation in the present-day election campaign is somewhat premature for us. We have just finished tackling a group of problems connected with preparing and conducting the Forum of Estonia's Peoples, and such a rapid switch to other concerns is a complicated matter. And, at the same time, these elections are the first for us in

which we can participate independently. It would, of course, not be sensible to allow such an opportunity to slip by. We discussed these problems and came to the following conclusion: we will contend for deputies' seats in the local soviets. The national-cultural societies have many of their own specific problems—ranging from a search for suitable rooms and instruction in the native language to taxation and the publication of our own newspapers—and solving them requires help from the local organs of self-government. For example, our deputy in the Tallinn City Soviet could attempt to solve a problem such as the following: at one time, back during the period of Bourgeois Estonia, practically all the national-cultural societies had their own centers where they could assemble and conduct their work. With the advent of the Soviet regime, these societies ceased to exist, and the buildings belonging to them were turned over to the state. Nowadays some of the societies which existed previously are being reborn. Perhaps we should give some thought as to whether these rooms and houses should be returned to them. Another question pertains to taxing the national-cultural societies. It is clear that funds, and considerable ones at that, are needed for normal operation. We cannot count merely on dues and on the contributions made by certain sponsors. And so we need to earn some money on our own. In time, these societies will have their own cooperatives, small enterprises a considerable portion of whose profits will be plowed into developing the national culture, Sunday schools and other forms of education, as well as into certain other needs of national-cultural autonomies. Such a practice as the following exists throughout the entire world: funds earmarked for the needs of national-cultural societies and autonomies are not imposed as taxes. And this is only fair and just. But why shouldn't we study this practice and apply it to ourselves? So the role to be played by the local organs of self-government and their deputies in solving these problems is great. And this is yet another confirmation of the point that our Association should try to obtain deputies' seats.

[V. Akimov] But these, you will agree, albeit very important matters, are, nonetheless, pragmatic, utilitarian problems for the Association, which it must solve at the level of the local soviets. I would also like to hear your opinion about the political aspects of the activities conducted by the national-cultural societies.

[Kh. Sheyn] Let me repeat again that we are only at the beginning of the path. In my opinion, the process of the emergence of national-cultural societies has taken place very rapidly in our republic. As far as I know, the Soviet Union still has no experience in such matters. The time has now come to define to what degree these societies reflect the interests of their own communities. The situation is such that not one of the national-cultural societies in Estonia can state today that it is the fully entitled representative of its own community. There are societies which unite from one-third to two-thirds of a nationality group. And there are those which include only 10-15 percent of a community's members. And if the process continues to develop—and the democratization of all spheres of our

public life permits us to hope for this—it is specifically the national-cultural societies which will be able to approach a situation whereby they will express the interests and aspirations of their own communities, i.e., to become a subject of activity. Only then will our actions in the political arena be well-grounded and have a firm foundation. And it is then that our Association will be able to speak out as an independent political force with its own program. On a general level, the basic, conceptual factors of our work have been set forth in the Declaration of the Third Forum of Estonia's Peoples Concerning the State of Affairs in the Republic. The first few lines of this document—which is very important for us—emphasize that we consider the fundamental issue in solving the problems of inter-ethnic relations to be democratic, genuine guarantees, as established in the USSR Constitution, for observing the principles of the republics' self-determination and sovereignty, as well as the voluntary nature of their inclusion in the Soviet Union. We support the aspirations of all democratically minded inhabitants of Estonia in their struggle for perestroika as well as for a final destalinization. And we affirm that neither among ourselves nor between us and the Estonians are there any internal conflicts, not to mention any menacing contradictions.

[V. Akimov] Just as was the case before, there are still many disputes concerning the residence qualification. Some of the inhabitants of this republic consider it to be undemocratic. What is your opinion on this matter?

[Kh. Sheyn] The Third Forum of Estonia's Peoples has stated its attitude toward such a qualification. We consider it to be the introduction of a correction. So far there is no other way to ensure that the problems of development of self-governing territories be solved intelligently, competently, and within the situation which is actually emerging. But we are opposed to denying the right to vote and be elected to the local soviets to those persons who just yesterday still possessed this right. Ascribing to the law a retroactive force—and, you know, that is precisely what happened in this case—is undemocratic. In our opinion, the residence qualification should be extended only to those persons who chose Estonia as their place of residence already after the Election Law was passed.

[V. Akimov] Some time ago a new expression—the "Russian Question"—made its appearance in our political lexicon. In the opinion of certain groups of the population, the attitude toward it constitutes a unique kind of test of democratism.

[Kh. Sheyn] Our Association has already emphasized on more than one occasion that the "Russian Question" in Estonia must be decided by the Russians themselves. Today the Slavic cultural societies included in the Association represent only four or five percent of the Russian-speaking population. And this, on the one hand, affirms once again that the movement along the path of creating national-cultural autonomy has still just barely begun, and, on the other hand, it attests to the very great heterogeneity of the Russian community. Its members are less integrated than others in the socio-cultural sphere. This is also

affected by the circumstance that the proportion of the intelligentsia in the Russian-speaking community is lower than it is in the others. Of course, we try to take all these factors into account. But one thing is indisputable for us: the fundamental guarantee of the free development of all the nationality groups in Estonia consists of recognizing the guarantees of the free development of the Estonian nation. I understand that people could grasp at my words and return the discussion again to the priority of the indigenous nation. But the reality of the situation is such that only with the firm confidence of the Estonian people in independence do we see the possibility for other nationality groups to develop. If we want to live better in the future, we must do everything to remove excessive politicization from our life. And, above all, this must be done in the sphere of culture and education. That is why we place particular hopes on the Slavic national-cultural societies, and we are hoping for the tolerance of the Russian community. We are not abandoning any kinds of discussions on the problems of national-cultural autonomy. We are now an absolutely independent organization. We are prepared to hold conversations with the Intermovement, the strike committees, or any other movements. But only on the following condition: if the discussion is calm and devoted to problems of cultural autonomy. We attempted to conduct a dialogue with the OSTK [expansion unknown], but we were unsuccessful. There were too many mutual suspicions and an inability to approach problems. But this is not a tragedy. Our lack of experience in holding such meetings most likely had an effect as well. We are firmly convinced of the following: mutual understanding has not been excluded; sooner or later everything must arrive at a norm. And the sooner the better.

[V. Akimov] Taking the Association's youth and its inexperience in conducting election campaigns into consideration, you will probably be seeking some kinds of possible alliances with other political forces. Whose support will you strive to gain, and whom will you yourselves support?

[Kh. Sheyn] Of all the movements existing in the republic today, we are closest to the People's Front. We grew out of the People's Front, and we have no programmatic differences with it regarding the nationality question. Furthermore, five representatives of the national-cultural societies are members of the People's Front Plenipotentiary Council.

Problems of Internal Soviet Armenian Diaspora Outlined

90US0184A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
12 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by S. Vardanyan and G. Rubinyan: "Who, If Not We?.."]

[Text] How many of us have given sufficient, serious thought to the perennial question: What is a nation? And what is the birthright of a nation—the works of art, architecture, or other material and non-material values; and perhaps yet even Man himself—the designer and

creator, capable of breathing life into stone, or into a word? What profit is there in conjecturing at this time, when not one—but millions of our fellow-countrymen have been swept around the world by the winds of fate, and find themselves excluded from the invigorating, interlocking chain which nurtures the nation's roots; and that means, they have been lost to the nation as its birthright. The foreign-language surnames of our fellow-countrymen, who have lost their language, culture and traditions—is that not the most bitter proof of that terrible penalty called "assimilation," which is already overtaking us, setting us on the edge of a precipice, into which we lack the strength to look...

It is first of all a question of the so-called internal Diaspora—Armenians who dwell on the territory of the Soviet Union. Strictly speaking, we have only just sounded the alarm concerning the fate of nearly two million of our fellow-countrymen—and to a not inconsiderable degree this was brought about by the upsurge of social-national self-awareness in the republic itself, on the crest of the events surrounding Nagornyy Karabakh. But having lived for many long years with such a condescending and disdainful attitude toward "our's" and in general to everything "our's," it is characteristic, and not only in questions of the nationalities policy, that these attitudes led to a truly tragic situation, when we simply "forgot" about the leaders, and at times had already given up the struggle "for survival" of the Armenian colonies within the country. Ties and contacts were maintained exclusively with the Diaspora abroad—moreover, and very significantly, at the state level: thus, at one time a Committee for Cultural Contacts with Armenians Abroad was established for this very purpose. And although pessimists predict the inevitable assimilation of the Armenians who by the will of fate find themselves in a foreign country, the thread of their ties with the Motherland are not only not being severed—on the contrary, they are beginning to grow stronger against the background of relaxation of international tensions, and the greater degree of freedom in them. And, moreover, the diaspora abroad has escaped the fate of the Soviet Armenians, who like other Soviet "National Minorities," experienced the bitter trials of all the excesses of Stalin's nationalities policy, which was constructed on the idea of super-centralism, with all the consequences that ensued. Thanks to which, no doubt, they have also managed to retain the genetic coding in a number of generations for the instinct of national self-preservation, expressed in the quite stable and well-organized systems of education, culture and other spheres.

And after all, the Armenians did not appear overnight on the territories which are now part of the USSR. The Armenian colony in Georgia, for example, has an almost 2,000-year history; the Armenian settlements in the Crimea and the Ukraine have been there for a thousand years; and in Moldavia and the North Caucasus, for many centuries. The picture of the contemporary distribution of Armenians in the Soviet Union looks much

more cloudy—to this day, no more-or-less serious or detailed research has been conducted on this question. There were, of course, certain scholars who have also dealt with this topic, but in the given instance it is a question of extensive and full-bodied research.

In addition to all of this, the migration of the populace from Armenia is not a thing of the past, but continues to this day—which has introduced significant changes to the map of Armenian settlement on the territory of the USSR. The mass deportation of Armenians in the 1930's and in 1949 played its role as well. To this day the precise number of Armenians deported is unknown, but the reduction in the populace of the republic in 1950 in comparison with 1949 was 67,600; if one takes into consideration natural and mechanical increases one can estimate that in 1949 alone, about 100,000 Armenians were uprooted. No less a depressing situation came to pass then as well in other regions of the country where our fellow-countrymen dwelt. Deported in 1944 and 1949 from the Crimea, and partially from Georgia and the North Caucasus, they added to the number of Armenians in Siberia and Central Asia.

The migration process—true, this time voluntarily—continued in the so-called years of stagnation as well. In the years 1970-1984 alone, 4,491 citizens of Armenia moved to Kazakhstan; 3,962 to Uzbekistan; 1,950 to Turkmenia; 747 to Tajikistan; and 502 to Kirghizia (!!!) During those same years about 103,000 people moved from Armenia to the RSFSR (of which about 19,000 moved to Krasnodar Kray, and 6,636 moved to Rostov Oblast); moving to the Ukraine were 22,793; to Georgia, 20,246 (of which, 2,159 went to Abkhazia, and 604 to Adzharia); to Moldavia, 1,449; to Belorussia, 691; to Latvia, 992; to Estonia, 763; and to Lithuania, 573. The statistics are so stunning that they can in no way be written off to chance. But neither is commentary necessary—the motives for such mass resettlements in search of "a better life" are completely clear, and represent quite vividly the degree to which society is troubled.

Nevertheless, there is no paradox in the fact that, having increased in numbers over the years, the internal Diaspora has gradually ceased to live a full-bodied national life. For example—whereas, in Central Asia at the dawn of Soviet rule (1918) there were 80,000 Armenians living in the cities of Tashkent, Ashkhabad, Samarkand, Chardzhou, Fergana, Andizhan and other cities; fifteen Armenian schools were opened, as well as four kindergartens, nine libraries, and 16 reading rooms; and workers' houses with their amateur and theatrical groups; textbooks were compiled and published, and various newspapers were opened—today there are no Armenian schools there, nor any Armenian newspapers.

The situation is complicated as well in Krasnodar Kray, where Armenians came to live several centuries ago. In the 1920's there were 140 Armenian schools in the region. Krasnodar hosted an Armenian State Theater a National University, and the Armenian Department of Proletarian Writers; newspapers, magazines and books

were published in Armenian, and there were Armenian-language radio programs. Few people know that an Armenian national region was once situated between Maykop and Tuapse, from 1925-1953. It included 68 Armenian villages and farmsteads (with Shaumyan as the center), and had its own newspaper, radio broadcasts and schools. Today out of 140 Armenian schools in Krasnodar Kray there are now only three remaining. And these comprise the total number of Armenian schools on the territory of the RSFSR (of course we are talking about permanently-functioning schools, and not about those which were opened by the Armenian children evacuated from the disaster zone).

Alas, this situation was a direct result of the years of Stalin's authoritarian rule, and subsequently his successors as well: Collectivization with its multitude of victims; mass repressions; the struggle with nationalism and cosmopolitanism... Which of the nations of the USSR has not experienced the enormous losses dealt by the banal policy with respect to the national regions, built on a single model and image, and has not felt the echo of those tragedies? Is it necessary to say how worthless and at times harmful were the stereotyped slogans and exclamations, declared for decades, about friendship and the triumph of internationalism, about the development and blending of nations. How many scholars in their time built their dissertations on the fact that, in time, all languages would blend into one! The apogee of magniloquence in nationalities policy was the myth of the formation of a single nation—a Soviet nation... It is not for nothing that recently everyone has been speaking with great alarm about the loss of national traditions and national thinking in Armenia itself: Could the internal Diaspora live by different laws? Of course, there were attempts to protect one's own person there too, one's unique culture and traditions; but they were all smashed by the persecution, cloaked with the bugbear of accusations of nationalism. Those who could find the strength to do so, resisted: they wrote complaints, and they went around to the authorities. But as a rule, their efforts did not bring results, although there were rare exceptions. Thus, for example, for many years the inhabitants of the Armenian village of Moldovka in Adlerskiy Rayon of Krasnodar Kray had sent envoys to the USSR Supreme Soviet, petitioning, begging, and demanding that an Armenian school be opened in their village. Here is an excerpt from a letter they sent to Leonid Brezhnev in 1969: "We have appealed to you in three letters, and have sent four telegrams, but were not favored with a reply. Apparently our letters and telegrams are not reaching you. If we do not receive a reply this time, we will be forced to try for a personal audience with you. We are asking permission to open an Armenian school. But the local authorities are subjecting us to fines in the amount of 20-30 rubles simply because we want our children to be able to read their native language. We are being threatened with arrest and prison..."

Their struggle was crowned with success. A school was opened in Moldovka that very year. But five years later,

on the eve of a new academic year, the school was torn down on instructions of the local authorities, and the textbooks sent from Armenia as a gift were burned. Today School No 66 in Moldovka is again operating, but the situation is very difficult, because of the threat of closure which hangs over them. True, this time for an altogether different reason—now it is the Armenian parents themselves who do not want to send their children to be trained in a national school, and each class amounts to only 8 or 9 children in all. What of it? The logic of the phenomena is inexorable: the instinct of national self-preservation which prevailed for decades has been rooted out; replacing it is another kind of self-preservation, in the direct, vital meaning of the word.

It is time to understand at last that the Diaspora, both the external and internal kind, is a single concept; and this is also the Armenian nation. And that means that it has the total right to be included in the existing system, in the sphere of the state in the republics, and it has the right to state protection, to live its common life as a nation. Who, if not we, should be extending the hand of assistance to our brothers and sisters, who have been uprooted from their native land? Who, if not we, should be concerned for their fate?

Remember them—our Georganized countrymen, the old and new Armenians of the Ukraine and Crimea; the Georgians of Dagestan, Northern Osetia, Checheno-Ingushetia and Stavropol... Remember the Krasnodar Armenians, the overwhelming majority of whom are Amshenites, but there are among them also exiles from Vano, Sasun, Yerzik and Mush; and not so long ago, people from Akhalkalaki settled here too. Remember those living in Armavir, in Adygeyskiy Autonomous Okrug, Stavropol Oblast; and the Cherkessy Armenians (Cherkesosgay), who have long since forgotten their native language. Remember the Armenians from the villages of Sultan Nukhi and Mirzabeklu of Kutkashenskiy Rayon of the Azerbaijan SSR, who have become Turkic-speakers but have kept their faith and national self-awareness.

Remember the long-forgotten fate of the Armenians living on the left bank of the Kura in the outlying villages around Mt. Nukha, who were forced to adopt the Muslim faith... According to eye-witness historians, in 1751 after a bloody battle here, from 14,000 to 15,480 families were forced to renounce their Christian faith, and at the beginning of the present century, the total number of Armenians who adopted the Muslim faith had reached approximately 100,000. And nevertheless even they for a long time preserved their Armenian placenames, their memory of national perceptions and traditions, and certain families preserved Armenian script, and to this day on the outskirts of these village one can see khachkary, gravestones, with Armenian inscriptions and the ruins of churches and cathedrals. For whom are we waiting? Who will take up the study of the past, and the present internal Diaspora, and when? Who will systematically organize the available data on the

history and geography of their settlements on the territories of the USSR. Who will study their present, and when?

Today. Right now; for tomorrow it will be too late. We must give thought to establishing a state institutions capable of coordinating all the work on the internal Diaspora. This could be a specially-organized Committee, which includes a scientific-research center with the appropriate subdivisions, which possesses broad authority. Under the aegis of the Committee it would be possible to establish branches—representatives in other republics in the country; associations of fellow countrymen, defending and representing the interests, needs and concerns of our fellow countrymen. It could even take upon itself the preparation and publication of reference works, containing precise information on the resettlement of Armenians on the territory of the USSR, data on the most varied aspects—cultural economic and so on—in the life of the internal Diaspora. Through its efforts intellectual life would experience a rebirth in places where Armenians have settled densely—publishing newspapers, and books by Armenian authors; organizing theatrical tours and concerts; reanimation of theaters, libraries and so on—inviting, of course, the participation of the widest variety of republic organizations. Incidentally, the idea of establishing such a coordinating center is not a new one—at time such a committee did exist, being the connecting link between the republic and the Diaspora, both the external and the internal. Then it was known as the Committee for Assistance to Armenia (Its first chairman was O. Tumanyan), and it displayed an enormous amount of selfless devotion in its activity, right up to that fateful year, 1937. Perhaps, today this noble cause could be taken up again?

No doubt there is no need to explain how important this is at the present time, when under the influence of the process of perestroika, national life has begun to revive in Armenian colonies, and societies have begun to appear, although yet small in number; and when Armenian classes and Sunday schools have opened. A noticeable trend has appeared for repatriation of Armenians from other regions of the country as well. Remember how helpless we felt when faced with the enormous influx of refugees who came pouring in from Azerbaijan? Now is the time to take up this question without delay, creating a clear-cut structure for receiving and quartering repatriates similar to and on the basis of the committee which is functioning even now, which was organized in the post-war years to help settle repatriates from abroad, the influx of whom, incidentally, declined radically in subsequent years. Moreover, even in the 1920's, there was a similar subunit at the Armenian People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs—the Evacuation Department (later on, the Department of Resettlement), which was employed at resettlement of the refugees who returned to the Motherland after sovietization, which helped them both morally and materially in those years of hunger. Later on, it is true, its activity began to take on a strange form: In 1923 the department appealed to the RSFSR People's Land Commissar, with a proposition to settle

Armenian refugees in the North Caucasus; and in 1924 imposed a general ban on Armenians returning to the Motherland, "without the knowledge and permission of the Soviet People's Commissar and the People's Land Commissar..." And that was at a time when the population of Armenia had only in 1940 reached the level of 1918 in terms of numbers...

We shall not repeat the mistakes of the past. Let us become, at long last, perspicacious: after all, history, no matter how harshly, returns on its circle and tolerates no mistakes. Whatever the organization was named, it was called upon to take up the affairs of the internal Diaspora (including its repatriates); no matter what system and structure it assumes, it must be set up very quickly—this is a matter of paramount necessity and significance, even against the background of the difficulties the republic is now experiencing. But you see, the weight of the burden is not beyond our strength when we bear it together, and not separately...

Thus far, although the question of the need for strengthening ties with the internal Diaspora has been proclaimed from the highest rostrums in the republic, the situation has not changed significantly. The question on Armenian schools is of special concern, for they are in tragic condition: Everyone knows that assimilation, as such, begins with the loss of one's native language; the rest—is just a matter of time. Among the reasons for the situation which has come to pass are such, as the shortage of teacher cadres. In fact, after the closing of the Rostov Armenian Pedagogical School at the beginning of the war, the number of young specialists for the schools of the RSFSR declined significantly. A way out was seen in non-competitive acceptance of secondary school graduates—representatives of the internal Diaspora—for pedagogical specialities in the VUZ's of the Armenia; but this was found to be ineffective, since vacancies were very few, and few were able to pass the entrance examinations. One would think that the Ministry of Public Education would take under its control all questions connected with developing the system of Armenian schools and classes, and would organize a steady supply of textbooks and methodological literature for them. And in the matter of training teacher cadres, opening a special pedagogical school for representatives of the internal Diaspora could play a large role: gifted young men and women from the entire Union could be trained there.

In a word, there is a good deal to think about. The problem of the internal Diaspora is so painful and of such long duration, that it cannot be solved in a single hour, much less with the help of prescriptions given in a single article. However, one thing is clear: we have no right to delay further.

Armenian Bishop in Moscow on NKAO, Other Political Issues

90US0184B Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
24 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with Bishop Tiran by M. Vartanyan: "Contemporaries Without Fear and Reproach"; in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpts] "We believe it is our duty to be not just close to, but together with the Armenian public at large, and experience their needs and problems;" thus did Bishop Tiran begin his conversation with our special correspondent. Bishop Tiran is head of the Novo-Nakhichevan Russian Armenian Diocese, the representative of the Armenian Church in Moscow, and senior priest of the Moscow Armenian community (In secular life, he is Kazaros Aykazovich Kyuregyan).

[Correspondent] Tiran Srpazan, from all appearances you have been living and working in the capital for some time. What has changed over the years?

[Bishop Tiran] I have been in Moscow for 15 years already. During that time, of course, a great deal has changed. For example, in recent years many young people are coming to church. This makes me happy, not only, and not even so much because the church is gaining new parishioners. But it seems to me that the main thing is that, this is a symptom: the people have grown weary of faithlessness, of moral unscrupulousness, and the lack of a spiritual outlook. In church they find high moral principles, which answer the very highest humanistic ideals of justice and mercy. A thirst for such ideals is, of course, very good and is an important feature of our times. No, do not consider this propaganda for the church and its postulates. It is a question of universal human needs—to which the people and the government, politicians and philosophers, have at last given serious thought—which are not subject to their convictions...

[Correspondent] Tell us something, if you please, about yourself.

[Bishop Tiran] I was born on Cyprus, in Nicosia, in an Armenian family. In 1962 (You will remember, there was such a "summons" in the time of Khrushchev) I moved to Armenia, along with my family. In 1964 I entered the Ecclesiastical Academy of Saint Echmiadzin, and graduated in 1970.

[Correspondent] How do you, in principle, relate to politics? Do you believe the church should remain aloof from politics?

[Bishop Tiran] From politics, perhaps; but not from life. The Armenian Church—as it has evolved—has never stood aloof from on-going events.

[Correspondent] And you yourself? How do you feel about the political storms of recent years and months?

[Bishop Tiran] I have always taken part in meetings of the Moscow Armenian community, and continue to do so. I have often spoken from the rostrum, honestly stating my own position. In addition, I am a member of the consultative committee of the Conference of European Churches—this general-European organ examines not only strictly ecclesiastical questions, but also historical and political ones: for example, the extremely critical problems of disarmament and international relations...

[Correspondent] How did the Church manifest itself in the days following the earthquake of 7 December 1988?

[Bishop Tiran] People began to gather here, at the church, as early as the morning of 8 December. And on the 9th, and the 10th and 11th (If you recall, that was Saturday and Sunday), extremely energetic activity commenced, to render assistance to the victims. In a short time a significant sum of money was collected—about 150,000 rubles. We sent it to the hospitals and resort hotels to which they had evacuated women, children and the injured from the disaster regions. We sent the 120,000 rubles which we had in the Church account at that time, to Echmiadzin. We actively cooperated with separate organizations, such as "SOS-Armenia" in France and Switzerland. We received an entire plane-load of material aid and several vehicles besides from these countries: clothing, and other necessities. They were distributed among the victims who were in the hospitals, and also to Polyana, the CPSU Central Committee hotel, which is in a picturesque corner of Moscow. Immediately after the earthquake this hotel received over a thousand people from the disaster area. What do I remember most of all from those tragic and troubled days? The very first lot of goods, shipped in almost immediately after the official report of the earthquake—was from the American Embassy...

In a word, during the four most difficult months after the tragedy, the Moscow Armenian Church was one of the centers for rendering and distributing aid to the people and to the disaster regions. Even today we maintain close contact with Echmiadzin on all questions which concern rebuilding the destroyed cities and villages, and on help to the suffering people.

[Correspondent] What is your personal position on the problems of Nagornyy Karabakh?

[Bishop Tiran] I believe the Armenian people made one mistake in this movement: they took the possibilities of glasnost and perestroika too literally and too close to their hearts. And well, as to the essence of the problem—here, in my opinion, everything is obvious: the well-known decision of 1921—this was a tragic mistake of the past, and it must be corrected. I am convinced, moreover, that if in early 1988 the mass information media had not characterized the popular movement in Artsakh and in Armenia as "extremist," if the leaders of the party and the state had immediately delved into the essence of the problem; and if, after the appropriate governmental decree the 400 million allocated for the socio-economic needs of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] had been used directly as intended—then events would not have developed as they did. And if this problem is not solved right away—Karabakh will suffer the fate of Nakhichevan, and this time—under the "umbrella" of perestroika; that is, in a few years when the Armenians, after pressure from all sides, become a minority there—then they will remember to hold a referendum. In short, I strongly condemn dragging out the political decision on the fate of Artsakh.

[Correspondent] Let us return to the moral position of modern youth. You were saying, that young people are showing greater interest in the church than before...

[Bishop Tiran] The reason for this turn-about, in my view, is not only moral, but historical as well. Today we are all going through difficult times, and the young people come to the church with their troubles. That is the way it has always been, that is the way things have come to pass historically. The Armenian Church, unlike other faiths and religious trends, has always been with the people: both in hard times and in happy days.

[Correspondent] Please, if you can, something on the order of a brief sermon: In your view, what spiritual qualities should a young person of today cultivate in himself?

[Bishop Tiran] Every person—is an integral spiritual universe. Therefore to give universal advice is complicated, and false: it does not apply to everyone. Every one takes his own path. But the most important qualities—industriousness and love for man—are always important; one can not get along without them. And the Church has always preached this high moral foundation—regardless of the epoch and the government, it has cultivated the best attributes. Therefore, I am certain that the Church cannot hinder a young person in life. At the same time I absolutely do not believe that all young people who come to church must be true believers—but both for themselves, and for the times in which they live, it is very important that they believe in the good principles which are preserved within the walls of the church. In a word, both governments and nations and the Church badly need contemporaries without fear and reproach—and not only nostalgic memories of them, preserved from the days of knighthood.

[Correspondent] What, in your view, is the greatest defect of a "godless" society?

[Bishop Tiran] It consists of the fact that this society is cut off from spiritual literature, and is morally illiterate. Its members did not grasp the spiritual norms of the human community while they were children—consequently, quite often they simply do not know how to conduct themselves in life. In my opinion the problems of adolescents are associated mainly with this; although in Armenia, by virtue of the spirituality preserved within family upbringing, these problems are manifested much less obviously than, for example, in the USA or in Russia.

[Correspondent] What, in your view, are the basic legal guarantees that society should give to modern man?

[Bishop Tiran] The principal guarantee is this: a democratic Constitution, which ensures that all laws concerning the rights of man in society are carried out. That is, in my view, the formula for a law-governed state. Thus, Gorbachev is absolutely right in advancing the thesis of a law-governed state; but, unfortunately, we do

not yet have a new Constitution which completely reflects the interests of the individual.

[Correspondent] And what is your attitude toward the idea of a politically-independent Armenia?

[Bishop Tiran] Armenia has been a part of Russia since 1828, including Nakhichevan and Karabakh, which were always and ever considered Armenian regions, and the indigenous population of these regions was not persecuted because of national origin at that time.

I am convinced that we must always be allied with Russia, regardless of concrete political tendencies. But that does not, of course, indicate that we must now tolerate encroachment on our rights on the part of the state.

[Correspondent] And what are the principal obligations of an individual to society, and to the state?

[Bishop Tiran] Democracy—is not anarchy. Society must demand of a person that he live in accordance with its laws and not set himself apart from them or abuse them.

[Correspondent] Secular historical science is today keen on taking up studies, complete with facts and biographies, which eliminate the blank spaces in the history of our country. Are there also such blank spots in the life of the Armenian Church?

[Bishop Tiran] Is it not so, that official historical scholarship has given a one-sided account of many events pertaining to the period of 1918-1920—including the life of the Armenian Church?

Or the 1930's, a bitter memory for the entire nation. From 1932 through 1938 Khoren Muradbekyan was Catholicos of Armenia. In 1938 he unexpectedly and suddenly died. The official version (which they reported to us at the ecclesiastical academy as well) was: Catholicos Khoren died from a heart attack. That is what the official sources say to this day. However, there is irrefutable evidence of the fact that he died a violent death, for he did not wish to submit himself on all questions to the will of the Leader of all Times and Nations.

I am in principle interested in the "blank spots" not only in church history, but secular as well, which have not yet become available to glasnost. For example, there is great interest in the history of the Armenian people's struggle for liberty at the end of the 19th and the early 20th centuries—many facts here are also misinterpreted. Or—already in the post-October period—the fact of the vicious murder of the Tsar's family, including the small children...

And yet another moment in the history of the post-October period: As we recall, prior to that time Russia and Turkey had always been enemies. And suddenly, an abrupt thaw in relations. Moreover, the young Soviet state, which was suffering from domestic material and financial problems, suddenly offers significant funds, in

order that the Turks smash the Greeks in Izmir. Greeks, who had given so much to Russian culture and faith!

We remember the kind of "gratitude" this policy wrought in the years of the Great Patriotic War, when the Turkish army was standing right along the Soviet border awaiting the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad, ready to invade the territory of the USSR, or more precisely, the territory of Soviet Armenia. It is difficult to fathom what might have happened to the Armenian people at that time if the Soviet Army had not won the victory at Stalingrad.

And how many victims, in the name of democracy and glasnost, were there in subsequent historical periods? According to certain data, their numbers were no less than the number of victims of the Civil War.

[Correspondent] Which of the political figures of the past do you remember with respect?

[Bishop Tiran] I remember Kosygin. Looking at his actions from afar, I often noted the soundness and the wisdom of the steps he undertook (Although acting soundly and wisely in the years in which he occupied high positions was, you would agree, not easy). I once managed to meet with him personally (More accurately, not once but over the course of a rather long period of time). I had the honor to escort Catholicos Vazgen-I during his vacation at Krasnye Kamnya—the government sanatorium. At that very same time Kosygin was also vacationing there. And as much as this person had always occupied high places in his work (A relatively high altitude, I repeat—to the extent of the existing possibilities)—how simple he was in real life. He was pleasant and kindly in conversation, and took a dim view of the prefix "spets-" [special] which was in force in that institution also, and always took his meals in the common dining room. And I recall how during that same summer someone from the Ministry had come!.. "Monarch's" habits without number: he exchanged greetings with no one, nor did his wife, and dined—only in his room.

In a word, then too, in conversation, Kosygin always left the very best impression.

[Correspondent] And Khrushchev?

[Bishop Tiran] His biography is yet another confirmation of the fact that a nation should elect a highly-cultured leader. The moreso, since history has demonstrated more than once how great is the role of the General Secretary in our country. Yes, he can and should have his own principles, interests and passions; but he should act in accordance with the Constitution in any event. But when voluntarism rules... Just take Khrushchev's unconstitutional position with respect to the believers: He went and closed nearly every church in the country...

[Correspondent] A question having the most direct relationship with church literature; although today there is

lively interest from both believers and non-believers. Somewhere in the first decades of the new century, we were firmly "promised", on the basis of ecclesiastical sources, the end of the world...

[Bishop Tiran] There are no such indications in Armenian sources. There is indication of the fact that the Second Coming of Christ will occur, but the time is not definitively stated. It is only said that God the Father alone knows the time...

[Correspondent] Is it another matter, that the portents of the "end of the world" should more likely be sought in secular life, than in ecclesiastical literature?

[Bishop Tiran] Exactly so. With our present-day level of military technology and the amount of nuclear weapons that have piled up on the Earth; with confrontation with these weapons unheard of for millennia—I believe that a nuclear catastrophe to one degree or another, is practically inevitable.

[Correspondent] Is that your personal opinion?

[Bishop Tiran] That is my personal opinion. Although, it goes without saying, that I would not want that to happen. But, until all nuclear warheads on the Earth are eliminated—my hopes are not very high. You see, until now for all practical purposes only obsolete nuclear weapons have been destroyed, while in parallel new research is going on and new rockets are being built. In the final analysis, technology could one day make a mistake! Thus, I would like to wish from my heart that Gorbachev's proposals on nuclear disarmament would quickly be put into effect.

But, as far as a specific time is concerned, information accurate to the year on the end of the world is—I believe, later additions made by ministers, done for the purpose of forcing people to think more about morality, and to put a halt to depravity and other negative phenomena in our life.

Pan-National Armenian Movement Representative Views Blockade Issues

Azerbaijani People's Front Position

90US0201A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
10 Oct 89 p 4

[Unsigned article: "Blockade"]

[Text] This was the title of an article published in the newspaper *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI* on 1 October this year. It was about the raging conflict between Armenia and the neighboring Azerbaijan republic, a conflict which has today taken the form of a blockade.

The material also told about how the blockade reflects on the life of the republic and its population.

Yes, the transport system is laid out in such a way that the majority of the cargo (up to 85 percent) reaches

Armenia by roads which pass through the territory of Azerbaijan. And when the transport workers of that republic closed off the roads and railroads, Armenia was left practically cut off from the country. This act has been called a strike, although for some reason the embargo extends only to freight for their neighbors, while the rest of the transport jobs are carried out as usual—the article says. The basic demand is to preserve the status quo in Nagorny Karabakh, force the Armenian population of the oblast to give up their demands to secede from the Azerbaijan SSR, and force Armenia to stop supporting the inhabitants of the NKAO.

Meanwhile, the situation in Armenia is becoming more and more exacerbated. The Zvartnots Airport is working under tense conditions. Airplane fuel has to be brought into Yerevan by air, the republic does not have enough medicine, newsprint, gasoline—even for emergency vehicles, or food. Armenia's economy is suffering vast losses, and there is no one to bring suit against: the republics in our state are not legal entities.

If nothing changes, Armenia's industry will be paralyzed in the near future.

The border oblasts are uneasy. The village of Yeraskh lies on the border between Armenia's Araratskiy Rayon and Nakhichevan ASSR, which is part of Azerbaijan. The road is closed. Representatives of the Azerbaijan People's Front (APF) search even army vehicles.

There is a memorandum signed by members of the primary APF organization at the Baku airport and addressed to the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation and to republic organizations of Armenia. It states that beginning on 25 September flights on the Baku-Yerevan route are to cease. The blockade is extended to the air, too?

As before, Nagorny Karabakh is in a grave situation.

At the session of the republic Supreme Soviet, much was said about the immorality of the blockade organizers, who have placed in a grave situation the people who survived the earthquake, losing friends and relatives, shedding blood.

"The blockade, unquestionably, is an impermissible means of exerting political pressure"—this was the conclusion drawn by the author of the article. Without mentioning the fact that it should be removed. But as long as the question remains unresolved (and in order to resolve it as quickly as possible)—"we need the truth about the events in the Transcaucasus. Hushing up the events around Nagorny Karabakh and the informational blockade in spring of last year only exacerbated the situation. The outrages in Sumgait, which were not discussed out loud, led to fresh victims, outbreaks, and monstrous cruelty, and not only in Azerbaijan. There were the tragedies of Fergana, Novyy Uzen...."

This, in brief, was the content of the article.

On the same page of the newspaper there was an interview of L. Yunusova, member of the board of the Azerbaijan People's Front, by correspondent "M.N."

We present it for your attention.

On the other side of the barrier

"It's Not a Blockade,"

in the opinion of Leyla Yunusova, member of the board of the Azerbaijan People's Front (APF), who answered the questions of correspondent "M. N."

[M.N.] The extraordinary session of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet has just ended. Would you call its decisions progressive in today's complex situation?

[Yunusova] From our point of view, yes. The republic Supreme Soviet decided to abolish the Committee for Special Administration of the NKAO, thus fulfilling one of the main demands of the People's Front. And attempts to sidetrack the session away from the vitally important problems did not succeed. There was a moment when Azerbaijan CP Central Committee First Secretary Vezirov ordered the procurator to arrest APF board members who were present in the hall. All of the enterprises where people saw the direct broadcast immediately went on strike. And the session was forced to fulfill yet another of our demands: to publish the draft law on sovereignty for universal public discussion. On 23 September this law was passed. Now decisions of the USSR government will be in force in the territory of Azerbaijan only after ratification by the republic Supreme Soviet.

[M.N.] How will the new laws of Azerbaijan affect the inhabitants of Nagorny Karabakh?

[Yunusova] Anyone that doesn't like these laws can go to Armenia. We will resettle our homeless refugees in their place.

[M.N.] Did the session discuss the question of the blockade of Armenia?

[Yunusova] The decision about the railroad workers' strike was made by the People's Front, not the Supreme Soviet. Our conditions for ending the strike remain in force—first of all Armenia must renounce its territorial pretensions in Nagorny Karabakh. I think that this cannot be called a blockade at all. We have simply ceased to provide Armenia with that which we previously provided them free of charge—our oil and our produce...

"M.N.," 1 October of this year

As the Armenian SSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply has reported, out of the 100,000 tons of freight which Armenia received daily by railroad from Azerbaijan (before the blockade), only 3-4 percent of the goods are of Azerbaijan manufacture.

Armenian Refutes Azerbaijani Claims

90US0201B Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
10 Oct 89 p 4

[Interview with Ambartsum Galstyan, senior scientific associate of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History, member of the Armenian Karabakh Movement Committee, by *KOMMUNIST* correspondent T. Akopyan: "There Should Be No Illusions"]

[Text] APF board member Yunusova expressed the point of view of the Azerbaijan People's Front on the blockade. Proceeding from a celebrated "parity," the editors of *KOMMUNIST* asked a representative of the Pan-National Armenian Movement (PNAM) to comment on this statement.

The questions of our correspondent T. AKOPYAN are answered by a member of the Armenian Karabakh Movement Committee, Ambartsum GALSTYAN, who is a senior scientific associate of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History.

[Correspondent] The session of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, as mentioned by L. Yunusova, enacted the "Law on the Sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR," which, judging it by its basic positions, is difficult to fault for deviation from democratic norms....

[Galstyan] Indeed, this document was adopted, as it says, based on "the inalienable right of every people to a free, independent determination of their own fate." It is also difficult to argue with the proposition that "only a free and equal union of Soviet nationalities within the framework of a socialist federation guarantees their all-round development."

But, judging it by its actual effects, the right to "all-round development" in the territory of a neighboring republic is secured only to Azerbaijanis. And what is the use of declarations about the "inalienable right of every people," when they are trampling on the will of the Armenian people of the NKAO to true self-determination? That means that these documents must be stamped "Not for Karabakh." That, at least, would be more honest.

In our highest instances [instantsiya] they never tire of repeating: "We must proceed on the basis of higher state interests." But these "higher interests" have been used to justify illegal acts. Proceeding from these "interests," Karabakh was snatched away from Armenia by decision of the Caucasian Bureau. Under this interpretation of state interests, they are directly opposed to the interests of the people, of the individual. And if we strive to be a law-governed state, then we must place the rights of the individual, the rights of the people, above state interests, and higher state interests must take shape only based on these rights. But for now the right of the inhabitants of Karabakh to self-determination is simply being ignored.

Incidentally, can the decision by the Caucasian Bureau on 5 July 1921 to turn over Nagorny Karabakh to

Azerbaijan be considered a lawful legal act, if the decision was made not by the country's higher legislative authority, but by a party organ, and a regional one at that?

[Correspondent] The situation today is such that demands for a just resolution of the "Karabakh question" are perceived by Azerbaijan as an attack on its sovereignty.

[Galstyan] Depending on how one interprets this sovereignty.

During the November rallies in Baku, portraits of the Sumgait killers were hung up, and people demanded that they be returned to Sumgait or Baku for their case to be heard, based on the sovereignty of the republic. It turns out that the massacre in Sumgait and the Armenian pogroms in Baku and Kirovabad are the sovereign right of the Azerbaijan people, and no one has the right to infringe on it.

There cannot be a "greater" and a "lesser" sovereignty, which varies for peoples of larger and smaller populations. Each people is free to decide their fate themselves. And the people of Karabakh have already made their choice.

[Correspondent] The Azerbaijan People's Front has more than once announced its devotion to the ideas of democratization, humanism, and perestroika. How do these declarations tie in with the blockade?

[Galstyan] An organization cannot be organized on democratic principles and call itself "people's" if it achieves political recognition by acts of open hostility, playing on the misfortune of another people.

The APF considers the term "blockade" unacceptable, and refers to what it has done as "an economic embargo." But the word "embargo" refers to the actions of a state which for political goals is refusing to sell its **own** products to another country. But the railroad is not the property of Azerbaijan, and the freight which is shipped on it, in the overwhelming majority, is going though the republic as transit goods.

At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, people's deputy M. Lauristin called the actions of our neighbors "an act of economic terrorism."

In recent days, following discussion of the situation in connection with the blockade at the session in Moscow, the APF has changed its tactics and now says that the people organized the blockade. But I am far from any notion of laying the responsibility for the blockade on the entire Azerbaijan people. For that shameful act, the leadership of Azerbaijan must bear political and legal responsibility.

The blockade has continued the series of actions which are aimed at preventing a just solution of the "Karabakh problem." Let us recall that with the specter of Sumgait ["sumgaitom"] they tried not only to scare us, but also to

divert our national energies. We tried to get the case of the Sumgait pogrom participants heard in the USSR Supreme Court, and to give "sumgait" a political evaluation (which just didn't happen). Then came "Zvartnots," and immediately there was a noisy campaign throughout the entire country: "Armenian extremists have cut the strategic artery of the country" (we did not hear any such assessments with regard to the instigators of the blockade). In September of last year—the events following the incident in Khodzhal. And again the Armenian people tried for an objective assessment of the anti-Armenian speeches and pogroms in Azerbaijan. Now this blockade....

One wonders, if Azerbaijan is convinced of its rights in the NKAO, of the justice and legality of its positions, why does it resort to illegal actions and try to draw us into them too?

Let me cite an excerpt from a report by a KAVKA-ZSKOYE SLOVO correspondent in Shusha which was published in this newspaper on 10 August 1918.

"...Vast Karabakh has for the length of an entire year been living literally without a kopeck; the citizens have long since turned to subsistence farming, teachers and officials, at fantastic cost to their lives, go long months receiving no salary, and the state mechanism of our land cannot function normally without these necessary workers."

As you see, both the Musavat and the Soviet leadership of Azerbaijan have always tried to resolve the "Karabakh question" by force, but despite this, the problem remains and will become more acute, if our neighbor republic does not seek a way out of the crisis which is more acceptable to norms of human coexistence.

At the 19th party conference, M.S. Gorbachev said, in connection with the difficult social-political situation in the country: "Whoever endures, is victorious." Indeed, we must endure, we must not fall into despair. We must have no illusions; we face a lengthy struggle for the rights, honor, and dignity of our people.

[Correspondent] Let us return to the interview with L. Yunusova, in which she says that any residents of the NKAO who don't like the new laws of Azerbaijan can move to Armenia.

[Galstyan] This declaration was made in too crude and offensive a manner for me to take it seriously. I will say merely that the Armenians in Karabakh are not "gastarbeiters" who kowtow to their master and then, when they are not wanted, may run along home. I don't want to go off into a historical excursus (a fair amount has already been said and written about this), but Armenians have been living since time immemorial in Karabakh, it is their birthland, their fatherland.

And they will continue to live there, regardless of whether L. Yunusova likes it or not.

The overwhelming majority of the people of the NKAO made their choice on 20 February 1988. You can oppress Karabakh, you can throw up a blockade and make assaults. But you can never go back to the 19th of February. Everyone who has been in the NKAO may be assured of that.

[Correspondent] And nevertheless, acknowledging our responsibility to the people, do we have the right to remain implacable opponents? The PNAM in Armenia and the APF in Azerbaijan have influence and authority with the people, and this means that by coming partway to meet one another, sitting down at the negotiating table, they could do their bit to normalize the situation between the two republics.

[Galstyan] Our movement is based on the indisputable fact that our peoples should live side by side in peace and harmony. And this means we must have contacts at all levels. If every meeting between representatives of the two republics could save just a single human life, could return peace to just one family, it would be immoral and inhuman to refuse such meetings.

Quite recently the role of moderators was undertaken by the People's Front of Leningrad, three of whose members were in Baku, Yerevan, and Stepanakert. On 18 September a meeting was called in Leningrad with representatives of the APF, the PNAM, and the Miatsum Society from Artsakh. But the APF broke off the meeting, on the grounds that the session of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet was taking place in Baku during those same days. Incidentally, our session was also taking place on the same days.

Later a meeting was held in Moscow, where I and Vazgen Manukyan, with the cooperation of an interregional group of USSR people's deputies, met with two members of the board of the APF. Academician V. Palm, co-chairman of the interregional group, also participated in the meeting. The atmosphere at the meeting, I make no secret of it, was fairly tense. As preliminary conditions for further negotiations we demanded the lifting of the blockade, ending the persecution of Armenians in Baku, and allowing them to leave Azerbaijan without hindrance, for which there are serious barriers (your newspaper has written about this).

The representatives of the APF answered that they condemned the Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan, but they were unable to stop the people, because the Azerbaijanis were outraged by the "annexation" of their territory (i.e., the NKAO). But they told us that they would take up these questions, if Armenia would stop interfering in the internal affairs of Azerbaijan. In short, they demanded that we not hinder them from "imposing order" in Artsakh.

For our part, we more than once declared that representatives of Azerbaijan and Artsakh should be sitting at the negotiating table, that we were not prepared to speak in the name of the NKAO. But the fate of our fellow countrymen could not help but disturb us.

And finally, we for some reason did not speak about the fact that the blockade is not only a problem between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a "conflict," as they attempt to present it in the Center. This is a problem of the Soviet federation, which, having taken Armenia into itself, took upon itself, among other things, the obligation to defend her from any aggression. If the federation will not deal with the situation, we ourselves must seek ways to normalize the situation.

Russians in Caucasus Reject Azerbaijani Appeals Against Armenians

90US0200A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
24 Oct 89 p 1

[Letter to *KOMMUNIST* signed by nine staff members of the Yerevan Garrison House of Officers: "Someone Else's Voice"]

[Text] In the newspaper *BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY* on 5 October we read two letters which were appeals to people's deputies from Baku residents of Russian nationality. Later we learned that such letters in the name of citizens of Russian nationality, with appeals to "rebuff the Armenian nationalists" who are encroaching on the territory of Azerbaijan, appear frequently in the pages of the Azerbaijan press. And we consider it our duty to respond to them.

All of us representatives of the Russian people who are living in Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot help but be alarmed by the relations between the two republics. And we, for our part, must do everything in our power to restore good, neighborly relations between them.

That is why the aggressive and provocative tone of these letters is perplexing. What is the good, for example, of announcing that the "contrived problem of Nagorny Karabakh" is one of the points of implementation of a program by the Armenian bourgeois party Dashnaksutyun to create the mythical "Greater Armenia"—an Armenia extending from Turkey to Voronezh Oblast, from the Caspian to the Black Sea. It hardly seems likely that you letter-writers thought up these fantastical suggestions by yourselves. Don't you really feel that your names are being used for unseemly purposes? Or do you seriously think that even the residents of Voronezh Oblast must now fear the "Armenian extremists"?

Living in Azerbaijan, of course, you must share with its people their concerns and worries. And so you cannot help but be concerned for the fate of the Azerbaijani refugees. But does compassion really have a nationalistic purpose? Perhaps you have forgotten the fate of tens of thousands of Armenians who have been banished from the cities and villages where they have lived for centuries!

At the beginning of the events in Karabakh, the Central press flashed the report that the 200,000-member Armenian population in Baku had come out with a statement in which they, like you, held the "Armenian extremists"

up to shame. Are there many Armenians left today in the international city of Baku: your neighbors, coworkers, comrades?

You raise your voices in defense of justice. And where were you during the slaughter in Sumgait, and the Armenian pogroms in your home city?

You write that the "Armenian nationalists" want to undermine the economy of Azerbaijan. You write this at the beginning of October, at the very height of the shameful blockade of Armenia on the part of the republic in which you live. At the bottom of the letter are the signatures of women: Margenkova, Bryzgalina, Grigoryeva, Neverova. Really, isn't it painful for women and mothers to realize that, because of the blockade, thousands of children in the disaster zone will not have a warm roof over their heads this winter?

We have intentionally not touched the question of Nagorny Karabakh. The people of Artsakh have made their choice, and it is not suitable for us to teach the residents of this area, who have been living on their land since time immemorial, how to conduct themselves.

And you shouldn't make excursions into history, the more so as it is very difficult for you to get at the truth through the debris of falsification and lies advanced by Azerbaijani scholars.

But perhaps it would be better for you to go to Artsakh and ask the Artsakhians why they don't want to live as part of Azerbaijan? Or look into the eyes of the grief-stricken parents of the three Russian soldiers who were burned alive in Kirovabad, or give an answer to the relatives of the investigators who were brutally murdered in Ardarm by the crazed Azerbaijan crowd. After all, they too wanted peace in this land.

No matter what corner of our immense country we live in, we will always remain Russians. And a Russian person has always been distinguished for compassion, and the ability to understand his neighbor and come to his aid. And it hardly behooves us to throw yet another stone onto the avalanche of interethnic strife, and in doing so to take the side of the "aggrieved party,"—which we doubt very, very much.

[signed] Z. Khodanovskaya, A. Koleno, G. Chertkova, Ye. Chekhovskaya, staff members of the Yerevan Garrison House of Officers (a total of nine signatures).

Armenpress Sees 'Pan-Turkism' in Azerbaijani People's Front Claims

90US0200B Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
17 Oct 89 p 3

[Armenpress report: "Tendencies and Policies"]

[Text] On 17 September of this year, the Abu Dhabi newspaper *AL-BAYAN* published an interview with one of the leaders of the Azerbaijan People's Front, a certain

I. Aliyev. Probably it would not be worth mentioning this primitive but essentially impudent interview, were it not for two facts.

What I. Aliyev talked about has become in Azerbaijan today the predominant tendency and political program.

Now and then we hear talk about the need to conduct policies "beyond political orientation," and about the fact that today "pan-Turkism" has ceased to be a political factor."

Here are several excerpts from that conversation:

[Question] Could you explain the purposes for which the Azerbaijan People's Front was created?

[Aliyev] We laid the groundwork for creating our organization back in 1985, and since that year we became a political organization in the literal sense of that word, we have been able to unite millions of Turkish-Azerbaijanis. And now we can express our hopes and aspirations publicly, out loud. We are striving once more to confirm our sovereignty and independence, and to proclaim the Turkish Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. This is the aspiration of eight million Azerbaijan Turks.

[Question] What kind of political and economic ideas does the Azerbaijan People's Front propound?

[Aliyev] The deductive model on which the Front's ideology is based is the means of development set forth by the late Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, whom we consider the spiritual father and commander of the Turkish nation. Ataturk was a contemporary of Lenin, and both of them changed the course of history. Our country has lived for 70 years by the principles set forth by Lenin. And this is the result. We have also followed the successes of Turkey, and have hesitated to choose the path which we should have been following.

From the point of view of methodology and planning, we have set ourselves three goals:

1. a return to our Turkish national character;
2. a return to our Moslem cultural values;
3. renewal.

Our blue-red-and-green national flag symbolizes these goals, and at its center there is also a crescent moon. The blue color symbolizes the Turkish identity, the green color—Islam, and the red—progress.

[Question] How are your relations with Turkey?

[Aliyev] Turkey is a window which looks out on the West, for all the Turkic peoples in Asia and the Caucasus regions. We welcome investment of capital in the region by Turkish industrialists, and also the development of economic collaboration. We are pinning our hopes on this economic collaboration. In any case, all this means mutual political rapprochement and the establishment of

friendly relations between the two sides. But our goal is to create a "Greater Turkey," or unite all Turks abroad under the aegis of Turkey.

[Question] What is your position with regard to the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh?

[Aliyev] This is an artificial problem fabricated by Armenian provocateurs who are being supported by influential and business circles, and the Kremlin is taking advantage of the situation in its own interests—in order to consolidate its authority by fomenting strife—that is, Moscow is carrying on a policy of "divide and conquer." Those who create these problems are pursuing the goal of diverting us from our true struggle. If the Center would leave us alone to go one on one with the Armenians, we could easily resolve this problem with them. After all, Armenia's target is not only Azerbaijan, but also Turkey.

The Armenians are presenting territorial demands which the press is thoroughly bringing to light. And the goal of the Armenians, naturally, is to create a "Greater Armenia." The Armenians have powerful pressure groups and machinations in the Soviet Union and the United States. In recent months they have acquired arms, and we know that the source of these arms is the Soviet Union, the Americans, and the French, but our young people will give them the appropriate response.

Jurist Denies Legality of Law on Azerbaijani Sovereignty

90US0231A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
31 Oct 89 p 4

[Interview with A.A. Sobchak by Armenpress special correspondents L. Azroyan and Dzh. Balagezyan: "Despite the Spirit and Letter of the Law"]

[Text] "The law on sovereignty that was adopted at the session of Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet completely contradicts the USSR Constitution and therefore must be repealed," states USSR Supreme Soviet member A.A. Sobchak, department head at the Law School of Leningrad State University.

Commenting on that law at the request of an Armenpress correspondent, he said, in particular:

"I must say that recently we have developed the practice of having the union republics change the constitutional legislation. If one proceeds from the norms in the Constitution that is in effect—however poor that Constitution may be—and if we want to live under conditions of a law-governed state, we must respect the Basic Law. I myself am the first adherent of changing that Constitution as quickly as possible, of repealing many of its principles. But while it is in effect, we must take it into consideration. But not too long ago certain union republics, particularly the Baltic republics and Moldavia, made a number of changes in their Constitutions that contradict the union Constitution.

"Those contradictions may indeed be objective and have been caused as a result of the fact that changes were not made in the USSR Constitution at the proper time. However, if one proceeds from the Constitution that is in effect, they cannot be recognized as being valid. Therefore the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet promptly and correctly reacted to the need to repeal these constitutional laws in the republics. We are now coming up against a new fact—the Law on Azerbaijani Sovereignty. I think that this law contradicts the USSR Constitution in a number of principles, and not only concerning questions involving the autonomous formations and boundaries, but also with regard to the question involving the establish of direct diplomatic relations. This law contains a number of other formulations of this kind that touch upon the mechanism for seceding from the USSR, which mechanism does not correspond to the country's Constitution.

"Then there arises the question: how should the union government act? The union agencies must carry out an identical policy with respect to everyone. Prior to the change in the USSR Constitution, such laws do not have any legal force, because the principle that is in effect is: if the republic laws do not correspond to the union law, the union law has legal force. It is another matter that tomorrow we must pose the question of changing the union Constitution and the union legislation precisely from the point of view of guaranteeing the republics' right, say, to determine the processes for seceding from the country. But then it is absolutely mandatory to discuss the rights of the autonomous formations. So today in connection not only with NKAO [Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], but also with a number of autonomous formations in RSFSR and other republics, the question that is being raised concerning exactly what an autonomous republic is and the extent to which its rights are legally consolidated and defended within the confines of the republic. Because a more numerous nation that represents a union republic can suppress a less numerous nation that constitutes an autonomous formation.

"Therefore I feel that in the new Constitution we must define several things—the inviolability of the territory; the fact that it belongs, as national property, to every indigenous people that lives on that territory; and its right to determine whether it is to be part of a union republic, or to be a free union territory, or to be a union republic—-independent or autonomous. I feel that every people, irrespective of its size, must determine for itself the form of its state coexistence.

"But... the forms should not be chosen arbitrarily. It is necessary for the people to know: Do you want to be a union republic? Because that will require large expenditures to maintain the apparatus, and that apparatus must be paid by the republic itself, from its own budget. Consequently, it may be that, taking into consideration the small size of the national formation, say, for example, the NKAO or other formation, it is better to follow a different path—to become a union territory,

that is, an autonomous formation that is directly subordinate to the USSR. These federal territories exist in many countries. In the United States, for example, the federal District of Columbia, which is directly subordinate to the federal government."

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, how do you explain the fact that the union government has not yet given an evaluation of the law on sovereignty? Because slightly more than a month has passed since it was enacted by the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Sobchak] I cannot answer that question. I myself ask questions like that, but I do not receive any answers. However, I do know that at the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet this question is being studied and one must assume that recommendations will be worked out to repeal that law. I think that this law should not be ignored in silence.

[Correspondent] There cannot be two opinions that the Law on Azerbaijani Sovereignty is directed against the attempts of NKAO to secede from Azerbaijan. So in this regard I would like to know your opinion—the opinion of a legal expert—as to whether the 20 February 1988 decision of the session of the oblast Soviet of NKAO is constitutional, and the extent to which that decision corresponds to Leninist theory concerning the right of nations to self-determination.

[Sobchak] The posing of the question on the part of NKAO in determining its independence and in defending its interests is completely valid. It is also valid within the confines of the Leninist concept of self-determination and the confines of the legislation that is in effect. But it is another matter when, in the process of that movement, the struggle begins to take on illegal forms. And here it is also possible to reproach the NKAO leadership, which could have attempted to find a more diplomatic path for the constitutional resolution of this question. I feel that if, from the very beginning, the question that had been raised in Nagornyy Karabakh was not the question of becoming part of Armenia, but the question of a federal union territory—one with self-determination and one that is subordinate to the union center—it is possible that there may not have been any resistance. As for this resolution of the question, this question is also constitutional. The USSR Constitution does not contain any prohibition against creating such territories. I must say that we ought to proceed along the path of the lawful resolution of all questions, and in no instance should we proceed along the path of confrontations.

[Correspondent] A bit earlier you mentioned the inviolability of the territory of a particular national formation. It must be assumed that the inviolability of a territory is directly linked with, or mutually dependent upon, the right of nations to own, for example, land and natural wealth. I would like to know your opinion about the draft version of the Ownership Law which, after the

first discussion at USSR Supreme Soviet, was sent back for modification. How do you visualize the rights of nations to own property?

[Sobchak] At the session I said that the natural features must belong to that population, to that nation—and I emphasize the indigenous nation—that lives on that land. When the Ownership Law is enacted, there must be a consideration of the interests of all the nations, even the smallest ones. And there must be a definite structure of rights here. The basic right is the right of the indigenous nation. All the remaining laws, including the republic ones, come afterwards. For example, in RSFSR we have more than a hundred nations. If we say that the land, the mineral resources, and the water belong to the republic, all the remaining nations that are part of RSFSR will prove to be separated from that ownership. Consequently, this is not the solution of the question. Therefore I feel that we need to create a hierarchy of legislative rights. The first and basic right is the right of the nation that is populating that territory, and only then the derivative rights that that nation gives to the higher state formations—the republic and the union. And for each use of that national property—the land, the water, the mineral resources—there must be the consent of the indigenous nation. This, it seems to me, is one of the main points that we must include in the Ownership Law, and then it will be much easier for us to resolve the national problems. Then many of the national tensions will simply disappear. For example, take, once again, the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh. If a nation has been living on that land for millennia, then it is obvious that this is its territory, this is its land. Therefore no one has the right to chase them off that land, or to encroach on their rights.

The Ownership Law requires modification. However, this must be done with the nation's participation. It is my profound conviction that this question must be presented for nationwide discussion, and a referendum must be held. One cannot make mistakes with regard to such matters. And the nation will prevent us from making mistakes.

Komsomol Official on Samarkand University Informal Groups, Issues

90US0202A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 14 Oct 89 p 1

[Interview with Komil Rashidov, Samarkand University Komsomol committee secretary, by Andrey Semerkin: "On Construction Detachments, Elections, and Dialog with Informal Groups"; in Samarkand, date not given]

[Text] [Semerkin] Your university is one of the initiators of the movement for student self-government in the republic. What in fact does self-government mean at Samarkand University?

[Rashidov] It means the assignment of young scientists and specialists; it means representation on the Scientific Council... We have received these rights, but it is true we

cannot depart from the framework of national economic problems: if in a certain rayon there is no demand for specialists with such-and-such a profile, we cannot send a graduate to that rayon regardless of whether we have our representatives on the assignment commission or not.

Moreover, many questions have not been defined in the juridical sense. For example, our students become members of the acceptance commissions, but it is not clear whether they have the right to ask questions of the secondary school graduates, or whether they should defend the examinees' interests... Therefore, the students act primarily as observers. The situation is the same with distribution of Lenin Scholarships, and also at sessions of the Scientific Council.

It's another matter with the construction detachments. The commanders and commissars of our detachments are now—students only. Commissions from Moscow and Tashkent which inspected the work of the university construction detachments last year and the year before came to the conclusion that there are a lot less violations in such detachments than there were in detachments led by instructors. We had been convinced of that even before the commissions came.

In 1986 the university went out to pick cotton for the last time. At that time doubts arose as to whether it was worthwhile granting leadership of the student cotton-pickers to the instructors. Following the example of the construction detachments, the students themselves were sent out as the leaders. And under the leadership of their comrades, the students worked better than before, when the instructors used to go out into the cotton fields with them.

Self-government has also touched upon student scholarship. In the past, students were for all practical purposes unable to publish their works, even if they merited publication. Through our efforts, in 1989 two anthologies of student works were published, on the natural sciences and on the humanities.

[Semerkin] Reports and elections are commencing in the Komsomol organizations. How will they go in the university? What is your prediction?

[Rashidov] In the past, secretaries of Komsomol organizations were nominated from among students found suitable by the deans or department heads. Since 1987, Komsomol leaders have been nominated not "from on high," but "from below," at group Komsomol meetings. In May 1989, the deputy secretary of the university Komsomol Committee was elected from among three candidates. The elections were held in two rounds. The candidates' programs, their biographies and their photographs were published. The winner was Ravshan Indaminov, a graduate of the Mathematics Department.

Alternative elections in the VUZ—this tradition was begun in Samarkand. The first rector in the Soviet Union elected on a competitive basis was the rector of the

Samarkand Medical Institute. The second rector in the country who won his post by election, was the rector of Samarkand University. We do have something to be proud of. And they also do, where they are learning to organize alternative elections.

I think the reports and elections in the university Komsomol organization will take place in a spirit of openness, demandingness, and alternativism.

[Semerkin] What do you consider most important in bringing up young people at the university?

[Rashidov] The construction detachments. The Samarkand Detachment has just returned from working in Armenia, near Leninakan. Reports about them have been most positive. Our detachment had also worked in Kiev Oblast after the Chernobyl tragedy. The detachments accomplish genuine, necessary things. This is serious work, and not a game. And therefore, participation in a construction detachment is very significant for a student. I consider the construction detachment to be half of our Komsomol work.

But there are also serious problems facing the construction detachments: housing, funds, wages... Unfortunately, it is harder to solve these problems in Uzbekistan than in other republics. Perhaps that is because the cotton campaigns have become accustomed to look upon the students as a source of cheap labor. The students sense this, and ask to work in construction detachments outside the republic—for them this more rewarding, both psychologically and economically.

We have nevertheless found a temporary way out: We send outside the republic those who have worked well here, as a form of incentive.

Another problem is the fact that yesterday's instructors could hardly be considered good carpenters and joiners. Therefore, we began to organize pedagogical detachments. In 1988 there were two pedagogical detachments, working in their specialties at Pioneer camps; in 1989 there are already six.

[Semerkin] A final question. In many VUZ's in the republic active social processes are taking place—informal organizations are being created, expressing this or that interest, and a struggle for the minds of the students is in progress... And how is it with you?

[Rashidov] The same. There is a socio-political club called "Initsiativa" at the university. It is international in its make-up, and the club membership includes instructors, both communists and non-party members. Initsiativa speaks out for deepening democratization and for social justice. Its articles have appeared in the oblast newspaper LENINSKIY PUT.

Another association, "Ibrat," brings together not only the instructors, but the students as well. Ibrat was born in the period in which the republic was discussing critical,

problematic articles in the republic press, weighing the pros and cons. The Ibrat association was born on the wave of this activity.

There are other informal associations in Samarkand as well, expressing the interests of the Tajik and the Crimean Tatar populace...

We are striving for dialogue with the informal groups: an expression of this striving was a discussion-meeting held in May of this year at the oblast Library imeni Pushkin. The Komsomol obkom and gorkom helped organize this meeting. And although not all the informal associations willingly enter into dialogue with the Komsomol, we are not about to despair. We understand that on a number of positions the informals properly raise urgent questions, and that it is necessary to keep looking for approaches to new social associations. That is one of the directions of our work, and we shall continue.

Uzbek Officials Refute 'Provocative' Claims About Kokand Violence

90US0244A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
4 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by D. Usatov, procurator of the Uzbek SSR, state counselor of justice class 3, and V. Kamalov, Uzbek SSR minister of internal affairs, colonel of the militia: "To Whose Benefit Is This?"]

[Text] On 11 August Radio Ozodlik broadcast from FRG territory a report on an approved mass meeting of people working in Uzbekistan's news media which had been held on 10 August in the clubroom of the publishing house of the republic Communist Party Central Committee.

Together with its own comments on this event the overseas radio station quoted extracts from a speech at the meeting of Mukkaram Muradova, lecturer of the Elementary Tuition Methods Department of the Tashkent State Pedagogical Institute. She was called in the broadcast a "witness to the Fergana events".

With truly striking knowledgeability Ozodlik lavishly quoted this "witness" the day after the meeting, portraying, with Muradova's input, the law enforcement authorities' confrontation with the criminals as reprisals against innocent people. This is what Ozodlik broadcast with Muradova's words:

"The innocent blood of many young people, children even, was shed in Fergana Oblast. Writer-friends, how can we describe and excuse the shooting, as if at sparrows, at small children seated on the branches of trees and watching what was going on? Now they want to wash away these bloody traces. Mothers standing at their sons' graves can still be seen at certain Fergana cemeteries. They are guarding the graves against the killers, who might dig them up to remove the bullets from the dead bodies and cover up this crime.

"According to objective estimates, more than 300 persons have died up to the present time in Kokand alone. If this is the case, 100 years even will not be enough for the inhabitants of the city of Kokand and the surrounding areas to mourn their guiltlessly slain sons.... The leaders and organizers of this tragedy are not here but in the apparatus in Moscow."

Ozodlik concluded the broadcast with a provocative appeal of its own: "Concerning the bloodshed in Kokand, similar to the crimes of the fascists, journalists have spoken of the need to find and punish the culprits. Otherwise, they have declared, they will be left with no choice other than to appeal for assistance to the United Nations and demand withdrawal from the USSR."

Procuracy material information: Summoned to the Tashkent Procuracy, Mukkaram Muradova essentially confirmed that she had said what has been quoted above and declared without more ado that she had been an eyewitness to the events which she had described. However, the "eyewitness" failed to communicate to the procuracy more specific information concerning these events.

Another method of influencing public opinion. A leaflet signed on 1 August 1989 on behalf of the "Birlik" Uzbek People's Movement Central Council. It was distributed in Fergana Oblast, in Tashkent and in other localities. What was "whispered" in these anonymous leaflets? The lack of newspaper space prevents us quoting it in full, unfortunately, but here are the most "impressive" parts.

"We have recently received numerous pieces of information concerning the illegal use of weapons by police officers and MVD forces at the time of the Fergana tragedies. In our opinion, the basis of these events were two major crimes, which have rocked society and which are contrary to commonsense—these events occurred in Kokand on 7 and 8 June. The first crime occurred on 7 June at approximately 1530 hours near the building of the Kokand Municipal Internal Affairs Department, where police officers opened fire from submachineguns and service pistols on an unarmed crowd. Many people were killed and wounded as a result. The second crime was perpetrated in the morning of 8 June, at approximately 1030 hours near the building of the city party committee, where without any reason and warning soldiers submachine-gunned the participants in a mass meeting....

"The soldiers continued to fire at the crowd, which was fleeing in terror. Many people were killed and wounded. The precise number of casualties is being concealed from the public.

"We consider both these events the shedding of the blood of and a crime against the peaceful population.

"False information has been disseminated in the central press concerning an alleged 'attack by an armed crowd' on the above-mentioned organizations. This was a planned move aimed at covering up the crimes of the guilty parties. In fact, the people had no weapons. There

could have been no question even of an attack on their part.... This was recently acknowledged by Oblast Prosecutor A. Atadzhanov (the newspaper KOMMUNA of 18 July)....

"It is pointless hoping for the party and soviet authorities to reveal the true causes of the said tragedies. Proof of this is the report carried in the press of the Uzbek CP Central Committee commission headed by M. Ibragimov for studying the tragic events in the Fergana Valley. This document, written in the spirit of the stagnation times, contains not one word about the mass crimes against the Uzbek people in Kokand....

"The people must themselves struggle for their honor and dignity. Demand that all the murderers who fired at the people and their protectors be brought to book in accordance with the law."

Fed by "Birlik" representatives, the "crimes against the Uzbek people" in Kokand are accumulating increasingly new spine-chilling "details". At an unsanctioned meeting organized by "Birlik" on 15 October in Lenin Square, where, incidentally, by a decision of the Tashkent Gorispolkom, such activities are altogether banned, A. Abdurakhimov, who had come from Kokand, fomenting with malice aforethought the unhealthy passions of those assembled, went so far as to say that "troops were committed to Kokand on the date of the fourth or the fifth. Soldiers with weapons surrounded the people. There were armored personnel carriers, tanks and helicopters. Several hundred helicopters were flying over the city. This led to the start of war in Kokand. I believe that this command was given from above." Before Abdurakhimov's eyes, allegedly, "the people were fired on from the rooftops for 2 weeks." Before his eyes, allegedly, "the police and soldiers shot from Lenin Square at peaceful people who were relaxing in the park nearby. They fired from a helicopter also." "On 8 June the soldiers surrounded the people and began to fire at them. The leaders made no attempt to stop the soldiers." "They fired at people from a distance of 1.5 km from a helicopter." "The soldiers finished off wounded people in cold blood." Provocative general phrases, as you can see, here also.

But now the facts, incontrovertibly established in the course of the investigation of the crimes perpetrated in Kokand.

On 7 and 8 June the participants in the mass unrest succeeded in temporarily establishing control in certain parts of the city, paralyzing the operations of the railroad station and capturing three diesel locomotives and up to 100 motor vehicles, including 5 fire trucks, two of which were wrecked and set on fire. They smashed a public order guard post, 7 buildings of police precinct inspectors, the municipal internal affairs department centralized remote alarm box control desk building, 20 "Soyuzpechat" newsstands, the municipal trading organization for trade in foodstuffs, various workshops and the state automobile inspection building, from

where 10 motorcycles and 10 motor vehicles were stolen, robbed branch No 3 of the municipal trading organization for trade in industrial goods' store No 34, broke into and set fire to 64 apartment houses and torched the medical sobering-up station.

From the testimony of witnesses (their names are not given as yet in connection with the fact that the investigation is not complete).

A., an official of the Kokand Internal Affairs Department:

"At approximately 1400 hours on 7 June I received a warning from the state automobile inspection post that armed gangsters traveling in 20-30 Kama trucks and buses were coming from the direction of Rishtan.... The gangsters tore into the city with shouts about dealing with Turks and the Soviet authorities. All were armed with various implements and they picked up local Uzbeks, and whoever did not want to go along, they took by force. At about 1500 hours the entire gang was in the square near the municipal police department....

"We received information that the city was on fire and that Turks were being attacked, and their homes torched. Four precinct inspectors were beaten up in Khimik Square, and two had their guns taken.... They began to set fire to the state automobile inspection branch and the medical sobering-up station. A vehicle of the medical sobering-up station was overturned at the Lenin Monument. The gangsters caught a motorcyclist who was trying to ride across the square, beat him up and set fire to his bike.

"At about 6 pm detainees (74) were brought to the square from Namangan and released.... Following this, the gangsters grew even more insolent and began to demand the release of everyone. The crowd crossed over to the gate, and attacks on the police and attempts to seize their weapons began. Then two shots were heard from the direction of the park. One shot hit the service cap of an officer of an internal affairs department company. Then they flew at us with sticks and stones. For our part, we began to fire into the air from submachineguns and service pistols. Shots were heard from the crowd also....

"On 7 June I was somehow hit in the helmet and lost consciousness for a time."

Yu., an employee of the Kokand Municipal Internal Affairs Department:

"... Our leaders, the prosecutor and the first secretary of the gorkom and other comrades attempted to establish a dialogue with the crowd, but the latter was in an extremely hostile frame of mind. It shouted 'death to the police!' It then began to attack the municipal internal affairs department, throwing stones, bottles and other objects at us. Rifle shots began to ring out from the crowd, and the crowd moved onto the attack. Only the warning fire into the air of our associates stopped the crowd.... I was hit by a stone on my right leg, which is still

painful, and the wound has not healed.... Very many side arms, mainly home-made, were found in the square and in adjacent areas. A sawed-off shotgun was found even...."

Ye., an employee of the Kokand Municipal Internal Affairs Department:

"...Crowds of people, almost all of them armed with various implements for causing bodily injury, had begun to force their way through toward the municipal internal affairs department building. The implements included knives, sticks with tips, pitchforks, axes and swords, and they also had firearms in the form of sawed-off shotguns. The crowd had stones aplenty. It shouted threats at the police officers and threatened punishment and murder.... They confirmed their words with deeds and hurled stones, sticks and bottles at us and tried to beat up the police officers.... Then rifle shots rang out from the crowd in our direction from the direction of the park....

"When the crowd had been dispersed, very many of the gangsters' weapons—knives, axes and such—were found in the square, in the park and elsewhere...."

There are many dozen such pieces of testimony from witnesses, from which it can be seen that on 7 and 8 June in Kokand police officers and internal forces were dealing not with a peaceful demonstration but with armed, excited gangsters, who made daring attempts to seize facilities belonging to the state, set fire to homes and so forth.

From the results of the investigation of the events which occurred on 8 June in front of the building of the Kokand Gorkom it was determined that several thousand persons had gathered near the gorkom building, in Oktyabrskiy Park and in the Oktyabrskiy Public Garden. Many of them were carrying sticks, stones and knives and also weapons specially fixed for causing bodily injury.

From the report of the Kokand prosecutor:

"Some of those who had assembled got into the soldiers' buses parked at the printing house building, taking from there bread, canned goods, water and the belongings in them, and some of the demonstrators clambered onto the top of the buses, beat up one of the soldiers, taking away his shield and tearing off his helmet, and shouted threats at the soldiers who were surrounded.

"At this moment a tractor with a trailer in which, according to the testimony of eyewitnesses, there were 20-40 young men in an aggressive frame of mind and armed with sticks, hoes, knives and other weapons pulled up behind the crowd on Oktyabrskiy Park Street, near the bus stop. Jumping down, they all determinedly and with shouts of 'urush' (war) began to force their way to the front ranks of the demonstrators. They hurled sticks, stones and bottles at the soldiers and Comrade Musabekov. They drove away two soldiers' buses and attempted to drive away a third, which the soldiers tried to stop. At this moment the command was given to the

fire-cover groups for the purpose of cutting short the disturbances and unpredictable consequences to open fire into the air, which was done at 12 hours 45-50 minutes. The demonstrators began to run off. Then some of them started to call for a return since they believed that the soldiers were firing blanks. Some of the demonstrators began to assemble once again, moving toward the soldiers and hurling sticks, stones and bottles at them. In this connection there was a repeat opening of fire into the air, after which the bulk of those who had gathered ran off."

From material of the USSR Procuracy team of inquiry investigating the crimes committed in the course of the Fergana events. "During the curtailment of the unlawful actions of the participants in the mass disturbances in the city of Kokand 60 extremists sustained bullet wounds. Fifteen of them subsequently died. There were no women and children among those killed and wounded."

From the publication "Let Us Judge Dispassionately" of A.A. Atadzhanov, prosecutor of Fergana Oblast, in the newspaper FERGANSKAYA PRAVDA of 8 August 1989. "The 'Birlik' appeal points also to my article of 18 July of this year in the newspaper KOMMUNA and to the fact that in this publication I allegedly called the mob gathering a peaceful demonstration. There are no such words in the article. Confusing the people in the name of the prosecutor is dishonest."

The judicial proceedings in Kokand against a participant in the Kokand events, Kh.R. Abdurakhmanov, are now at an end. It emerged as clearly as could be in the course of the examination during the trial with what kind of "peaceful" demonstrations the police officers and internal affairs forces were dealing. The trial material has been published in the press and requires no comment.

The investigation of all the crimes committed in the course of the Fergana events is being conducted by the USSR Procuracy team of inquiry and the military prosecutor's office. The inquiry into the episode of the use of firearms by the police officers and internal affairs forces

in Kokand is not yet complete. And if in the course of the inquiry instances of the illegal use of weapons are established, all those found guilty will be liable before the law. No one intends concealing anything. Everything will be given extensive publicity.

Numerous movie camera and photographic documents testify that soldiers in bullet-proof vests and helmets, already wounded, were defending themselves against an attack by a furious crowd. Many inhabitants saw how many soldiers and police officers sustained injuries.

In this connection one asks oneself when listening to Ozodlik and reading "Birlik's" leaflets some perfectly natural questions. Who benefits from this absurd, distorted information? What ultimate ends are pursued by the malicious spreaders of every conceivable slanderous invention? Who gains from such a fomenting of passions and the endeavor to destabilize the situation? Who needs to associate the criminals who instigated the mass disturbances in the Fergana Valley with the entire Uzbek people and engender by slander distrust of the party, soviet and law enforcement authorities? These questions, as many others also, will be answered by the inquiry, and the results will be reported in the press.

But even today one thing is clear: Those who are acting in this way in this complex period are pursuing their own unscrupulous ends.

It is not known how much time it will yet take for the entire horror of the tragic events in the Fergana Valley to be forgotten. However, in this crucial period for the country and the republic all working people should together with officials of the party, soviet and law enforcement authorities do everything to put a stop to dangerous rumors inciting the unaware part of the population and the youth to new crimes.

Only a calm, balanced approach to an analysis of what happened from the standpoints of the internationalism which has always been characteristic of the multinational population of Uzbekistan may serve as a realistic counter to all imprudent rumors and calls for a "struggle for honor and glory".

Supreme Court Official on Civilian, Military Justice

90UN0113A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Oct 89 1st Edition p 2

[Interview with A.S. Koblikov, doctor of jurisprudence, professor, member of the Scientific Advisory Council under the USSR Supreme Court, by S. Pashayev: "The Authority of the Court"]

[Text] Objective investigations, an effective defense, and an independent court. This was how the USSR Congress of People's Deputies defined the formula for socialist justice in a concluding document. Our correspondent talks with A. Koblikov, doctor of jurisprudence, professor, member of the Scientific Advisory Council under the USSR Supreme Court, about some of the problems connected with the implementation of these principles.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Semenovich, in the tremendous amount of reader mail dedicated to the problems of legal reform, perhaps we hear most often about the need to enhance the role of the court, to raise its authority, and to guarantee genuine independence and the subordination of the judges and people's assessors to the law alone.

[Koblikov] This is perfectly natural. Indeed, the principle of the independence of the judges, repeatedly declaimed in the past, has been shamelessly flouted through interference in the activities of the organs of justice on the part of those who hold power. On 1 December 1988 the USSR Supreme Soviet for the first time (how strange it seems) directly prohibited interference in the exercise of justice. From the legal point of view this is of principal importance.

[Correspondent] In the context of our conversation, there is clearly a need to delve further into problems of the independence of the military court as well. It certainly has its own specific character, inasmuch as it has long been accepted that military justice is subordinate to the military authorities. The military justice regulations of tsarist Russia, for instance, established that the war minister would exercise "general supervision over the military courts and the officials of the military department, having the Chief Military Prosecutor under his authority."

[Koblikov] I would emphasize that even then the situation provoked the most emphatic objections. It is no accident that, with the very first decree concerning the court system, signed by Lenin on 24 November 1917, the Soviet power abolished military and naval courts of all designations. The army court began to build itself on the general principles of soviet democracy common to all courts.

[Correspondent] How genuine is the legal independence of the military tribunals and military procuracy from the local and military organs today?

[Koblikov] Here, it seems, one may agree with the answer that Major General of Justice A. Katusev, chief military prosecutor, gave when he was appointed by the USSR Supreme Soviet to the office. Even today a formally independent prosecutor turns out in the final analysis to be actually dependent on the various officials in charge of the supply of materials and machinery to the organs of military justice, or of the resolution of housing problems, or of the conferring of military rank, etc. I must say, though, that in the course of judicial and legal reform, legal guarantees are beginning to be strengthened organizationally and materially.

Legislators are finally paying attention to this aspect of the issue. A Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR, passed this year, established a direct relationship between the number of guarantees of independence of the courts and the creation of the necessary organizational and technical conditions for their functioning, as well as the material and social maintenance of the judges, appropriate to their high status. In particular, pay for the judges is set with regard to their proficiency recommendation. The local soviets are obligated, no later than 6 months after the election of a judge, to provide him with comfortable lodgings. Without touching on the other organizational and material problems that will be resolved on the basis of laws already passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet, I will note that a draft Law on Military Tribunals, which takes into account the distinctive character of the Armed Forces, is currently being developed and will also embrace these issues.

[Correspondent] And which of the real guarantees of independence for the judges and people's assessors of the military tribunals is it expected to strengthen?

[Koblikov] The main thing, as I already said, is to move from declarations about the independence of the judges (they appeared in the 1936 Constitution and have been repeated many times since) to the creation of concrete legal preconditions protecting the justice system from any attempts to influence it when it is ruling on the fate of this or that person. In particular, this law must provide a system of electing and dismissing the judges of military tribunals which does not make them dependent on the discretion of one or another group of people. In my opinion it would be best, in this context, if the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium were to elect them for a 10-year term. And dismissal of a military judge before the expiration of his term would be allowed only under exceptional circumstances. Only on a limited number of grounds which are concretely defined by law. For example, judges who are elected and who reach the age limit for active military service may not be discharged and deprived of their judicial powers before the end of the term.

Of course, military judges must also in full measure enjoy guarantees of immunity. In particular, they must not be subject to arrest and arraignment, or even to legal action, without the consent of the USSR Supreme

Soviet. The people's assessors of the military tribunal must, in my view, enjoy these same guarantees of immunity in the execution of their responsibilities.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Semenovich, it has been reported in the press that 1,750,794 crimes have been registered in this country over 9 months of this year, which is a 33 percent increase over the corresponding figure for last year. The organs of justice, as we see, need not fear unemployment. In this context, how does the situation look in the Armed Forces?

[Koblikov] At first glance one might get the impression that the case is different here compared to the country as a whole. It was reported at the Congress of People's Deputies that the Army and Navy have managed to reduce crime over the last 3 years by more than a third, and that the number convicted in the military tribunals has fallen by more than 50 percent. But it appears that these figures should not in any fashion reassure us. We must keep in mind that crime in the Army is not an isolated phenomenon. It is engendered by those same economic, social, and moral causes which are characteristic to the whole of our society. And there is no basis for optimism in the thought that several dozen crimes each year, to be honest, go undiscovered. Furthermore, these include the most serious ones as a rule. Of course, the absence of the rudiments of order in some of the subunits more often than not contributes to this. But to a great degree the careless functioning of the legal mechanisms existing today also prove to be a contributing factor, including delays in getting information to the military prosecutor, "homespun" investigations, and, in general, attempts to cover up the incident. These mechanisms, beyond any doubt, also require improvement.

[Correspondent] Today we speak with a shudder of the illegal actions of Stalin's assistants, who fabricated "cases" against innocent people. All of that, it would seem, is in the past. However, does the problem of ensuring the objectivity of investigations still remain on the agenda?

As we know, only the truth, and not some sort of statistics in an account, or "higher" consideration, or calculations of momentary advantage, must be the compass and reference point for the law. This is always the first consideration. Well, even today from time to time glasnost has its cases of legal proceedings instituted against the innocent as a result of biased, tendentious, or unskilled investigations, or the desire to get a "confession" from the accused at whatever cost. Confirmation is provided by the fact that each year military tribunals deliver a number of "not guilty" verdicts, and the military prosecutors discontinue a portion of the court cases involving criminal charges with full rehabilitation of the accused. Here is an example from the recent past. Private Makhmudov was convicted by the military tribunal of one of the garrisons for assault and battery and inflicting grave physical injuries on a fellow serviceman. The investigator drew up a conclusion of

guilt, the military prosecutor affirmed it, and the military tribunal "rubber-stamped" the charge. Finally, the okrug military tribunal reversed the sentence. In the course of a supplementary investigation it turned out that Makhmudov had not broken the victim's jaw... It was a certain Troitskiy who had testified in court as a witness, and whose testimony had proved convenient for the investigator and had not been verified by the court.

[Correspondent] The question inevitably arises: Why did the mechanism of a legal defense for the accused in court not work in this instance?

[Koblikov] Precisely because it is imperfect too. That is also why there is such a heated discussion today concerning the issue of the participation of the counsel for defense, not at the very end of the investigation as the present law specifies, but specifically from the moment charges are leveled, or even immediately after the arrest. In all cases. And only now, for the first time, is one of the foundations of the right to a defense, judging by everything, going to be secured—the principle of a presumption of innocence. It is specifically these legal devices that create the conditions for a strong defense, which is a component of a "formula for justice."

[Correspondent] But can, let us say, the military man avail himself of all these blessings? Particularly the ordinary soldier involved in a criminal case?

[Koblikov] To be honest, that is not an easy question. And here is why. In a criminal case advocates perform the actual defense, and they are paid for their labor by those to whom they have rendered the legal aid. Demonstrating its well-known concern for this category of jurist, the USSR Ministry of Justice last year adopted new regulations on the system of pay for their labor. As a result, the services of an advocate have become noticeably more expensive. For example, to conduct a relatively minor criminal case, instead of 25-30 rubles, it is now necessary to pay 120-130 rubles. The authors of the new departmental regulations "did not forget" (unfortunately) soldiers and sailors either. Formerly, members of the military in compulsory terms of service were able to get legal help in many instances free of charge, and now they have been deprived of that right. Even though the soldiers' pay has not increased. So we might as well not ask about a strong defense, but whether a defense will in fact be available.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Semenovich, our time is notable for its heightened attention to the problems of justice and its energetic steps in the creation of new laws. How do you, a scholarly jurist, evaluate this process?

[Koblikov] It seems to me extremely important that we all begin to acknowledge how great the role of the law is in the economic, political, and spiritual life of our society and of each individual person. And, simultaneously, how neglected our "legal economy" has turned out to be. It is no accident that, at the Congress and the first session of the Supreme Soviet, it was necessary to pass, repeal, and amend a number of laws and resolutions "right off the

bat," as they say. But I and apparently many others, felt that some of the people's deputies were not well versed in legislative activity and did not quite grasp the complexity of creating legal norms able to function effectively and with reasonable stability. Even a correct idea, if it is transposed into the language of a law unsuccessfully, can turn out ineffective or even produce a negative effect. I cannot help but think of Lenin's celebrated warning that "one must legislate with threefold caution."

Incidentally, I remember a discussion at today's session of the Supreme Soviet of a draft document on an amnesty for former servicemen who were taken captive, of a limited contingent of our forces in Afghanistan. At the first discussion, as you remember, the deputies did not arrive at an agreement and the draft was returned to the committees and commissions for revision. It seems to me that this occurred because several of the deputies did not have a clear idea of the legal nature of the document. And unfortunately the jurists did not have time to make the discussion clearer. At base there was confusion about the concepts of amnesty and pardon, which are essentially distinct. Had they analyzed these terms in a legal sense from the start, I believe the participants in the discussion would have reached a mutual understanding more quickly.

And I would like to mention one more thing here—the moral example of the parliamentarian-legislator, who must be very upright. In any civilized state the parliament first and foremost is the bearer of the idea of legality and the defender of the constitution. Our Constitution, of course, needs to be seriously reworked. But a law remains in effect until such time as it is repealed. Otherwise we have illegality, anarchy, and arbitrary rule. Therefore, any calls to ignore it or to disregard the binding nature of this or that statute in the least fashion are incorrect. Let us hope that these are the difficulties of the growth of our democracy.

MVD Press Center on Crime Rate

90UN0277A Moscow *CHELOVEK I ZAKON* in Russian No 9, Sep 89 (signed to press 25 Jul 89) pp 34-37

[Commentary by Internal Forces Colonel B.P. Mikhaylov, doctor of jurisprudence: "The USSR MVD Press Center Comments"]

[Text] Over 5 months in 1989, 884,967 crimes were registered by the internal affairs organs and the Procuracy, almost 32 percent more than during the analogous period last year. Unfortunately, crime is growing, and the growth rates remain high.

Felonies constituted 102,726 incidents, which is 83.2 percent higher than during the analogous period of 1988. Among the felonies, more than one-quarter comprised crimes against a person (murder, attempted murder, rape and attempted rape, and premeditated serious bodily injury), as compared to 28 percent for the corresponding period last year.

The number of robbery attacks on apartments, taxi drivers, and personal means of transportation increased by 69.9 percent. The majority of the attacks were committed in a group. Among the criminals detained, 39.7 percent were not working anywhere, and one out of every three had previously been tried on criminal charges.

Property crimes also grew by 53.1 percent (498,857 cases). They remain proportionally high. Over half the property crimes consist of theft of citizen's personal property. These types of crimes are particularly widespread in the Estonian, Moldavian, and Latvian SSRs, in Khabarovskiy and Primorskiy krays, in Kaliningrad and Rostov oblasts, and in the North Osetian ASSR.

In the economic sphere, the most characteristic embezzlement of state or public property is by misappropriation, waste, or abuse of official position. Over 5 months, these crimes comprised over one-third of the crimes solved by internal affairs organ staffers. The BKhSS [Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] organs solved 4,047 particularly large-scale cases of embezzlement (57 percent more than in 1988), and thwarted 15,917 transgressions, which is also 11 percent higher.

In the range of measures taken by the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to ensure law and order in the country, particular attention has been directed toward increasing the efficacy of the fight against organized crime.

A specialized subdivision has been created within the ministry's structure; analogous apparatus are being formed in many republic MVDs, and UVDs [internal affairs administrations] of krays, oblasts, and large cities with the most difficult situations. An active process is underway to establish these subdivisions, and to raise the level of professional training of agents, as well as their equipment.

Serious multistage work is being conducted to expose organized criminal associations. In 1988 alone, 1,200 highly organized groups posing great danger were exposed.

This year, measures are being conducted to document the illegal activity of the most dangerous representatives of the criminal element, the major plunderers and dealers running the show within the economic atmosphere of the republics of Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus, the Ukraine, the Far East, and in a number of other places. Many of them are brought up on criminal charges, which will be described in greater detail in subsequent commentaries.

In March 1989, in Northern Osetia, the core of an armed, organized group long active was arrested; its participants had perpetrated a number of murders, serious bodily injury, robbery attacks, and extortion. Among those arrested in the case was a militia staffer who not only betrayed the interests of the service and abetted opposition to the law enforcement organs, but

took direct participation in the commission of serious crimes. Three pistols, a large amount of ammunition, money, and valuables worth about R40,000 were confiscated from the criminals.

At the same time, the fight against organized crime is constrained by the flawed nature of the criminal and criminal trial legislation. The actions of the criminal association ringleaders, who are not linked with committing concrete crimes, are not encompassed by the law; it lacks legal norms to defend participants in the criminal trial, a fact exploited by the criminals to pay off and blackmail witnesses and victims. Reliable data obtained by the use of technological means as the result of operation and detection activity are not admitted as evidence in a case. This is not considered proof for a court procedure.

In light of this, the ministry has introduced a number of proposals to the legislative organs. At USSR MVD initiative, laws have been adopted providing heavier charges for extortion in the Russian Federation, the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Latvian, and Turkmen SSRs; corresponding proposals have also been introduced into the Supreme Soviet Presidiums of a number of union republics.

A barrier of mistrust in the law enforcement organs has started to be surmounted with the introduction in early 1989 of increased criminal charges for extortion. While during all of last year, 600 cases of racketeering were disclosed, in only 4 months of 1989, 1,507 declarations of extortion were received, resulting in 1,107 criminal cases. A total of 687 people were tried on criminal charges; almost one-third of these were minors. They were all involved in extorting hefty sums by means of threat, force, pogroms, and arson.

For example, at the railroad station in Donetsk in February of this year, a group of racketeers headed by the Parubets brothers was detained; it had amassed R11,000 by threatening cooperative members. The racketeers were brought up on criminal charges. The most widespread extortion is practiced within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, Sverdlovskiy Oblast, and the cities of Moscow and Leningrad.

The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs is implementing applied organizational measures aimed at improving the activity of the operations subdivisions, and actively involving workers and public organizations in the fight against organized crime.

Within the area of interdiction, the measures for exposing individuals running games of chance should be cited. Over the period mentioned, 5,315 incidents of games of chance were disclosed, for which 76 people were brought up on criminal charges, and many on administrative charges, and the records of 1,038 people were sent in for taking social action against those guilty. As the records of criminal cases among racketeers and victims show, there are more than a few people involved in games of chance.

Over the last 3 years, as a result of the execution of the 18 June 1987 USSR Supreme Soviet Ukase on amnesty and humanization of court practices, the number of convicts in detention facilities was reduced 40 percent, including the number of women imprisoned, by a factor of over two. For the first time in the country for many decades, about 200 colonies were either shut down or converted into LTPs [treatment and labor prevention centers]. Tens of thousands of former convicts returned to their families and labor collectives before their sentence was up; the majority of them labor honestly, and are justifying society's trust in them.

At the same time, as a result of these processes, the criminogenic composition of the convicts has become more complicated: The proportion of those convicted for felonies has reached 50 percent; one-third of the convicts have some sort of psychological deviation. As a result, the operational situation of the detention facilities has been exacerbated. The number of cases of attacks on representatives of the ITU [corrective labor institutions] administration has grown, including holding them hostage; in only 5 months of this year, these incidents number 33. Over April-May, during such extraordinary occurrences in UVD detention facilities in Khabarovskiy, Voroshilovgradskiy, Donetsk, Aktyubinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Rostovskiy krayoblispolkoms [krai-oblast executive committees], after all attempts to persuade the terrorists failed, weapons were used by special assault groups to defeat the terrorists, resulting in a number of them being killed and wounded. The hostages were freed.

The operations situation in the ITUs is characterized by a high degree of tension and complexity. During 5 months of this year, the total number of crimes in detention facilities increased 28.8 percent, including a 32.5 percent increase in premeditated murder and attempted murder, a 2.3 fold rise in incidents of resisting administration representatives, and a 64 percent increase in escapes and attempted escapes.

At the same time, it should be noted that the preventive possibilities of the RSFSR UK [Criminal Code] Article 188.3 and analogous articles of the UKs of other union republics (malicious disobedience of the requirements of the administration of the corrective labor institution) are obviously ineffectively applied. Thus, in the ITUs of the Altayskiy, Kirovskiy, Krasnoyarskiy, and Primorskiy krayoblispolkoms, where the number of felonies has particularly grown, not a single person has been charged under this article. The complications in the ITU operations situation have pointedly raised the issue of accelerating perestroika of indoctrination and regimen work, and bringing psychologists and psychiatrists onto the ITU staff.

Measures are being taken for the improvement of the living conditions under which sentences are served. Last year, for example, dormitory facilities for 22,600 were introduced, and dining facilities for 7,000. Instead of the

2 square meters of living space stipulated for each convict, on the average today, there are 2.7 square meters.

A program for the prevention of tubercular infections is being implemented in the ITUs. Some 27 specialized colonies for maintaining convicts with tuberculosis have been opened. But this is obviously not enough. Unfortunately, in many cases, local soviet organs obstruct the creation of specialized ITUs for those with tuberculosis.

A ukase was adopted in May of this year stipulating that no less than 10 percent of the convict's earnings be reserved for him, regardless of all deductions, for purchasing foodstuffs in the ITU stores. The convict is permitted to spend up to R25 per month, rather than the previously permitted R15 on food and essential items.

A number of restrictions in the work regime and maintenance conditions of individuals located in investigation isolation cells and prisons have been lifted by the USSR MVD. We speak of the creation of better living conditions.

In the course of realizing the practical measures for the ministry and collegium's restructuring of the ITUs, the concrete proposals and critical comments expressed by the mass information media were taken into broad consideration.

Particular attention was directed toward the improvement of the conditions for working with ITU cadres. In accordance with the demands of the times and the recommendations of party and soviet organs, over 9,000 people came to work in the ITUs last year, including 2,000 communists, allowing for something of an improvement in the staff of associates. An extraordinary certification of all cadres was carried out in order to determine the professional suitability of the worker toward the service. Over 5,000 staffers were recognized as being unsuited to their positions. More attention is being directed toward the cadres' professional training.

In accordance with the resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, "On Legal Reform," the task has been set for a radical revision of the current corrective labor legislation. A doctrine model of the Bases of corrective criminal legislation of the Union of SSRs and the union republics has been developed by the USSR MVD.

In contrast to the currently effective Bases of the corrective criminal legislation of the Union of SSRs and the union republics, a legislative regulation of the general statutes, the procedure, and conditions of execution of all forms of punishment, in addition to the application of other measures of criminal law effects on convicts are stipulated.

The formula of the legal status of convicts was supplemented and refined to a significant degree in developing the model. It stipulates necessary guarantees of the rights of convicted citizens during the period of serving their punishment in the form of detention or arrest, including

the convicts' right to use their national language, and the right to freedom of conscience.

There is a proposal for the introduction of a differentiated system of changes in convict maintenance conditions in ITUs, depending upon their behavior and their attitude toward work. A number of restrictions which have not justified themselves in application are subject to repeal.

Naturally, concrete measures for the humanization of the system of carrying out punishment must be combine with a fortification of legality and discipline, with the adoption of the strong measures established by law applied to those individuals who have not rejected a criminal way of life, who do not wish to take the road to correction.

This particularly concerns the leaders of the criminal element, the so-called "thieves within the law," who do not work, who live at the expense of the "[obshchak]" (the thieves' fund), corrupting other convicts, and resisting the administration of the detention facilities. Such individuals should be more actively disclosed, taken under strict social control, and sent to special colonies where only "thieves within the law" and other authorities of the criminal world are kept.

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Belorussian SSR KGB Official on Phone Tapping *90UN0323 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 7 Oct 89 p 4*

[Interview with Ye.S. Akhremchik, chief of the Belorussian SSR KGB investigations section by SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA reporter: "On the Secrecy of Telephone Conversations"]

[Text] Ye.S. Akhremchik, chief of the Belorussian SSR KGB investigations section, answers our reporter's questions.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Yevgeniy Serafimovich, I will begin by reading lines from a letter to the editor: "When I begin talking on the telephone, I hear some sort of clicking in the phone. They say that this is a result of special agencies plugging into the line and that they listen to many official and personal conversations. But actually, according to the Constitution, this is strictly prohibited. I would like to hear an explanation on this matter from responsible officials of Belorussian SSR KGB. Yu. Serlyuzhitskiy, Gomel."

[Akhremchik] Yes, in accordance with Article 56 of the Constitution of the USSR, the personal lives of citizens, and the secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraph messages is protected by law. KGB agencies strictly comply with socialist law in their activities. The appearance of various types of "clicking" and other interference during telephone conversations may

be caused by defects in the telephone network. You need to address these questions to the telephone communications centers or to the Republic Ministry of Communications.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] You are saying that KGB agencies strictly comply with socialist law... But I would like to know who monitors the activities of the state security agencies? Or do they themselves make the decisions and monitor themselves?

[Akhremchik] Unfortunately, a false and outmoded view exists of KGB agencies and their activities. Certain comrades cannot free themselves from a thoroughly erroneous stereotype regarding KGB agencies to whom allegedly everything was permissible. There are many reasons why this stereotype was formed.

Actually, KGB activities are accountable to the USSR and Republic Supreme Soviets and to the recently established USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security Issues. Procurator agencies also conduct constant monitoring.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] But nevertheless, if a man is of the opinion that his telephone is being monitored, how can he defend himself?

[Akhremchik] Any citizen can appeal to Soviet government agencies, procurators, or the courts in defense of his rights. At the same time, it is necessary to have certain facts at one's disposal which provide the basis for thinking that his rights are being violated.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] And if he does not succeed in gathering facts and he only has an assumption?

[Akhremchik] If there are no facts, then the assumption is most likely far-fetched.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] And that is all. Life is a complicated thing. I must confess that there are situations when security agencies must have information for the purposes of defending the interests of the state and society and, as they say, by any means. What higher authority grants the authorization in such emergency situations?

[Akhremchik] Even in emergency circumstances, KGB agencies act within the limits of socialist law. I must say that at the present time the Law on the USSR Committee for State Security is being developed which will be submitted for review by the USSR Supreme Soviet. All rights and responsibilities of KGB agencies for defending our society will be set forth in it.

Ukrainian Justice Official on Legal Reforms

90UN0255A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
3 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with V.S. Stefanyuk, Ukrainian SSR deputy minister of justice: "Each Person's Motivation Makes It

Genuinely Possible To Elect the Most Worthy Working People to the Office of People's Assessor"]

[Text] The terms of office of people's assessors in the rayon (or municipal) courts are running out. The next elections are scheduled for October-November. What new factors will they bring to the course of the juridical-legal reform? V.S. Stefanyuk, Ukrainian SSR deputy minister of justice, replies below to these and other questions of ours.

[V.S. Stefanyuk] As you know, people's assessors will now be elected for a term of five years, while judges will be elected for a term of ten years. I would like to emphasize that, whereas the judges are to be elected by staff members of the organs of authority, the assessors will be elected by the public directly.

[Correspondent] That is to say, anyone may become a people's assessor, right?

[V.S. Stefanyuk] The law stipulates only two conditions for this. The candidate must be a citizen of the USSR. And he must be at least 25 years of age by Election Day. Of course, it is extremely important to include on the roster of people's assessors those persons who will undoubtedly be able to utilize their own knowledge, skills, and experience for working in the courts.

To tell the truth, the labor collectives are confronted with a very important task. Because, after all, it is not a simple matter to single out and name the most worthy, principled, uncompromising, and well-versed persons. In such a situation the nomination of two or more candidates to one seat is most welcome.

[Correspondent] Elections on an alternative basis would seem to allow us to return the judiciary to its high purpose within the society, and to restore the court's lost prestige. Is that correct?

[V.S. Stefanyuk] I think that the people will elect officials who are worthy of their high calling. Nowadays they are provided with some significant privileges: people's assessors retain their average wages and other payments during the period when they are performing their duties in court. The time of this work is made equal to the time spent in their permanent work activity. And the break from production is provided to last for no more than two weeks a year.

[Correspondent] Besides the elections, what else will strengthen the court?

[V.S. Stefanyuk] Constructing and renovating court buildings, as well as outfitting them with up-to-date organizational equipment and motor-vehicle transport. We need to manifest concern for providing court staff members with housing, telephones, travel passes, and rest homes. I am profoundly convinced that this should be a matter of prime concern for public organizations, local soviets, and, naturally, the judicial organs.

[Correspondent] What are the basic guarantees of the independence and inviolability of judges and people's assessors?

[V.S. Stefanyuk] In the first place, a people's assessor can now only be fired or transferred to a lower-paid position by way of a disciplinary procedure with the consent of the labor collective which elected this person. In the second place, a people's judge or a people's assessor, when performing their duties, cannot be held criminally liable or arrested without the permission of the Supreme Soviet of a union republic, or between its sessions—the Supreme Soviet Presidium of a union republic. And, in the third place, if a criminal case must be brought against a judge or an assessor, it must be done only by the republic's procurator or by the procurator general of the USSR. And such cases come under the jurisdiction of the republic's Supreme Court. That is, not even administrative penalties can be imposed upon a judge or an assessor when they are performing their duties.

[Correspondent] But what if the voters have made an obvious mistake in electing a people's assessor?

[V.S. Stefanyuk] Then, in accordance with the Law on the Status of Judges, he can be removed from office ahead of schedule. Let's say, for violating socialist legality. It could and has been done for committing a disgraceful action incommensurate with the high calling of a people's assessor or a people's judge. There is a mechanism for recall: the law provides that elected persons are directly responsible to the people who elected them.

As you can see, everything is directed in such a way as to make sure that judges remain true to the law. They must be aloof from political campaigning, conditions of the day, and the ambitions of individuals.

[Correspondent] What can you say in reply to complaints such as the following: It is said that the people's assessors do not really decide anything in the courts?

[V.S. Stefanyuk] According to our Constitution, a people's assessor enjoys all the rights of a judge. During the course of a court trial he is free to put questions to participants in the trial and to clear up circumstances in the case. Just like a judge, an assessor may state a special opinion in a written form, if he is not in agreement with his colleagues.

You will say that these are declarations, but what happens in fact? In fact, beginning on 1 December of this year, a people's assessor who has a higher legal education will obtain the right to take the place of a people's judge in a rayon (or municipal) court in the event of the judge's prolonged absence.

[Correspondent] But, of course, such assessors are in a very distinct minority, are they not?

[V.S. Stefanyuk] Nevertheless, this is a step forward. People's assessors are achieving a more profound mastery of the specifics of judicial work; they are gaining

practical skills while supporting their professional comrades. I can name quite a few active and conscientious assessors. Among them are A.F. Burakov, a machinist-instructor at the Donetsk Metallurgical Plant, and R.V. Gorbach, a master of handmade embroidery from Kiev Oblast.... There are quite a few worthy examples from around the oblasts.

[Correspondent] But, Vladimir Sergeyevich, to what extent are our judges and people's assessors coping with the present-day problems of society?

[V.S. Stefanyuk] In connection with the adopted decree entitled "On Decisively Intensifying the Fight Against Crime," the USSR Supreme Soviet has obligated the investigatory organs and courts to investigate and try with maximum strictness cases of muggings, robberies, rapes, drug trafficking, and other crimes. We must not permit any weakening in our attitude toward dangerous criminals, or toward the leaders and active participants in organized criminal groups.

The collegium of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Justice has thoroughly analyzed the results of the work done during the first half of 1989, as well as the status of socialist legality, and discipline in the activity of the courts and judicial institutions. The work accomplished has remained insufficient to raise the level of the law-courts, to reduce crime in this republic, or to curtail instances of lawlessness and bureaucratism. After decisively condemning instances of red tape, violations of procedural deadlines, and the inferior quality of trying cases, the collegium mandated the courts, organs, and judicial institutions to take immediate measures to eliminate the above-noted shortcomings.

[Correspondent] And so now the more responsibly we voters approach the elections of people's assessors...

[V.S. Stefanyuk] ...the more serious demands we will be able to make on them later. And that is why these elections will undoubtedly become the next milestone of perestroika in this country's juridical activity.

Ukrainian SSR MVD Chief on Crime in Republic

90UN0231A Kiev POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA in Russian No 19, Oct 89 pp 64-67

[Article by I. Gladush, Ukrainian SSR minister of internal affairs: "In the Interests of Perestroika and Democracy"]

[Text] The processes of revolutionary renewal begun in our country at the initiative of the party today encompass all spheres of society's life. Perestroika is inseparable from the development of democracy.

However, it should not be forgotten that democracy is not only the expansion of actual rights, but a strengthening of responsibility, discipline, and organization. The country has set a course toward the creation of a law-governed state. Yet it may be created only when all our decisions and actions are founded upon a strict legal

basis, when the lawful interests and rights of both society as a whole and each citizen in particular are reliably defended to the full extent of Soviet laws.

The 4 August 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the Decisive Intensification of the Fight Against Crime" is aimed precisely at strengthening such defense.

In recent years, the problem of the fight against crime has become very acute. The criminogenic situation existing in the country, and in our republic in particular, is alarming. Organized and group crime, racketeering, speculation, and clashes of hostile youth groups are spreading.

Criminal manifestations are becoming more and more dangerous. A consolidation of criminal groups is taking place; they are arming themselves and acquiring motor vehicles intensely.

The unlawful activity of various types of extremist and nationalistic groups has become enlivened.

Unfortunately, the situation which has come about has not been studied in a timely and thorough manner, as a result of which neither the necessary predictions nor a system of effective counter measures has been developed.

Shortcomings in the work of the internal affairs organs have also had their effect on the growth of crime, as have the passivity of part of our staffers, their disorientation under new conditions, and their indecision in situations where it is necessary to apply legal sanctions. Preventive work with those previously convicted is being done poorly, as is work with youth having a militia record. Many crimes remain unsolved.

The significant reduction in the activity of the voluntary people's brigades and public points for maintaining law and order has also had a negative effect on preserving order on the streets and in public places.

The courts frequently show lenience in the determination of punitive measures for those previously convicted upon their commission of a new crime.

Recently, the courts are frequently applying deferments in executing sentences. Frequently the decision about this is being made without consideration for the public danger of the crime committed, or the identity of the guilty party.

I will cite such an example. In February of this year in Dergachevskiy Rayon, Kharkov Oblast, Skorik, with three prior convictions for theft of kolkhoz [collective farm] property, was sentenced to 3 years detention, suspended. And the very next month, he and his lover killed and robbed an old woman. Only after this was the transgressor arrested and brought to criminal accountability. Unfortunately, such cases are not isolated.

The problem of the lawful defense of the militia staffers themselves has come into sharper contrast under the

circumstances of the activization of functions of anti-societal, nationalistic, and extremist-minded elements. The criminals are getting bold; incidents of disobedience of the legal demands of militia men are becoming frequent, as are armed attacks on them. While last year five militia staffers died in the line of official duty at the hands of criminals, in only 8 months of this year we have lost 9 of our comrades; 78 were wounded. In the meantime, the number of criminal cases stemming from resisting militia staffers in the execution of their official duty in recent years has been cut in half.

The issue of the material and technological support of the organs and subdivisions of internal affairs remains urgent. For the umpteenth time, life has convincingly shown that a "cheap" militia costs our society dearly.

Even the fact that a significant portion of the motor vehicles and motorcycles have long passed their established periods of use bespeaks the level of their provision. Let us say, 44 percent of the automobiles should be written off.

The criminological and special equipment for the main trends in work are at 60-70 percent of full strength.

In Volynya, in Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, and Kherson oblasts, one out of four district inspectors is not even provided with office space. Every fourth rayon and city militia department is housed in unsuited space, and 109, in temporary space.

Of course, such a situation is hardly conducive to strengthening law and order and the authority of the internal affairs organs. The USSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the Decisive Intensification of the Fight Against Crime" stipulated measures which will create real opportunities for the representatives of the internal affairs organs and primarily the militia to vitalize their activity, to make it more effective.

In the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, in its organs and subdivisions in localities, together with other law enforcement organs, concrete plans of action stemming from the demands expounded in the Supreme Soviet decree have been determined and are already being realized. We strive to coordinate precisely our action with the actions of the republic Procuracy, the KGB, the Supreme Court and the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Justice. The activity of the militia itself is being restructured in a radical manner. In order to reduce the number of unsolved and uninvestigated crimes, the inquest and criminal investigation apparatus, and the expert criminological subdivisions are being strengthened. A crime prevention service concerned with individuals inclined to commit crimes has been restored within the Ukrainian SSR MVD system.

In association with the vitalization of the fight against crime, the labor collectives of many of the republic's enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes [state farms] are

making suggestions about increasing the militia's numbers, providing with motor vehicle transportation, and other equipment at the expense of their resources.

Temporary committees for combatting crime, created in localities, are taking concrete measures to strengthen the militia organs. Thus, in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, a broad ranging-program defining the tasks and responsibilities of Soviet law enforcement and management organs is establishing order. It is envisaged that the number of staffers of the oblast's internal affairs organs be increased by over 2,000 people at the expense of the resources of enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes, by a committee decision, and that the militia and procuracy be allocated a supplemental 910 transportation units, including 645 motor vehicles and motorcycles for district militia inspectors. In Donetsk, the financing of the city's internal affairs organs with the resources of enterprises has grown to R6 million.

Over the past decades, the urban population of the Ukraine has grown 13 percent, while the subdivision staff, of, say, the patrol-sentry service has remained almost unchanged. It is therefore extraordinarily important today to raise the effective interaction of the militia with the labor collectives. In particular, the experience of the cities of Gorkiy and Novaya Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, merits wide-scale introduction for the enterprises' creation at their own expense of workers' detachments to assist the militia, and associations of voluntary people's brigade for maintaining public order.

In that same Dnepropetrovsk area, in Zheltye Vody, in July of this year, a session of the city soviet of people's deputies resolved to create a workers' detachment to assist the militia at the expense of enterprises.

Over just one month, the members of the detachment created on the site of the Eastern mining-enrichment combine detained 77 transgressors, including a criminal recidivist, prevented several gang attacks, and detained three groups of motorcycle thieves.

A total of 130 such formations are currently active in the republic.

Today, the main attention of the internal affairs organs is concentrated on the key trends of operational-service activity. In oblasts, operations for revealing felonious criminal elements and parasites are being implemented such as "Covering detachment" [Zaslony], "Poppy" [Mak], "Market" [Rynok], "Cooperative" [Kooperativ], "Concern" [Zabota], "Under Surveillance" [Podnadzornyy], etc.

Racketeering groups in Kirovgrad and Chernigov have been eliminated by staffers of the internal affairs organs and state security.

In August alone, 18 organized crime groups were revealed. For instance, in Dnepropetrovsk, an armed group of seven people who had committed eight serious crimes, including murder, was incapacitated. In Krivoy

Rog, 20 racketeers are being brought to justice; on their conscience are gang attacks, infliction of serious bodily harm, and extortion of funds. In Zaporozhye, a dangerous group was detained; it had committed 40 thefts, robberies, and other serious crimes. Firearms, ammunition, and narcotics were confiscated from them.

The forces of the internal affairs organs are also concentrated on revealing dangerous, carefully concealed, and well organized criminal groups in the economic sphere. The structure of the subdivisions of the BKhSS [Combatting The Embezzlement of State Property and Speculation] has been improved; new effective methods of operational-service activity are being developed.

Over 2,500 group crimes in the economic sphere been solved; over 6,000 people participated in committing them, among those, 1,216 managers of various levels and 725 accounting staffers.

About R10 million, 6.2 kilograms of gold, and hard currency was taken from plunderers, speculators, bribe-takers, and hard currency dealers. Thus, in Zaporozhye Oblast, 18 manipulators were unmasked who had been operating in the "Vtorchermet" and "Vtortsvetmet" system, in the "Zaporozhyetorresursy" association and in the rayon purveyance offices of the oblast consumers' union. By means of systematically deceiving those who turned over the raw materials, they created a scrap metal surplus worth R773,000.

A multi-branched group of speculators in the Lvov area was neutralized. Imported personal computers, TV, video, and radio equipment, and other valuables were confiscated from them.

Approximately 400 crimes linked to thievery and speculation in the area of cooperatives were discovered.

Efforts are also gathering strength in the fight against the narcotics business. I would note that over the last 18 months, about 186 metric tons of narcotic raw material were confiscated and destroyed, allowing the prevention of 600,000 opium injections. Their price on the black market is R134.4 million. At health care system facilities, 116 violations of production, inventory, storage, and release rules for narcotic and strong medications have been documented since the beginning of the year. A total of 150 medical staffers have been brought to criminal and administrative accountability for these violations of the law.

The number of dangerous crimes committed in corrective labor institutions has grown recently. In this year alone, convicts mounted 10 incidents taking hostages from among the administrations of these institutions. Special groups have been created from among the workers of these institutions and servicemen of the internal security forces for actions during emergence of extraordinary situations in the corrective labor institutions, investigation isolation cells, and curative labor corrective cells.

Work with cadres, their political indoctrination and professional training, are an important means to raise the efficacy of our activity. We have done a great deal to purge ourselves of traitors to our cause, of those who have lost their trust in people, who have compromised themselves. One of the most important criteria of our work is its evaluation by workers, in light of which we are continually growing stronger.

The role of the political organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is growing immeasurably under modern conditions. After all, the demands upon each of our staffers for political maturity, ideological conviction, and precision of world view positions has grown immeasurably. Politicized associations and groups, a portion of which have dangerous nationalistic tendencies, are emerging in the republic, especially in its western oblasts. Members of such groups attempt to plant nationalistic ideas, promote extremist slogans, try to force inter-ethnic enmity, even among staffers of the internal affairs organs. They proceed toward a direct confrontation with the militia, threaten our staffers, appeal to them not to execute the orders of the local organs of power, and provoke excesses.

The Ukraine is a large, inter-national republic. The composition of its militia staffers is also inter-national; representatives of 46 nationalities are in the service. Working arm in arm, they are called upon to guard our great property, the friendship of the peoples of the Country of the Soviets. In taking an oath, they swore their loyalty to the multinational Soviet people. That is why today we turn increased attention to patriotic and inter-national indoctrination.

I will touch upon one more aspect of this issue. As a professional, I can testify that crime has never been, for example, a Ukrainian, Lithuanian, or Armenian problem—it is extra-national. Therefore, an effective fight against it can only be fought jointly, on an inter-national basis, without limiting law-enforcement activity to national quarters.

Militia service has never been simple, but always honorable. And the overwhelming majority of our staffers bear service conscientiously, giving fully of their efforts and capabilities.

Our district inspectors perform difficult work in the midst of people. For example, the respect and authority of the population is enjoyed by such district inspectors as militia Major V.S. Lobanov, working in the Simferopol Rayon department; militia Captain I.D. Budunkevich, of the Sinyatinskiy Rayon, Ivan Franko area; V.I. Zbiglyy, of the Glybokskiy Rayon, Chernovtsy Oblast; N.F. Kivenko of the Velikobagachanskiy Rayon, Poltava area, and I.G. Pokutniy of the Romenskiy Rayon, Sumy area.

A weighty contribution in the fight against crime and violations of the law is made by the commander of criminal investigation of the Shevchenkovskiy Rayon department, city of Zaphorozhye, militia Captain R.L. Tamarkov; senior commander of the BKhSS department Dzerzhinskiy Rayon department, Zhitomir Oblast, militia Captain L.K. Trofimchuk; senior investigator, Internal Affairs Administration of Khmel'nitskiy Oblast, militia Lieutenant Colonel N.L. Derekon; senior state auto inspector of the Kirovskiy Rayon department, city of Donetsk, militia Captain A.V. Zorkin; Internal Affairs Administration expert, city of Kiev, militia Lieutenant V.P. Golubenko, and subdivision department commander of the patrol-sentry service, Internal Affairs Administration, city of Kharkov, militia Sergeant N.F. Babich.

A consolidation of the militia, the strengthening of its authority is in the interests of every Soviet person. This is a reliable guarantee of the defense of his rights, life, honor, and dignity.

People justly demand real results in the strengthening of law and order in every city and village. This can be achieved only through the united efforts of the state organs, public organizations, and all citizens. Consolidation is as necessary to all of us as respect for the law, and for one another. It is necessary in the interests of perestroika and democracy.

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**Official on Leningrad Video Production,
'Videosalon' Regulation***90US0204B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 27 Oct 90 p 2*

[Interview with Lenkinovideo Director Arnold Yanovich Vitol, by K. Klyuyevskaya: "Videomagic or Videomafia?"; date and place not given]

[Text] **VIDEOBOOM: A new audio-visual epoch. On almost every corner there are signs—"Videosalon."** Whereas there are 78 movie theaters in the city and 119 clubs and palaces of culture with movie equipment—videosalons number nearly a thousand. And how many video tape recorders are there in the apartments...

The massive invasion of video technology today gives rise not only to rapture over the broadening horizons of the capabilities of "home movies"—a number of acutely painful problems are observed as well.

Every day the editors' mail contains angry letters from the readers. Those who own video tape players write about the scanty, outdated repertoire of the video libraries, and about the impossibility of buying video tape cassettes in the stores. Parents and teachers, upset by the videomania of the adolescents, are also unhappy with the repertoire of the videosalons, which is eroding the spirit of the young people. They write about a videomafia, about organized underground showings.

[Klyuyevskaya] We are talking with Arnold Yanovich Vitol, general director of the Lenkinovideo Association of the Main Cultural Administration, Leningrad City Executive Committee: Your organization has been called upon to deal with this new phenomenon in our lives, which some call video-art, and others videoculture or videotechnology, not wanting to be too hasty to place it on the level of art. What can be done today in order to somehow regulate the situation?

[Vitol] I'll tell you right off, the situation is serious. We are also receiving signals about showing films on an exclusively commercial plane—erotic films, hit movies and horror films; about unhealthy competition among the owners of the salons, battles for spheres of influence, corruption in organizations at which these salons are situated, and about financial violations with ticket sales. And it's a shame there is no single video rental system. There are a lot of proprietors.

And there are only 14 state video halls in all. Mostly they show new films from the current movie repertoire, within one or two months of release. We have 242 video points for group rentals [brigadnaya аренда]; 142 are listed among young people's cultural centers; there are 28 trade-union points; 87 at the Cinematographers' Society; 173 at the House of Amateur Creativity; and about 20 at "Trudprom." The remainder (about half of all those existing in the city, if not more) are not registered at all.

[Klyuyevskaya] And control over them?

[Vitol] Unfortunately, no one has proper control over the video business today. In our association, only six staff members are occupied with video today, and two more at the main cultural administration. But there are thousands of video points, and more and more are springing up all the time.

For example, not long ago the fire inspectors closed the videosalons on Apraksiny Dvor and at house No 4 on Muchnyy Pereulok. The other day the proprietors broke the seal, failed to pay the fine, and continue to show films. On Vasilyevskiy Ostrov, out of 22 videosalons, only three met the fire safety regulations.

[Klyuyevskaya] Why are there so few state videosalons?

[Vitol] Compared with the private entrepreneurs, we are poor. And video equipment is limited: we have received in all ten sets of imported projection equipment. It's true that we may succeed in getting some more in conjunction with the Elektrosila Association. We have been allocated currency on mutually-advantageous conditions.

However, the question also comes down to a lack of space. For example, we wanted to open videosalons at Moskovskiy and Vitebskiy Vokzal, and at the airport, but we were refused because of lack of accommodations. Later it became clear that they preferred cooperatives to us, and for them they found space.

[Klyuyevskaya] But what is keeping you from putting the repertoire in order? Surely there are some kinds of lists of productions authorized for public rental, and annotations on the films which make up the stock at video libraries?

[Vitol] Yes, we have both the lists and the film libraries. Only for a long time there has been a wide gap between private rental and the state.

The stock of three video libraries amounts to 1,400 titles. But who is interested in old movies, transferred to video tape, and concert programs taped from the television? There is practically no video production in the country at all. Given the existing technology at film studios, original video programs and video films are shot just like motion pictures, and then transferred to video tape, which makes the production extremely expensive.

As concerns lists of film titles recommended for showing, the proprietors of videosalons are simply not interested in them. Every one of them is operating on a strictly commercial basis.

[Klyuyevskaya] And so it turns out that the viewers themselves determine the repertoire? After all, not one of the salons is empty.

[Vitol] The fact of the matter is that movie fans, who had been cut off from the world film industry for decades, flocked to the videosalons to make up for lost time. But there they saw not only "The Death of the Gods," "Twentieth Century," "Platoon," "Once Upon a Time

in America," "The Leopard," "The Godfather," "Chinatown," and other motion pictures of genuine merit—but also such openly commercial articles, such as "Eaten Alive," "The Man-Eating Boar," "The Bed of Sin," and others.

Whereas genuine motion picture fans understand the essential difference between works of art and empty, enticing spectacles; beginning video-viewers go through a period of attraction to just such "forbidden" films, with the cult of violence and the surge of vulgar erotic and pornographic films.

This has an especially negative influence on adolescents and young people. A letter which we received from Kolpino reports that the public itself has tried to organize control over the activities of the videosalons. The public has observed direct parallels between video rentals and an increase in instances of hooliganism—in which the very same methods of criminal assaults, violence and drunken revelry are used that were shown on the video screen.

The public is sounding the alarm, it is getting involved in the affairs of the rayon and in the organization of leisure time—that is splendid. But there are some very different examples. For example, at School No 31 in Vasileostrovskiy Rayon, adults arranged a showing especially for 13-15-year-old adolescents of an extremely low-down film, "The Murderer in the Mirror"—which resulted in fistfights and hooligan debauchery by the young viewers, immediately after the showing.

It is well-known that many extracurricular activities, including the work of various amateur circles, cannot take place precisely because the schools are closed in the evening hours—there is no one to act as monitor. However, in order to watch a film of extremely doubtful content, "Confessions of a Window-Washer," or "Ninja on the Field of Death" (with, according to the advertisement, 1,000 methods of murder), the schools are being opened even at night.

[Klyuyevskaya] But after all, does not the Ukaz of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 1 August 1986 stipulate criminal liability in accordance with Article 228 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, for "preparing or holding for the purpose of distribution of videofilms which promote a cult of violence and cruelty"?

[Vitol] That is so. But which films can be placed in this category? Who is supposed to carry out expert analysis of them? To this very day that has not been clearly established.

And how can one control underground cable television? After all, it is well-known that there are dozens of addresses from which videofilms are relayed to several thousand apartments. And if one takes into consideration the fact that, as a rule, there is more than one person sitting in front of the television, what a mass of viewers it must serve! Essentially this is a new kind of video piracy. With them it is very difficult to control the

state video halls. We, after all, have the right to show only films officially purchased abroad and distributed by "Videofilm," of GosKino USSR. These are very few in number. Video libraries today are incapable of competing with the uncontrolled exchange on the "black" market, which is abundantly resupplied with cassettes in circulation. It is no secret that skilled interpreters have been quitting their state jobs and are earning a living by providing synchronous translations for the underground video business.

[Klyuyevskaya] Do the videosalons contribute any funds to the state budget?

[Vitol] Today all video establishments are tax-exempt. But by decision of the financial organs, they must transfer five percent of their receipts to Lenkinovideo and eight to VAAP [All Union Copyright Agency]. However, no one even knows their estimated income, nor even the number of video points. Tickets are not to be sold at prices higher than the state price (1 ruble each), yet they are sold for two and even three rubles. Tickets are printed up on a typewriter (for example, at the videosalon on Izhorskiy Batalon St. in Kolpino), and many of them don't even issue tickets—they just pass the hat. And people crowd into the halls in much greater numbers than allowed for health and fire safety.

[Klyuyevskaya] But it seems that not all of them operate in this manner. Are there not also videosalons that do not cause harm, but do good?

[Vitol] Of course there are. I would like to tell you that the Cinematographers' Union, for example, derives funds to supplement the pensions of their unemployed cinematographers from the receipts of videosalons which are registered with the kinofund. And they also contribute money to the Mercy Society.

There are also, fortunately, videosalons where they show free animated cartoons for the children, and promote the classics. But it is costly for them to do so. Competitors from the neighboring streets break their windows and steal their equipment.

[Klyuyevskaya] It's obvious that such a situation cannot be tolerated any longer. Just what measures should be taken in order that video-art develops normally in our city?

[Vitol] I don't believe that bans such as those in the struggle with drunkenness and narcotics addiction would achieve anything. As we have already seen, resolutions are adopted, but they remain on paper—there is no one today to see that they are carried out, since the videosalons are subordinate to various authorities. What is needed is an overall, well-thought-out program that takes in the entire range of practical matters; one which would skillfully and intelligently counter any kind of illegal intentions. To do this, the question of the further development of video-art must be brought up and thoroughly discussed at a session of the Leningrad City Soviet. This was discussed at a recent meeting held at Leningrad

Gorispolkom Deputy Chairman T.V. Zakharova's office. A single, competent and authoritative commission of experts on video repertoire should be established, probably at the Cinematographers' Union.

A system of strict control should be devised, with very high fines for violations. And a certain amount per patron should be deducted for the state budget from the income of the video salons who are not contributing to charities. Facilities that do not comply with health and fire standards should be closed. The ispolkom departments of culture should be given responsibility for control and for the condition of videosalons in the region.

But we must not relieve from moral and official responsibility those who open and support video establishments, reap large returns from the receipts, and do not want to acknowledge by what means and from what kind of repertoire they were received. I have in mind primarily the Komsomol, youth and trade union organizations, for whom ideological-educational aims must be paramount.

And we cannot become complacent, thinking that video piracy and the anything-goes attitude of this phenomenon in our culture is of secondary importance. We are, as usual, behind the times. In foreign countries there has long been an active struggle with underground distribution of videocassettes and their illegal reproduction; police raids are conducted, and heavy fines are levied. I believe it is time for us to take a good look at their experience. But the main thing is to satisfy public demand for home video cassette players and video cassettes. After all, video is primarily for "home movies."

Latvian Paper Scores Belorussian Press Coverage of Baltic Events

90US0194B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 10 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by S. Shapran: "Sanctioned Insinuation: A Look at the Official Belorussian Press"]

[Text] Half a year ago, I proposed to talk to the editors of several Belorussian newspapers about political and social changes in Latvia. I was invariably refused, and as I learned privately, this rejection was barefacedly motivated by the phrase: "It's still a bit too early for us to report on that." And in fact, to this day I have not encountered a single attempt at any kind of serious analysis of the situation in the Baltic republics. Although the Belorussian press has tried to hold its tongue as well concerning the informal (read: illicit) life of its native land.

The Belorussian popular front "Adradzhenne" ["Renaissance"] became a stumbling block. By June 1989 the republic's press had carried a few revealing pieces on the Belorussian cultural societies "Talaka," "Svitanak," and "Tutevshiya." After the first sanctioned meeting of the BNF [Belorussian Popular Front] on February 19 in

Minsk, defamation in the press of the Soviet workers in the "so-called popular front" was incited on a large scale. As is known, the best defense is attack. This press campaign operated in the best traditions of the periods of Stalinism and stagnation, when it became customary to display admirable unanimity in censuring without having the faintest idea as to what was being run down: not a single Belorussian press organ dared to enter into a dialogue with the new public organizations. But this could not continue indefinitely. Finally a regular session of the BNF took place in Vilnius. And, frankly, the first report about this in the Belorussian press had a debilitating effect. The point is that every paper printed the very same piece by a BELTA correspondent, "Seek the path to dialogue," which stated in an on-the-whole nonbelligerent tone: "Now much will depend upon how the leadership of the new public organization conducts itself. One would hope that it confines itself to the realm of ideas and does not allow confrontation." The question of confrontation or dialogue is not a central one for the BNF. But if the BELTA correspondent took it into his head.... As they say, the host is the master.

Only one newspaper—"Literatura i mastatstva" ("Literature and Art")—dared to be objective. The republic's entire press amicably published the report "At the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium," which by hook and crook managed to present the BNF organizing committee's request to hold a session in Minsk as a barrier to "setting up a constructive dialogue and consolidating all of the forces for perestroika." "LiM" ["Literatura i mastatstva"] maintains the position that an opinion has the right to exist, even if it departs from the official point of view. After the BNF session "LiM" will publish a digest of materials from the session.

However, this light breeze, having replaced a protracted period of stillness, spread delight for a short time. Clearly those "at the top" were not immediately able to find a position towards unsanctioned disobedience. And after two weeks the Belorussian press hurried to report that the Popular Front had after all, it seems, taken the path of confrontation with the official authorities.

In particular the reflections of V. Dmitriev, who wanted to share a few impressions and thoughts on the session, were widely represented in the pages of the Belorussian press. True, these thoughts more resemble a programmed rebuff of the Popular Front by the Belorussian Communist Party. I will say it right away: the author does make fair observations with respect to the BNF. I am not idealizing "Adradzhenne." But I will not linger now on V. Dmitriev's objective assessments, since the entire tone of his speech was highly negative and often unethical from a journalistic point of view; by the way, this characterizes the attitude of the entire Belorussian press towards the BNF. V. Dmitriev maintains that the BNF's program is a mixture of variations on individual directions and recommendations given at the 19th All-Union Party Conference as well as excerpts from documents of the Lithuanian "Sayudis" and the Estonian Popular Front. The only thing new the author sees in the

BNF's program is the "attacks on the 'partaocracy' and on the 'administrative- bureaucratic system,' which supposedly interferes with the business of perestroyka." Our respected colleague has manifested here an enviable lack of attention: Comrade Dmitriev, have you read the programs of the Lithuanian Popular Movement for Perestroyka and the Estonian Popular Front? If you answer in the affirmative, about which I have my doubts, then you must have read the BNF's program "at breakneck speed." Belorussia has a unique ecological situation, and that alone already distinguishes the program of "Adradzhenne."

One thing that Dmitriev is really right about is that "if from the beginnings of perestroyka our official structures had paid more attention to the people's needs and sentiments, the organizing committee would hardly have received any support." Self-criticism is a wonderful thing! But further on our colleague moans that "none of the heads of our republic's creative unions, none of our famous Belorussian writers, literature specialists, or scholars attended the session." I don't know, but if the Belorussian journalist is still not familiar with the writers who were present at the session: R. Borodulin, V. Orlov, and A. Ryazanov; if the critic A. Sidorevich is not an authority; if the names S. Shushkevich (pro-rector of Belorussia University), Yu. Khadyko (doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences), M. Tkachev (doctor of Historical Sciences), and V. Konan (doctor of Philosophical Sciences) are not associated with Belorussian research; and if the presence of three people's deputies at the session says nothing at all to Dmitriev, then I am beginning to have serious doubts about his competence. However, it is possible that his orientation is with another science and literature—the one which is always biased and which today is already dead. Or maybe the journalist would like to turn a working session into a convention of paid celebrities. The human mind is a mystery.

Or perhaps, let us say, the author of the "reflections" is casting doubt upon Yu. Khadyko's statement that "a civilized government cannot exist without religion." That is his right. But it seems that the world's (and yes, our nation's) history has long since borne out Khadyko's position. Dmitriev did not like the idea of sovereignty for Belorussia either: That is why the journalist, with a light heart, ascribes to the session a chauvinist phrase such as "Belorussia for Belorussians." Comrade Dmitriev, were you by some chance hallucinating?

Or perhaps our comrade was offended on behalf of the CPSU when the just demand was made that Article 6 of the USSR Constitution be changed and when the defense of a multiparty system was heard. Or perhaps he already fears a real "leading and directing role" for the party? If the Communist Party is really not out of touch with the people's aspirations, does it have to fear a vote of no-confidence? And is that the point—who is leading? More important is how we are led. No one is denying the fact that it is precisely the party which initiated perestroyka. But wasn't it the Communist Party which

steered a steady course until 1985? Perhaps the Communist Party was an underground movement before April 1985? No such thing...

By the way, the author of "reflections and thoughts" is, of course, not alone: the editorial staff of the paper "Soviet Belorussia" has found another critic of the BNF—the writer Eduard Skobelev (who also holds the post of party gorkom instructor).

"My first feelings were amazement, joy and anxiety....I was amazed that the newspaper would print the words of a representative of a legally non-existing 'front.'" This is the naive beginning of the writer's commentary. Since when are our newspapers obliged to give the floor only to representatives of legally existing organizations?

One truly marvels, reading nonsense such as E. Skobelev's "Commentary." For example: "But how can socialism justify itself if it has not been allowed to develop its potential and if posts are placed in its path?" Who is placing the posts, comrade writer? Is it not the notorious agents of imperialism?! Or the intelligentsia, which according to V. Dmitriev, is occupied with nothing other than attending BNF sessions?

Or here's another Skobelev gem: "I ask—is that not the reason why the Vilnius session failed to respond to the clearly expressed expectations of Belorussians, who are subject to well-known oppression in the Baltic republics?" Is this self-respecting writer prepared to answer for his words? (In connection with this, the editor of "Sovetskaya Molodezh" would be grateful to Belorussians living in the Baltic republics if they would write in about their "oppression.") And the same self-assurance displayed by Dmitriev has allowed Skobelev to place an equality sign between the party and the people in his "Commentary." In reality this is impossible to do, even quantitatively.

At another point E. Skobelev states: "at the present time there is no political force in Belorussia which is capable of guarding the Belorussian people's national interests to a large extent, not even the Communist Party, which has realized its duty [well, finally!—S. Sh.]"

I do not intend to blame the Belorussian press alone for the one-sidedness and deliberate bias of the material which is presented to the reader. There are always honest people around, even in the editorial offices of Belorussian newspapers. And I have met them at BNF sessions. And Belorussian journalists have made sober assessments of the Popular Front's activities which have not appeared in print. It is another matter that speaking the whole truth in Belorussia has still not become the rule. We are pursuing a "heterodoxy" here to this day. Although precisely in this artificially created morass of the Belorussian press I see one of the principal reasons for identifying Belorussia with the French Vandee. And without glasnost this morass cannot be drained.

P.S. After this piece had already been prepared, another one, "Mystification, or a Conversation Apropos of a

Certain Publication by Z. Poznyak in the Latvian Newspaper for Youth" (based upon an interview with Zenon Poznyak appearing in "SM" ["Sovetskaya molodezh"] on April 20 of this year) was published in the 8th issue of "Political Interlocutor" (organ of the Belorussian CP Central Committee). In order to understand the groundlessness of the accusations made, it is enough to become familiar with this April issue of "SM." However, the authors of "Mystification..." take only four quotes from the entire text of the interview and in their own way comment upon them. Belorussian readers will think they are right: indeed, not every Belorussian reads "Sovetskaya molodezh."

However, it is comforting that "LiM" (organ of the Ministry of Culture and of the management board of the Belorussian SSR Union of Writers) on August 25 expresses its bewilderment over the publication in this magazine: "instead of vacuous chit-chat and malicious attacks, we should be publishing platforms and programs of informal associations and documents from BNF sessions.... It must be understood that we cannot found a popular movement and a popular initiative on prohibitions or orders and administrative measures."

Lithuanian SSR Goskomizdat Chairman on Publishing, Financing Approaches

90US0204A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
20 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by Lithuanian SSR Goskomizdat Chairman Yu. Nekroshyus: "Proving New Management Methods in Practice: Developing Independence"]

[Text] Economic independence and cost accounting in the republic, city, rayon and branch—today these concepts are not only foremost in the minds of the specialists, they truly reflect the mood of every one of us.

We are asking difficult questions on how to solve the economic problems, while trying to fit them to our own area or specific enterprise. I have devoted many years to the publishing business, and in this article I would like to reflect a bit on perestroika in the printing trade, in periodical literature and the book trade; that is, the whole publishing business. Sometimes one hears the opinion that publishers are not subject to the economy and are indifferent to its restructuring. However, the very essence, the nature of the press forces the accumulation of opinions and various projects, and trying them out on ourselves.

Intensive searches are under way in the sphere of the republic Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade, for new solutions and for defining its path within the general bounds of perestroika. It is Goskomizdat's idea to form a management organ for a new type of branch, to work out new economic ties and the total independence of the collectives on the basis of mutually-advantageous contacts, and to expand various forms of self-management. The basic principles for implementing economic reforms

have been determined as well. This means first of all, gradual removal of the functions of economic administration "from the top down," replacing them with horizontal ties, and integrating the production management systems at the primary level. Structural subdivisions of the committee shall be included in the new structural complex: a bank, a joint-stock company, joint enterprises, trade firms and associations, and so on. This will ensure the proper contacts and provision of information, will allow us to utilize the scientific-technical and commercial information of the central apparatus, encourage initiative, and will strengthen the basis of economic management.

Today the preparatory work has already been done to establish a joint-stock bank for the Lithuanian press, which should become the center of the branch's economic interests, and the conditions and guarantee of its development.

Goskomizdat has become a founder of the Innovation Bank of Lithuania and one of the members of its council, which permits direct participation in inter-branch projects, and acquiring sufficient economic information.

Spindulis, a joint (Lithuania-USA) printing enterprise has been established and is in operation, specializing in the publication of advertising at the highest level, which can serve the purposes of significantly increasing Lithuania's export goods. A contract has been signed for cooperation with Yugoslavian publishing houses. The first products published on a cooperative basis have been received. Book trade has been established with 76 countries in the world, although the volumes are thus far not very large and do not satisfy us. Talks are under way for setting up new joint enterprises with the USA, England, Yugoslavia, the FRG, Italy and France.

Goskomizdat is conducting a policy of technical and economic cooperation, oriented on quickly establishing a system of economic ties which would permit reliably providing the publishing and printing complex with the necessary equipment and materials. A special place is reserved in the projects for taking advantage of the republic's industrial potential, and for mutually-advantageous exchange with neighboring republics. All conditions obtain in Lithuania to expand the production of paper for the press, and in order to supply itself with cardboard, book-binding materials, and computers for publishing.

All of this is aimed at accelerating the development of the printing and publishing business, and depicts in outline the economic independence of the complex. For example, the committee, having invested start-up capital, plans to take part in joint construction with foreign firms of a writing paper enterprise. Considering the fact that the largest printing plant in the republic is being built in Vilnius, this would permit completely satisfying the public's demand for book products in the very near future, and would ensure their export to Western and Eastern markets.

In short, we are striving to implement our economic ideas, not by the methods of orders and instructions, but by means of putting them into effect, and proving them in practice. We are taking the very same steps in the publishing arena as well, where we have done away with orders—which today cause an allergic reaction in many people. Instead, we are proposing general documents of agreement on this or that problem for representatives of all republic publishing houses, and point papers defining the direction of publishing activities for a certain period. In such a situation the specialists on the committee play the role of initiators, and are realizing their own capabilities in a certain economic area. Their participation can appear in the initial stages while the new structure is being established, or it can switch to a form of independent action. Large concerns may act in a similar fashion, in setting up daughter firms made up of small groups of high-ranking specialists, experts and practitioners, and offering them independence when the latter achieve tangible economic results.

Establishing new economic, industrial and technological ties with neighboring republics is a very important stage. We have already spoken and taken counsel with the publishing houses of Estonia and Latvia, and will be meeting in the very near future to discuss specific matters. We must bring out the capabilities and future prospects of every republic. For example, the Estonians, who have good contacts with the Finns, promise taking upon themselves the production of high-quality printing inks; the Latvians could take up minor mechanization in printing plants; and we—the manufacture of computers for publishing, the moreso since the joint enterprise Baltikum-Amadeus is located in Lithuania. It is possible that, using the facilities the Plunge artificial leather factory, we will be able to supply the entire region with book-binding materials.

In which areas are we still strong, and which of the trump cards we hold are the most effective? What should we call a halt to and what should we develop? Where should we take risks and where should we depend on traditional production? The specialists on the committee must answer these questions without delay, without expecting that someone "up above" will provide a ready-made prescription.

The overall ideology of the economics of perestroika is very important. The motives of economic independence must be clear and understandable to everyone. Today we are obliged not only to declare, but to be convinced ourselves in the correctness of what we are doing, and to affirm that we are striving to work more effectively, with greater results; and work with ecological purity, skillfully making maximum use of secondary raw materials and advanced technology.

It is important to recognize that without a truly new conception of management, without a psychological breakthrough in consciousness, we will never be able to defeat economic backwardness and indifference. We must reject the pernicious notion that—one can make

mistakes; everyone makes mistakes, and others make worse ones. Thus, in my view, those hundreds and thousands of optimistic documents were able to wreck the economy of even such a huge country as ours, with its wealth of natural resources, and destroyed a great deal of riches or scattered it to the winds. Economic independence must guarantee the ability to create and use as much as is needed and is sensible for the republic.

The new economic thinking is gradually paving a road for itself. The latest decisions of the USSR Committee on the Press and its economic policy have put into a good mood. The "powerful" center has rejected all micromanaging, modification of plans, and control policy; it has reserved to itself only the strategic problems of the printing industry, raw-material production, and problems of modernization. It would be well if other union-level ministries and agencies would conduct themselves likewise.

Questions of leadership quality, style, culture and competence are now coming to the forefront. How to lead; how to define and direct this or that economic structure; and how to completely eliminate command without releasing the reins of the economy?

Issuing orders, relying on one's rank or "epaulets," is no longer effective. What is most important is to mobilize all forces and all specialists, and establish a creative and collegial atmosphere, which would encourage experiments, and would be a kind of catalyst. The Council of Ministers, as the headquarters of the ministries, must become a non-standard creative center, and not a place where things are read off by rote. Right now administrators of all ranks often fear innovation, avoid expressing their opinions, and are afraid to allocate and take risks. We lack, and at times severely lack those capable of discussing things and finding the proper solutions.

At the present time a lot of commissions and groups of experts are operating in Lithuania, and working out projects. In the process of the quest, dangerous dispositions have appeared as well: Here we go; we'll create a new model, and we'll go into full swing! Such an arrangement is, undoubtedly, dangerous for perestroika. We must operate on the basis of stable decisions, from a position of integration, while changing the economic structures, and understanding their interaction.

Today there is no lack of mentors and programs. There are also those who throw up their hands and expect a crisis of innovation. The practitioners who know very well the old ills of the economy will probably leave the scene soon. The moreso that with the present negative attitude toward them, some people are not presently filled with a burning desire to work out a program of perestroika for the transition period, and others lack such an opportunity. In brief, the new model is being set up in a situation when it is past time to move the chessman, when social passions and ambitions are seething; knowing neither how many bureaucratic seats there will be, draped in democratic tapestry, nor who will be sitting in them.

But we have crossed the Rubicon, and those of us who have truly estimated the situation must not become confused in the labyrinth of the new economy.

Georgian Journalist Runs Own Investigation of April Tbilisi Events

90US0192A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA special correspondent Valeriy Vyzhutovich: "Circumstances of the Time. Private Journalistic Investigation: Lessons and Reflections"]

[Text] In late July, when the facts, testimony, and documents he had brought to light seemed to him to have come together, become logical, and nearly formed a definite picture, he sat down at the typewriter and tapped out a letter:

"To Politburo member, CPSU Central Committee Secretary V. M. Chebrikov.

"Dear Viktor Mikhaylovich: I am troubling you with what is perhaps an unexpected but very urgent matter. When comrades E. Shevardnadze and G. Razumovskiy were in Tbilisi during the events of April, in response to the demands of the public, who had expressed a categorical lack of confidence in the official press, they offered me, an old-time journalist and editor in the creative association of the Gruziya-Film Studio, the official right to conduct an independent journalistic investigation of the events. This fact, which is unprecedented in Soviet journalism, cannot be judged otherwise than as evidence of the expansion of glasnost and democratization in our state.

"This journalistic investigation, lasting about three months, is nearing its conclusion. But it has made it necessary for me to meet you and ask you a few questions, and only after that will it be possible to arrive at the only correct final conclusion.

"I venture to express the hope that you will not refuse me a 30-minute audience, in particular because its results will be awaited with boundless anxiousness by the entire public of the Georgian SSR.

"Respectfully, Irakliy Gotsiridze."

A couple of weeks later he received a telephone call from Old Square: "Fly on up. Viktor Mikhaylovich will receive you." As soon as Gotsiridze entered the ante-room, an aide politely but firmly warned him: "The conversation will be brief. The Central Committee Secretary's routine is scheduled down to the minute." The conversation lasted three and one-quarter hours.

A few days later, Gotsiridze telephoned Politburo candidate-member D. Yazov, the USSR Minister of Defense. Yazov replied quickly and tersely: "Could you come and see me right now?"

At the risk of disappointing the reader, let me say at the outset that we will not be lingering with the journalist in

that big office, nor in the next or the next.... There are several reasons for this. First, the materials Gotsiridze obtained at first hand are something he himself should be the first to make public (a book is being written), and I do not wish, nor do I have the right, to take a colleague's lawful bread away from him.

The second reason is that the details of these meetings and conversations are no secret to many people. Gotsiridze has given a number of extensive interviews to the Tbilisi newspapers. What he talked about, and with whom, was also reported in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI on 10 September.

Finally, the main reason: Irakliy Gotsiridze is not a procurator, a lawyer, or a judge. He does not accuse, defend, or sentence anyone. There are high-level, fully-empowered agencies to do that. There is a commission that was created by the Congress of People's Deputies, and investigations are being conducted by the republic Procuracy and the military procuracy.... The task we face, you and I, is to assess the precedent itself: this private investigation. Why did it now become necessary and possible? How has it enriched our experience?

On 12 April, three days after the tragedy, USSR Foreign Affairs Minister E. Shevardnadze and CPSU Central Committee Secretary G. Razumovskiy arrived in Tbilisi and met with the public at Gruziya-Film. The shocked people began shouting and asked, Why aren't the newspapers or television telling the truth about what happened? Where are the guarantees that all the circumstances that led to the tragic outcome will be investigated thoroughly and objectively and that those who are guilty will be brought to justice? At this point, Gotsiridze stood up, took the microphone, and addressed Shevardnadze, whom he had known since the days of the Virgin Lands, and said: "Eduard! If you believe in my objectivity and honesty, allow me to conduct a private investigation additional to the official one."

Could Shevardnadze turn down the proposal? Even on the grounds that it came from a person who at that moment represented no one but himself? A tragic event, everything tense, any touch upon the pain might prove unpredictable. Wasn't it unreasonable to allow a casual volunteer to be involved in such a serious investigation? But could he be denied the right? After all, he had to know that, as usual, commissions would be set up, and behind tightly closed doors, in secret conference, people properly designated would agree among themselves how to assess what happened, whom to judge innocent and guilty. We do have experience of such investigations, for example in the case of Novochoerkassk, of which millions of people have learned only recently. But it is precisely because, sooner or later, people will learn the truth; even before, it was rarely possible to keep it under official wraps, conceal it and keep it quiet, and it is even less possible now. It is essential, however, to weigh the load of fatal circumstances very carefully and repeatedly, to establish their direct and reciprocal connections with people's actions, all the while manifesting a virtually

impossible and nevertheless essential impartiality. Can one man have the necessary spiritual strength, courage, and restraint?

What should the Politburo member reply to this proposal? Consider also the fact that he was no stranger to the land where the tragedy took place. The motives of human behavior here, it would seem, are quite clear and definite. Motives of political behavior, however... Stop! We're going backwards.... For so many years we were indoctrinated in the austere faith that politics is higher than morality. Only now, when we have officially proclaimed to the whole world the priority of what is common to all humanity, can we observe a definite and steady warming that returns us to the bosom of civilization. Today, pain—living human pain—is also a political factor that cannot be ignored, for that won't work.

"I have no objections," said Eduard Amvrosiyevich. "Go ahead."

Are you disappointed? Would you rather that such selfless endeavor not require high-placed support? Would you rather have it that any private person defending the public interest could demand that the safes of state institutions be opened to him and obtain the necessary information, documents, and data as freely as books in a library? Well, it would be nice to believe that someday we'll live to see it. Meanwhile, let's ask ourselves: What if someone who was privy to the events in Tbilisi categorically refused to talk with this "free-lance artist," unprotected even by a mandate from some solid publication, perhaps? What this involves is more than an unbelievable shortening of the distance to a desk in an office with tea and biscuits served by a polite secretary to both host and guest. What is involved here is something deeper, more fundamental, which Marx himself noted: "...the hierarchy punishes a functionary to the extent that he sins against the hierarchy or to the extent that he commits a sin which the hierarchy does not need, but the hierarchy takes him under his wing anytime the hierarchy itself commits a sin through him..."

Just so: What if they refused to talk?

Well, in that case let's imagine this: curfew has been imposed in the city; there are armored personnel carriers in the streets and military patrols everywhere; rumors are circulating that more people died than are indicated in the official reports... Many enterprises and institutions are not operating; demonstrations continue; people are demanding the truth about what happened. The whole country is talking about the tragedy...

No, there could be no "conspiracy of silence" surrounding this tragedy. No more. The thing took place in April, perestroika was celebrating its fourth birthday. The circumstances of place had not changed. The circumstances of time had.

If anyone among the writing fraternity had conceived the desire to have a private talk with members of the Politburo just five years ago, and on a subject like this at

that... Well, there's no need to be concerned for his fate: no one would have done so. Where would he come from? Gotsiridze did not come about by himself—the times called him forth. Then, however... What civilian interference could have been expected then in the affairs of those at the very top of the administration? High-level offices were tightly closed to assessments "from below," unless such assessments were accorded "the whole people's total approval." Yet unexpressed assessments, accumulating, pose the threat of explosions of extremism and rampaging passions or—and I don't know which is worse—lead to submissive, philistinistic resignation.

But now, today, an ordinary journalist is received at the highest level, so to speak. What does this indicate? Does it mean that now even a high official can no longer be indifferent to what people think and say about him? Probably. But this does not, I think, exhaust the social meaning of the precedent. True, leaders of that rank until recently showed themselves to the people very seldom except from the reviewing stand on the mausoleum. But suppose—let us imagine the unimaginable—Brezhnev or Chernenko, clinking with gold medals, had suddenly descended from the pedestal for a few minutes or even a few hours and become accessible and open to normal human communication—what would you and I have done? Well? What would we have done? Nothing, most likely.

How mistaken we are to assume that it is only "they" who give "us" lessons in comportment. No: everything is reciprocal; everything is dialectically connected.

Contemplating the rare, previously unthinkable openness with which the top leaders of Tbilisi and Moscow received a generally unknown journalist, let us attempt to understand what motivated them. A conscious need to tell the people the truth? The fear of being hurt by the truth if it should come to light without their participation? The desire to repent (if there was something to repent of), to confess their errors, to reply? But even if we assume the one, the other, or all three, the question remains: Why?

Until recently, the fate and career of our country's leaders did not depend on the opinion of "the lower orders" any more than the rising and setting of the sun depended on trade union meetings. There are still persons who believe, naively, that the essential and prime difference between the powers that be and ordinary mortals consists of personal Volgas, dachas, and special benefits.... I would say, however, that the main privilege of the nomenklatura is not to have to answer to subordinates, but I'm not certain this is a privilege. Could it be the fruit of mutual training [vospitaniye]? As many times as they announced, "Show your unanimous approval by your applause," we did so. Former Ukrainian CP Central Committee First Secretary P. Shelest, remembering L. Brezhnev unkindly, now shares these reflections: "He couldn't live without stars, he just couldn't; what can you do? As to spirit, nothing. He arrived an upstart and departed the same way. He held out because of the

nature of his entourage. An entourage is a big deal in politics." As to whether anyone else—ordinary people, ordinary folk—might serve in the entourage of such a person besides his closest advisors, Petr Yefimovich gave not a word or hint; that's the way he was brought up. But about a year ago, the first secretary of the South Sakhalin Obkom was relieved of his post—and not without the participation of the public. Or, another very recent example, the "boss" of Smolnyy tendered his resignation after being defeated in the elections of people's deputies.

In this short list, Dzhumbar Patiashvili stands apart. The measure of his guilt will be determined by the commission of deputies. The measure of his moral responsibility is something he determined himself, and voluntarily resigned his post.

From the telegram Patiashvili sent to Moscow (it was read aloud by A. Lukyanov at the Congress of People's Deputies) it is clear that in November of last year the first secretary of the Georgian Central Committee called for military force to "pacify [uspokoyeniye] the people."

"Why did you do it?" Gotsiridze asked. "Nothing out of the ordinary was taking place during that time."

"Yes, I intentionally characterized the situation as explosive in order to force the country's leaders to heed the Georgian people's protests regarding the draft amendments to the USSR Constitution, which were being discussed at that time."

In the fatal sequence of Dzhumbar Patiashvili's actions, this "patriotic" pressure on Moscow was a first attempt at—how should we put this—spreading it on thick to create a frightening picture of the situation. The second such attempt is attested by a document from Gotsiridze's file. It is the Georgian CP Central Committee Buro decree dated 7 April: "On the Introduction of a State of Emergency in Tbilisi."

1. In connection with the sharp deterioration of the political situation and the anti-Soviet and illegal actions of extremists and their followers taking part in an unauthorized rally involving many thousands of people, and undertaking attempts to seize certain enterprises and to organize work stoppages and strikes, calling for the overthrow of the republic's government, and posing a threat to people's lives and health, a state of emergency to be introduced in Tbilisi in the event of necessity.

2. Authorization requested from the CPSU Central Committee.

D. Patiashvili, First Secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee."

One thing is very puzzling: no minutes were held. It is impossible to determine by documentation who spoke and what position he took.

The meeting of the republic's party aktiv next day unanimously approved the statement of the Central

Committee's First Secretary: "The position of the Georgian CP Central Committee Buro rules out the manifestation of any political weakness or any unjustified concessions and compromises." The aktiv meeting was participated in by eminent representatives of the intelligentsia as well as republic leaders. Poet Dzh. Charkviani was the only one who raised his voice against these extraordinary measures. The appearance of General K. Kochetov and General I. Rodionov in the hall was greeted with applause.

What, pray tell, is most feared by a leader who is convinced that it is not he who is accountable to the people but the people who are accountable to him? He fears the loss of bureaucratic secrets, because such a loss means the loss of power. But the person who does not fear either one also makes us bolder, more steadfast and independent. Glued to the television set, ourselves hardly realizing it, we can observe deputies calling the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to the stand, for example, or the Finance Minister, or the Minister of Internal Affairs, and for the first time in our memory these people approach the microphone not to "map out new goals" but to give an account of themselves.

Because the "top guys" are beginning to sense that they are being monitored, while the "lower orders" are gaining the chance to do the monitoring, makes both sides stronger. To be sure, we are going from one extreme to the other in this as well. Yesterday it was obedient attention to what the leaders said; today, frequently, it's fierce confrontation with them. The mob is making idols out of raging persons who call for the overthrow of all apparatchiks without exception. Do you want to win cheers at a rally? Lambast the leadership! But they do not waste any time either, launching political labels like "extremists," "nationalists," "enemies of Soviet rule...." I have observed such "dialogues" this past summer in Moldavia and listened to them in Central Asia; I recorded them on Moscow's Pushkin square just a few feet away from IZVESTIYA.... How far all this is from respectful discourse! What primitive vapors waft from such "investigations"!

Against this background, the private journalistic investigation by Irakli Gotsiridze sets a rare example of meticulous, literate, civilized quest for truth. It could be the prototype of new diplomatic relations between the people and the authorities, these two high negotiating parties linked by a common fate.

Who is he, this Irakli Gotsiridze?

He was born in Tbilisi. He fought in the war, worked on ZARYA VOSTOKA, headed the Culture Department on VECHERNIY TBILISI, and was a stringer for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA for a time. He apportioned praise or blame as appropriate; he taught life.... In short, a journalist's career rather more ordinary than exceptional. But in '69 he told himself, That's it! I can't stand

it any more! So he joined the movie studio as an animated features editor, and never wrote another line for the newspapers.

Why is he alone? you ask. Why is he not in active communion with friends and fellow-thinkers?

We are, after all, drawn to the friendly collective. Yet an investigation "in the cause of truth and justice" today, if you have noticed, is rather more often entrusted to an individual, to the individual in particular, and then.... Because the individual is becoming more politicized day by day, while politics is becoming more personalized [olitsetvoryayetsya]. This dialectical process is growing, and you can't stop it.

The point here, incidentally, is not just someone's high human attributes. It is a matter of principle.

"I know you will show me no mercy. But you're the only one I can trust," said Dzhumber Patiashvili to Irakliy Gotsiridze.

Many people's absolute certainty that by following the corridors of officialdom you risk missing the truth is, alas, nourished by facts of our everyday reality. The powerlessness of the truth is probably the most dangerous kind of social powerlessness. But if state organs in some cases—by reason of official incompetence, bureaucratic high-handedness, or simple negligence—have manifested complete inability to deal with the truth and affirm justice, there must surely be one last resort to which one may appeal under extreme circumstances. It exists in every democratic society. It does not require an apparatus, offices, or a sign... It is not an institution. It is the citizen. The ordinary citizen, free and independent. Not necessarily a journalist. A jurist, scientist, or physician—whatever.

It is not absolutely necessary for individual amateurs to compete with professionals. But the right to make an independent analysis of any happening, on whatever scale, should pertain to each and everyone.

We are in the habit of saying: If there is something, they can take care of it without us. Under conditions of the nationalization of many aspects of our existence, a state monopoly on the investigation of extraordinary events and happenings has become entrenched. So very often, however, this most crucial work, on which people's fate depends, is turned over to those who are bound hand and foot by ties of departmental relations, local "patriotism," and bureaucratic solidarity... Any attempt at independent intervention in an investigation is nipped in the bud: "It's not within your competence!" That was how, for example, S. Zalygin was rebuffed by the authors of the "Project of the Century" to reverse the northern rivers. Common sense prevailed, but at what cost!

Hundreds of people he didn't know wrote to him and called him up. Many found out his address, went directly to his home and knocked on the door...

You have to know Georgia. When grief is visited upon it, people seem to take each other by the hand, help each other, render kindnesses and compassion. And there is a very close—one might even call it all-in-the-family—unity in their need and striving to understand how it all happened. If I say, therefore, that Gotsiridze's return from high-placed offices was anxiously awaited by the entire republic, it is no big exaggeration.

Could someone else have taken his place? Certainly. But that other person would have been invested with the same powers. Public opinion that is expressed through some person is a double winner. First, it is a genuine person. One can talk with him, negotiate, argue, reason together in a calm, comfortable situation, away from the multi-voiced rally in which both thoughts and words are frequently drowned. Second, such a person, being an exponent of the social interest, is totally invulnerable to bureaucratic pressure. He cannot be transferred, removed, or clamped down upon, because immediately someone else will appear, someone young or someone marked with age, man or woman, but with the same staunch expression of public concern that no one can erase.

I have not mentioned that the journalist was advised with respect to all legal aspects by republic Procurator V. Razmadze and Supreme Court Chairman A. Karanadze. The heads of official law enforcement organs conscientiously served the public every way they could for several months. For many years, so much that was useful, wise, or well-meant has run up against the wall of departmental egotism in our country. To this day, the departments and the public are in a constant state of opposition and clashing interests. For a state institution to work for a representative of the people voluntarily, without any visible benefit to itself, is something that was unimaginable before. Today as well, let us not be naive, no special eagerness to do so is as yet observable everywhere. The Georgian law enforcement organs' assistance with this journalistic investigation seems to be the first such example. Against the prevailing (and, alas, not unfounded) notions, people in authority today are within increasing frequency helping to bring the truth to light rather than concealing it.

The journalist's mission came to an end on the day USSR Defense Minister D. Yazov received him.

Yazov got two red file folders out of the safe and put them on the desk. One of them contained an order signed by General of the Army M. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff, to send additional troop units to Tbilisi in connection with the emergency there. The other contained the coded messages Patiashvili had sent to Moscow. Attached to the 7 April message, in which the Central Committee First Secretary requested military assistance, was a list of officials drawn up by Chebrikov—for inspection [dlia oznakomleniya]...

"I was the one who appointed Rodionov to direct the operation," said Yazov. "He did not receive a written order from me, that's true. But we did talk on the telephone..."

The "Findings of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission To Investigate the Circumstances that Took Place in the City of Tbilisi on 9 April 1989" states that "official documents confirm that until 8 April, I. Rodionov was against the Soviet Army's participation in stopping the rally."

And so, the main facts, documents, and testimony extracted by the journalist from the network of numerous, scattered, and frequently contradictory details and circumstances of the case have been turned over to the commission of deputies and published in the Georgian press. It must be repeated once more: these are not conclusions (vyvody). The commission of deputies is the body empowered to announce the conclusions. The way I see it, Irakliy Gotsiridze's main discovery is something else. The private investigation he undertook is one more step away from the confines of customary ideas. Massive movement in this direction is not yet to be expected, nor is it necessary. But when the people cease to be silent, when their opinion takes on character and force, the long-awaited features of a civil society are appearing and gradually taking root in our beloved Fatherland. But we must not deceive ourselves with the naive hope that such a society will come into being by virtue of a ukase or decree and we will change overnight. Such a society will be born in the throes of overcoming our own weaknesses and vices—fear, lack of faith, cruelty to one another, and lack of steadfastness in thought and deed.

A civil society can be nurtured but not instituted. Because it is not an institution—it is a citizen.

Kirghiz SSR Editors Hold Roundtable on Newspaper Content, Perestroyka

90US0186A *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian* 12 Oct 89 p 2

[Roundtable discussion: "Party Life: Perestroyka and the Press: What Should the Newspaper of Tomorrow Be Like?"]

[Text] To provide answers to this and a range of other questions was the goal set for the participants in a "roundtable" organized by the Kirghiz CP Central Committee's Ideology Section in the city of Osh. Opinions were exchanged by editors of the Issyk-Kul Oblast newspapers ALATAU TANY—M. Alybayev, ZARYA ALATOO—V. Khaletskiy; the Osh Oblast newspapers LENINSKIY PUT—V. Achkurin, LENIN ZHOLU—M. Moydunov, LENIN YULI—A. Abidov, deputy editor of the newspaper SOVETIK KYRGYZSTAN—E. Nurushev, as well as the deputy chief of the Osh Party Obkom Section, F. Vafin, the chief secretary of the oblast newspaper LENINSKIY PUT, V. Pukasenko, and others.

N. Mukhina, instructor in the Kirghiz CP Central Committee's Ideology Section, conducted this "roundtable" discussion.

[N. Mukhina] The subscription campaign is the best indicator of readers' attitude toward newspapers. Its

present-day results cannot help but give cause for concern among the leading officials of the oblast- and republic-level press. Nevertheless, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of newspapers in our times. They are all called upon not only to inform the readers about the events occurring in the country, but also to point the way for extricating ourselves from the complicated economic and political situations in which our society has found itself nowadays. Newspapers must find a new look corresponding to the spirit of our times and be a loudspeaker of public opinion. But just what is it which is hampering our newspapers from restructuring themselves at the present time?

[V. Achkurin] We are certainly living through a period which is not our best. Matters have reached such a stage that a certain decline in creativity is starting to occur in the collective. It sometimes happens that there are no materials in the editors' briefcases. We have begun to write less. This is to be explained either by a decline of interest in the press or by the fact that we ourselves are beginning to be "written out." The central newspapers have begun to pose serious competition to the oblast-level press. There is an enormous difference in the class and possibilities of the capital and the provincial newspapers. It is unthinkable that this gap can be reduced by the presently existing manpower. Our correspondents are far from always being able to carry out the intentions of the editors. But what alarms me as an editor most of all is the narrowness of the topics and the diminution in the quality of newspaper publications. In order to succeed, we need as a minimum some skilled economic observers and some strong "moralists." But where are we to get them? We are working hard to raise serious party topics. There is also the problem that nowadays we cannot take a new, qualitative step forward, as we succeeded in doing some 2 or 3 years ago. At that time we began by sweeping aside the old, hackneyed newspaper formats. We removed from the pages of our newspapers the heavyweight editorials and lead articles, loaded with quotations and stuffed with slogans that set everyone's teeth on edge. Reporting, timely interviews, non-production information, and other mobile reporting genres. The readers liked this. But now several years have passed, and we are confronted by the problem of a new qualitative shift. With each passing year, it is becoming harder and harder to accomplish this. In particular, it is becoming difficult to work in the sectorial divisions.

[N. Mukhina] It seems to me that many of our newspapers, at least in their format, are reflections of yesteryear. They were founded and consolidated their positions during the period of the administrative-command system; they actively aided the apparatus in commanding production and public life. Nowadays we need other approaches in the work of our press. Throughout the entire country party committees are changing their style of work, and the number of sectorial divisions is being sharply reduced. But the newspapers are being restructured too slowly. Just as before, they are teaching the peasants how to plow the land, the shepherds how to pasture their herds, builders

how to build, etc. The reader knows these edifying publications, and they, of course, do not strengthen his trust in newspapers.

[M. Khamidov, deputy editor, LENINSKIY PUT] We suffered a major fiasco by rushing in too ardently and zealously to propagandize such forms of economic management as leasing, agrobusinesses, etc. Whereas lengthy and heady articles were being written about the very same agrobusiness, we all devoutly believed that it was specifically they which were called upon to free our agriculture from the swamp of stagnation. But, in fact, everything turned out differently. Neither one nor the other innovation justified itself in Osh Oblast. And our journalists now have no moral ardor left for supporting new ideas and beginnings with their former zeal. We have now become much more cautious. We try not to crawl into the thicket of economics unless we have to. We are devoting more attention to tactical issues. We must not engage in a profanation of the economic reform, a complicated and very serious matter. We must free ourselves more rapidly from the ballast of stereotypes. We need reporters who are capable of going on ahead of the present day.

[E. Nurushev] In my opinion, the failed experiment in economics should not cause such a powerful disenchantment in us. These, after all, were just experiments, and the latter can yield either positive or negative results. In propagandizing the agrobusiness, we were reflecting, primarily, the viewpoint of those specialists who believed in it. It is a different matter than our believing in it as if it were our "baby." And this was reflected in the tonality of our materials.

And another thing. The naivete of a reporter is sometimes explained by his insufficient competence. And that is why the miscalculations made by economists sometimes must be perceived by us as our own failures. And then there is this point. Even though the experiment did not succeed, does that mean that we have to write finis to it? In such cases newspapers should very carefully and thoroughly analyze the causes of the failure. In short, a journalist needs competence in any matter. All our troubles occur when we write without a knowledge of the business at hand.

[F. Vafin] But where is a journalist to gain such competence if he fails to maintain close ties with party staff members and economic managers, but instead relies on his own intuition and experience? He tries to remain free from outside opinions.

[N. Mukhina] I agree. Among writers here a unique kind of stereotype is developing: a journalist often avoids meetings with party staff members or officials, fearing, so to speak, their directorial influence. And in vain. It is a great mistake to think that party organs must unfailingly exert pressure on journalists. Times are changing. Nobody will impose his own opinion on a journalist. But the journalist needs to be advised so that he does not allow annoying mistakes to slip through.

[A. Abidov] I would like to add to what has been said on the point that our life still comprises not just dark spots, as

it must seem to the readers of certain of our publications. Life is significantly more multi-colored and abundant. In recent times the press has been excessively concerned with negative elements. And this cannot help but affect the overall tonality of our newspapers. At times criticism grows over into excessive faultfinding. And LENIN YULI is no exception. At one point we calculated that one of our own staff correspondents had sent to the editors 19 critical items during the course of just one year. And he was not an isolated case. What kind of impression, it may be asked, can be formed in such a case among readers who follow our newspapers? It seems to me that excessively troublesome criticism has set our readers' teeth on edge. At times we throw ourselves from one extreme to another. At first we perceived and accepted leasing with excessive delight. Now we wave it away with both hands.

[M. Alybayev] In deed, our publications at times do not contain enough multiple colors. We present life either as completely white, or, on the other hand, as completely black. We have become accustomed to foisting our own desires and attitudes, our own ideas about life on our readers. And far from everybody likes this. The very fact of journalists specializing by sections (here I will allow myself to dispute with the advocates of a narrow specialization in the newspaper business) imparts to our materials a bureaucratic and didactic quality. Our newspaper strives to avoid such a practice. We do not try to instruct economic managers but rather to pose problems for them. It is my very firm conviction that shouting yields very little. What good are some teeth-chattering raids, which produce nothing in the economic managers but a sense of insult and a feeling of protest? We have abolished the sectorial divisions as things who had outlived themselves, and in their place we have created a single, economic division. We strive to make the newspaper chock-full of information. This seems to me to be the truest path. Such a line taken by the newspaper is producing positive results. The flow of readers' letters to our offices has increased. And in this beginning we have found support from the oblast party committee.

[V. Khaletskiy] In newspapers, just as in production, I think that the most important role is played by the human factor. Like any other supervisor, an editor should strive for social justice. It is not so simple to achieve at times. It happens sometimes, it must be admitted, that capable hard-working correspondents are supervised by good-for-nothing division chiefs. In such cases, we transfer him to a rank-and-file position on competitive principles. And all this is certainly done within the framework of glasnost and democracy. And in a creative collective this brings about only a sense of satisfaction along with a striving to work better and more productively.

[V. Pukashenko] At times we are scolded because our editors have not elucidated extensively enough the life of the primary party organizations. But, it may be asked, what if nothing is being done in these primary organizations? Let's be completely frank. At times there is nothing to write about from the primary party organizations. Nor do the party staff members take up their pens.

Where are we to get profound and interesting materials for one of the main topics of our newspapers?

[N. Mukhina] I am convinced that the newspapers lack in-depth materials solely because there are no genuine subject specialists in the editorial offices. This also pertains to journalists who write on party topics.

[Sh. Moydunov] If we are to speak about what the party newspaper of tomorrow should be like, then I am deeply convinced that it should be, above all, permeated with the party spirit. And if we write about party topics with insufficient quality and quantity, then we must blame ourselves above all. I consider that newspapers should not scorn the traditional, tried-and-true formats. And this includes topical type pages. It has already been mentioned that mail from readers is the most important indicator of journalistic work. I agree with this opinion. And so I must note that the readers of *LENIN ZHOLU* read the topical pages with enormous interest. We receive the most mail for "Komsomol Pages" and the "Veteran's Page." And this attests to the fact that we have chosen the correct path.

[N. Mukhina] In summing up the results of our meeting, allow me to express the general opinion of the participants in our "roundtable" discussion. The look and contents of tomorrow's newspaper are evolving today in a constant journalistic quest. It will be all the more purposive and interesting, the more the editorial collectives strive in their publications for competence, balance, and the ability to convey in their own newspapers all the multiple diversity of the world around us. Any journalist must have one unwavering rule: to turn to people more frequently, to listen attentively to their voices, to be responsive to their requests, suggestions, and remarks. Editorial collectives cannot turn out a good newspaper without a broad-based aktiv of writers. It is only in close communion with them and with the mass readers that new topics will emerge about good and positive experience, about overcoming deficiencies and negative phenomena, and about what hinders us from working and living well.

Local Party Officials Dismiss Frunze Editors Over Newspaper Content

90US0194A Moscow IZVe STIYA in Russian 2 Nov 89
Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Gennadiy Shipitko: "Forcible Pressure"]

[Text] Gennadiy Shipitko reports from Frunze.

By a decision of the Frunze party gorkom buro, the deputy editor of the city newspaper "Frunze Evening

News" has been dismissed. Not too long ago such an announcement would hardly have upset anyone. But today it aroused a strong reaction not only among local journalists but also within broad sectors of the public and the city. It was regarded as the persecution of a journalist and an attempt by the party gorkom to stifle the shoots of glasnost that have appeared in the media.

Today's confrontation between the party committee and its press has its own prehistory.

In this past year the buro heard the editorial staff's account in which various party punishments were announced for the paper's entire directorship. Later the director of "Frunze Evening News" was dismissed. The next to go was his deputy—V. Zapolskiy. Many reasons were found for this decision in the party gorkom. Here they had reprinted material from "Pravda," there they had published material from the press agency "Novost." But that was not the main thing: V. Zapolskiy had disobeyed an order not to publish anything that, in the opinion of buro members, would "incite people and create an unclear perception of events and phenomena in the life of the city."

A committee was formed of representatives from various sectors of the media for the defense of their colleague. The committee assessed the buro's decision as "forcible pressure" on the press and demanded that V. Zapolskiy be returned to his post. And in the event that these demands not be met, the editorial staff of "Frunze Evening News" reserved the right to suspend the newspaper's publication, beginning October 31. Events became further heated by the implacability of the other side, which declared that it would "drive off the entire editorial staff" if necessary. The party gorkom second secretary G. Kuznetsov even promised to "come to the aid of strikebreakers."

In the course of a discussion lasting many hours at a press-conference—to which leading buro members together with the party gorkom first secretary U. Chinaliyev were invited—both sides came to a tentative decision. A resolution to dismiss V. Zapolskiy is to be decided before long at a party gorkom plenum. The journalist himself may return to work.

On October 31 subscribers received their regular issue of "Frunze Evening News." A solution to a difficult situation, albeit a temporary one, had been found. But what about the future?

The need to legislatively strengthen the legal relations between publishers and newspapers under today's conditions has clearly arisen.

Lenin's Responsibility for Postrevolutionary Violence Refuted

90US0240A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Nov 89
Second Edition p 3

[Article by B. Kocherga, candidate of philosophy: "The Truth is Not a Matter of Taste"]

[Text] In familiarizing oneself with modern publicistic works devoted to our history since October, one turns one's attention to certain authors' efforts to turn at any cost the so-called "blank spots" into "bloody spots." And their "criminological" investigation detects an obvious tendency to associate this "evidence" exclusively with the deeds of the revolution, the Bolsheviks, and Lenin.

In order to be convincing, they set up cartridge belts of quotes from certain of Lenin's notes, directives, telegrams, etc., bearing witness, in the authors' opinion, to the cruelty and dictatorial nature of the leader of the revolution. Transparent hints are also made about the origin of the anti-humanism, the suppression of democracy, the repressions during the period of Stalin's reign. As one group of historians rightly noted, "another mythology has come to replace the mythology of the revolution's 'immaculacy,' when each of the Bolsheviks' steps was proclaimed and examined as being the single faithful step—this other mythology is that of the 'original sin' of the revolution. And then the roots of all subsequent evil, from Stalin's lawlessness to Brezhnev's stagnation—derive directly from the actions of the Bolsheviks in the first years after the revolution."

The topic of "the revolution and violence" is becoming persistently popular. It is undoubtedly an extraordinarily important problem in and of itself, and for the present time as well; it is a problem which our social science has gone over carefully. However, its research is not going to be objective and scientific without a comparative examination with the problem of "counterrevolution and violence." And this, to put it mildly, is what many authors overlook.

The accusations to the effect that the initiative for terror and violence came specifically from the central revolutionary authority are far removed from objectivity. The authors of such accusations are forgetting such an essential factor as the psychological mood of the revolutionary masses. In evaluating these or those facts of the manifestation of violence in that extreme social situation, effectively a situation of socio-psychological temporary insanity, the circumstance should also be taken into consideration that from today's level of development of social consciousness, a great deal is seen differently from the way it was in those years.

The well-known literary scholar and critic I. Zolotusskiy, rises to global philosophical generalizations and conclusions in contemplating the topic, "the revolution and violence." He writes, "For us, the idea is still higher than being, an abstraction—of human feelings. We still repeat Marx's formula: being determines consciousness. Yet the

experience of the 20th century disproved this deduction. It is not being which determined consciousness, but consciousness, the idea, the theory, which determined being. They ordered being at their discretion; they concealed it as they wished. The 20th century was made an epoch of violence above life, of abstraction above man, and, to be serious, the thing is (and that is not the only thing) that Stalin ruled us for 30 years."

Thus, the basic principle of the materialistic world view is refuted this time by the "experience of the 20th century," and first and foremost by our domestic history. If we are indeed "being serious," then the respected author does not note that in the given case it is not that "the theory determined being"; it was not "the idea" which committed "violence over life," but one aspect of being and life, of "human feelings" which implemented violence over another aspect of social being, which held the non-illusory, equalizing communistic, but genuinely historic necessity for social revolution. "...The idea of violence is depraved and criminal," states I. Zolotusskiy. "Dostoyevskiy was correct in predicting that having captured power, it would drown us in blood."

Of course, Dostoyevskiy was right, but what has the social idea of Marxism have to do with it? This is what. The idea of freedom as the main idea of life is not violent; it is not bound by some sort of decree, but flows from the nature of man. And supposedly Marx and Lenin did not understand this idea.

Of course, if one were to judge the ideas of Marxism by the sketches in the "Short Course," and especially by the means and results of their embodiment in life, that is all true. However, the fact that the Stalinist political doctrine came out under the Marxist flag, while the actual policy of Stalinism repressed and deformed, and "concealed what it would" of the nature of social being bespeaks exactly the opposite of what is being asserted in publications. It is the political being of Stalinism, which reflected the interests of a portion of the social being, that perpetrated violence against the very idea of equality and freedom (the leading social idea of Marxism).

The violence of this being determined the quite different ideas which were formed and theoretically "grounded" in Stalinism. In its essence, Stalinism as a political practice and theoretical concept had nothing in common with the main ideas of Marx and Lenin. But perhaps, the ideas are humane and freedom-loving, but they should be implemented through violence? Is it possible that this is exactly how Marxism poses the question? Let us listen to F. Engels: "...it is not Marx who binds people with his opinions and even less so with his will; these people come to him themselves. And it is upon this that Marx's unique influence, so important to the entire movement, is founded." (K. Marx, F. Engels, Works, second edition, volume 35, page 190).

On the subject of the matter of the correlation of being and consciousness, we would note that it is not so simple

as to be resolved by means of possibly effective, but superficial comparisons, even along the lines of the "history of the 20th century example." It is not accidental that mankind has struggled with this issue for several millennia now.

As far as the direct or indirect accusations of cruelty forwarded against Lenin himself are concerned, the following is obvious to us: The quotations cited are not only torn out of the general interrelations of the events, but, if it may be put that way, out of the "context" of the entire activity of the leader of the revolution. After the publication of V. Grossman's novella, "Everything Flows," this topic has taken a new, sharper turn, now already associated with the general assessment and attitude toward the personality of Lenin.

If we turn to the pages upon which the author places reflections on Lenin in the mouth of the novella's protagonist, Ivan Grigoryevich, it is not difficult to note that they are uttered not in the language of literary prose, but in the language of publicistic literature, aspiring toward "philosophical-sociological generalizations." It is obviously not by accident that here Grossman makes a transition from a literary-image method to a publicistic method. This allows the opportunity to show that such an attitude toward Lenin "exists." Therefore the artistic truth of a great writer consists not in the evaluation of Lenin itself, but in the fact that such an evaluation "takes place."

Of course, the writer's opinion has the right to be presented in such a manner. And not only in order to destroy the icon-like image of Lenin. After all, without these characteristics of Grossman, there would not have arisen convincing objections, which are themselves conducive to restoring scientific truth and veracity.

Of course, today examples may be cited as evidence that Lenin erred, including errors in the resolution of a number of matters associated with the fates of concrete people. Yet it must be borne in mind here that in resolving these matters he was attempting to rely upon objective material (or what was considered to be objective at the time). Additionally, it should be remembered that if facts and arguments bespeaking his wrongness arose, Lenin was prepared to acknowledge (and did acknowledge) his error, both in a concrete decision, and in theoretical and political issues of general principles. The latter circumstance also has particularly important meaning for an understanding of the evolution of the Leninist views on a number of problems, and for an adequate interpretation of his utterances regarding the various periods and event of the revolutionary struggle.

The motives which guided Lenin during decision making had nothing in common with ambitions or political intrigue, but were associated with the defense of the cause of the revolution. How he understood this cause is known to everyone who has taken upon himself the labor of reading carefully Lenin's work, political speeches, letters, etc.

Of course, however, Lenin, as well as other authors, may be read in various ways. Thus is entitled the publication of the well-known writer V. Soloukhin, "Reading Lenin," which was first published as a brochure, and then appeared, with some condensation, in the 10th issue of the magazine *RODINA*. In this same issue, historian-scholars G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, and B. Loginov convincingly proved, in my opinion, the obvious historical groundlessness of this "reading."

What is this publication of V. Soloukhin? This is an excerpted quotation from volume 36 of the collected works of Lenin and the author's commentaries on them. Why is this volume the volume chosen? Soloukhin explains: "...this was a most interesting and acute period, from March to July 1918, that is, from the 5th to the 10th month of being in power, from the 5th to the 10th month of ruling Russia, which turned out to be in Bolshevik hands, so unanticipated for even the Bolsheviks themselves..." And further on he frankly admits that he made these "excerpts," naturally, according to his "own taste."

It is accepted to think that there is no arguing taste. Indeed, taste is an individual thing.

What are these predilections of taste which may be observed in the Soloukhin studies of Lenin? Having conscientiously written out the quotations which speak of the need for a bread monopoly, universal labor conscription, the forced, repressive, punitive measures against those who concealed bread, the writer makes a transition to sociological commentary. In my opinion, there is in this commentary something which goes beyond the limits both of taste and of professional historical analysis.

According to the author's observations, "In carrying out Lenin's legacy, especially during the years before the war...people went to camps and died there for being 20 minutes late for work."

So, it turns out what kind of "legacy" Lenin bequeathed. In reading V. Soloukhin, you finally "reach" Lenin's true concept of socialism: The universal compulsion of workers to labor, repression against peasants, the destruction of the creative gene pool of the intelligentsia. In reading V. Soloukhin, you will recognize the "genuine" reasons for the victory of the October revolution: "Several tenths of one percent of Russia's population...strangled, slashed, shot, tormented with hunger, and used violence as best they could in order to hold this country in their hands."

One wonders for whom and for what are these "revelations" intended? For creatures from another planet who decide to familiarize themselves with the history of the revolution and Lenin's views, using the V. Soloukhin publication? Or for reader curiosity, for the reflex of revulsion from the cliché of the "mythology of the immaculacy of the revolution"? Or perhaps for the well-known frame of mind which claims the role of historical "memory"? But V. Soloukhin himself knows

perfectly well that the "most interesting and acute period" chosen by him, from March to July of 1918, was one of the most dramatic periods for the revolution (the beginning of the civil war, the intervention, the uprising of the leftist SRs [socialist revolutionaries], the devastation, the real threat of suffocation through hunger). He knows that the measures upon which Lenin insisted were in many ways extraordinary, extreme. There were also, of course, incorrect, even tragically erroneous political decisions, especially those which led to the sharp narrowing of the social base of the revolution, to turning yesterday's allies into overt or covert opponents. The result was the most burdensome social crisis of 1921, already after the victory in the horrible, "savage" civil war, to use Lenin's expression.

Yet does the writer know how Lenin himself subsequently evaluated these fateful political errors? After 1921, with the recognition of the complete unacceptability of the previous policy in a time of peace, he writes: "We had calculated, or, perhaps it would be more correct to say, we had assumed without sufficient calculation that by direct orders of the proletarian state, we would adjust state production and state distribution of products in a communist fashion within a small-peasant country. Life showed our error." (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, Volume 44, Page 151).

And further, already with absolute mercilessness, including toward himself: "On the economic front, with the attempt to make the transition to communism, by the spring of 1921, we had suffered a defeat more serious than any defeat inflicted upon us by Kolchak, Denikin, or Pilsudski; a much more serious, much more substantial and dangerous defeat. It was expressed in the fact that at its summit, our economic policy was removed from the roots and did not create the rise in productive forces which our party's program has acknowledged to be the fundamental and immediate task.

"Rural apportionment, that direct communist approach to the tasks of construction in the city, interfered with the increase in productive forces and proved to be the fundamental cause of the deep economic and political crisis into which we stumbled in the spring of 1921." (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, Volume 44, Page 159).

Yes, everyone must have the right to his own understanding of and attitude toward historical events and personalities, all the more so a creative, thinking person. In general, the absence of this right cost our science and culture dearly. The cooled and petrified "magma" of official Leniniana, having formed something like an idol, hid the living, real image of the great revolutionary and outstanding thinker, an image not without contradictions. And thus this magma hardly differentiates itself from certain modern tendentious readings of Lenin, and of history. The dogmatism, stereotypes, textbook hardening of the propagandistic versions of the "mythology

of the immaculacy of the revolution" have no more relation to scientific truth than does the anathema of its "original sin" of violence.

The truth is revealed in contradiction. However, the path toward the truth is not a matter of "taste."

Events Leading to Khrushchev's Ouster Reported

90US02394 Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by Yu. Asyutin, candidate of historical sciences, instructor, Moscow Higher Party School: "Khrushchev, 1964"]

[Text] On 14 October 1964 there took place a CPSU Central Committee plenum at which was heard N.S. Khrushchev's written request for retirement from the posts of Central Committee first secretary and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers occupied by him. The request was fulfilled. L.I. Brezhnev was elected first secretary, and A.N. Kosygin was recommended to the post of head of Government.

A quarter century has passed since that time. Until quite recently, nothing of what then happened in the Kremlin was known to the general public. Somewhat later, it was announced to us that Nikita Sergeyevich was removed for "subjectivism" and "voluntarism"...

However, the curtain of silence has lifted in the last 2 years. Journalists and historians have expounded for us a number of versions and revealed some details. But most importantly, some participants in those events have started to talk. And thanks to them, we now have a better idea of the causes which gave rise to these events, their course, and who was behind them. Thus there are still very, very many of the questions and arguments they provoke...

Judging by appearances, it all began when L.I. Brezhnev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, attracted N.V. Podgornyy to his side; in July 1963, Khrushchev summoned Podgornyy from the Ukraine and placed him in the role of Central Committee second secretary to replace the ailing F.R. Kozlov. The conversation of Brezhnev and Podgornyy most probably took place in the spring of 1964, when they were both vacationing in the Crimea. Judging by appearances, theirs was the decisive role in the preparations for Khrushchev's ouster. They did this most cautiously, without showing their cards.

This is how P.Ye. Shelest, CPSU Central Committee candidate-member and CP of the Ukraine [CPuk] Central Committee first secretary describes the matter. Opinions were exchanged on issues discussed in the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, and it would happen that dissatisfaction would be expressed on how N.S. took little consideration of his comrades-in-arms, and was becoming more and more rude and arrogant. If an interlocutor met their complaints with compassion and agreed, they turned the conversation to the idea that

it would, so to say, not be a bad thing to stop N.S., to straighten him out, to give him a collective reprimand, even, perhaps, to threaten him...

"Petr Yefimovich, why don't you convene a republic Central Committee plenum there in Kiev, invite Khrushchev to it. And there you can lay it on the line for him..."

"Not likely," P.Ye. Shelest sharply replied. "He will go running to you at the first whistle... And if he finds out why, they'll have our hide!"

It would seem that the conversation did not lead to anything concrete. But all the same, one more person had been turned into an accomplice. From that time on, he was in on their next intentions, supported them, and as if that were not enough, he carried out the appropriate work among the members and candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee from the Ukraine.

In the Russian Federation, such a role was taken on by former CPSU Central Committee Presidium member N.G. Ignatov. Seven years earlier, he had actively supported Khrushchev when Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov wanted to remove him, but then Nikita Sergeyevich became ill-suited, and Ignatov did not hide his dissatisfaction. Finding himself on frequent trips, Ignatov never tired of speaking aloud of his personal resentment, complained about the "ingratitude of N.S.," and he would talk to anyone who listened about the need for change in the leadership.

Yes, there were more than a few people dissatisfied with Khrushchev. But Brezhnev and Podgornyy knew that they could carry off what they had planned only by relying on concrete force. And they attracted to their side A.N. Shelepin, CPSU Central Committee secretary, USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman, and chairman of the Committee of Party-State Control, and along with him V.Ye. Semichastnyy, chairman of the Committee for State Security. It would seem that the shield was ready. But how about the sword? Perhaps it should be used as well?

V.Ye. Semichastnyy described to me that in the heat of the struggle for power, L.I. Brezhnev revealed in his office the opportunity for the almost physical removal of the "first."

"What do you have in mind, Leonid Ilyich?" asks the stunned head of state security.

"Well, something of the sort..."

"Poison, for instance, or a bullet?"

"Well it's not my place to tell you, Vladimir Yefimovich..."

"And how do you picture all of this? Can you guarantee that the secret will remain a secret?"

Brezhnev was obviously disappointed.

"But I thought that one of your service's most important tasks was to ensure secrecy..."

"Yes, but sooner or later, any secret stops being one."

Assuming that he had managed to convince his interlocutor, Semichastnyy heads to the exit, but Brezhnev stops him:

"There must be something you can do? Well, for example, N.S. is planning an official visit to Sweden... Perhaps we could arrest him as he returns?"

"We are not conspirators, and this matter should be resolved by legal means."

What trip were they talking about? N.S. Khrushchev's official visit to the Scandinavian countries, which began in June 1964. Take note, in June! At that time, all was successfully avoided by Nikita Sergeyevich. Either they were not prepared in time, or some other circumstances played their role here, but on 5 June, he successfully descended the gangplank of the steamship Bashkiria in the port of Baltiysk (Kaliningrad Oblast), where he was greeted by Admiral A.Ye. Orel, commander of the Baltic Fleet, General Colonel G.Ye. Khetagurov, commander of the Baltic Military District, and USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal R.Ya. Malinovskiy, vacationing in the area. Were they already in on it at that time? If they were, what was it that kept them from implementing the plan which Brezhnev had obviously shared not only with Semichastnyy? We still do not know...

Upon returning to Moscow, Khrushchev delivers at the CPSU Central Committee plenum a speech unexpected by anybody. He gives the understanding that yet another reorganization of agriculture will be proposed in November, as well as reforms in the area of science. Then the Constitutional Commission reports how the work is going on the draft of the new constitution, and expresses a number of "preliminary comments" on the principles which must be set in the foundation of the draft. And finally, speaking on 24 July at an expanded session of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium, he demands to review the main trends and tasks of planning for the near future. In his opinion, no matter how the party program envisages the building of communism in the near future, it is necessary to take a decisive course so that the people's welfare grow as rapidly as possible.

General grumbling arose... Some groaned because the fruits of long, hard work of compiling national economic plans and balances "had gone down the drain." The "ideological" aspects of the coming state reforms frightened others. Still others awaited with fear the promised cadre "shakeup." This atmosphere of dissatisfaction, alarm, and uncertainty was conducive to the rapid filling of the ranks of the "conspirators."

And Brezhnev and Podgornyy continued to cast out their "net." Thus they managed to fight with the "first" of G.I. Voronov, a very principled and businesslike man, that he had matured; Gennadiy Yakovlevich told me that they had

invited him to hunt at Zavidovo, and when they were ready to return, Brezhnev says, "Let us go in my car; we have to talk..."

It did not take much time to convince Voronov of the need to "get rid of this ridiculous man." Thus, one more tentative mark appeared next to Voronov's name in the register being kept by Brezhnev.

True, a drain of information occurred as well. From his son Sergey, Khrushchev learned that a former guard had told of Ignatov's suspicious conversations with obkom [oblast committee] secretaries, of the mention of November as a deadline by which something must be done.

"What are you starting against me, friends," he threw out to his comrades-in-arms in the Central Committee Presidium then next day. "Watch out, in case I toss you about like puppies."

Almost in unison the "friends" began to swear that not one of them had any intention of anything of the sort, that there could be nothing of the kind.

The fear of disclosure was placed before the need to accelerate events. Podgornyy ordered a document prepared with the enumeration of the sins of Khrushchev. The recruitment of the remaining "uncaptured" Central Committee members continued.

A conversation took place between a member of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium and A.N. Kosygin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. When they began to explain his position, he immediately asked,

"And with whom is the army and state security?"

"Malinovskiy and Semichastnyy are in on it," they assured him.

"I agree."

Voronov recalls that Kosygin's support was extremely conducive to attracting other Central Committee members: He enjoyed great authority (especially among economic executives)...

In the meantime, on 11 October, Brezhnev returns from anniversary celebrations in Berlin. The final meetings, the final calculations of strength. And on the next day, the decision: We will summon Khrushchev to the Central Committee Presidium meeting, present him with the list of accusations, and force him to retire.

But P.Ye. Shelest recalls, the difficult question arose: Who is going to call Pitsunda?

"Podgornyy, of course," said Brezhnev, "After all, he was chairman here, while we were gone."

"But what will I say?" objected Podgornyy. "After all, I just talked with him yesterday; I said that everything was as usual here, no problems were arising. What has

suddenly happened there?" he asked... Better let Brezhnev. All the more so because he has to give personal greetings from comrades Ulbricht and Stoph."

Everyone agreed. But Brezhnev was set against it. They barely managed to persuade him and almost had to drag him to phone by force. In a quavering voice he informs Khrushchev:

"There is a presidium meeting tomorrow... We want to discuss a number of questions. You should fly here immediately."

He requests, almost implores. Khrushchev gives in.

"Well, fine," he tosses out. "I'll think about it."

There was nothing to be done. They dispersed. It was uneasy. Every hour, Brezhnev called Semichastnyy and asked:

"Well, how is it?"

And only after midnight did he himself call:

"They just reported: The airplane for Pitsunda has been ordered for 6 in the morning. Mikoyan will fly with N.S."

And at this time in Pitsunda, Khrushchev told Mikoyan:

"You know, Anastas, they don't have any urgent matters. I think that this call is related to what Sergey told us..."

Came the morning of 13 October 1964. Semichastnyy calls Brezhnev:

"Who is going to meet him?"

"You are. Under these circumstances, why should everyone go?"

Vnukovo-2. Khrushchev and Mikoyan are coming down the airplane ramp.

"To your successful arrival, Nikita Sergeyevich," Semichastnyy greets him courteously, but with restraint.

"And where are the others?"

"They have gathered in the Kremlin. They're waiting for us..."

Khrushchev and Mikoyan sit in their long "ZIL-111," Semichastnyy in his "Chaika," from which he calls ahead:

"We're on the way to the Kremlin."

They arrive. Khrushchev heads for his Kremlin office, where Presidium members and candidate members are already waiting for him, as well as the secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee. Semichastnyy changes the guard in the reception area, and then in Khrushchev's house in Lenin Hills and at the dacha in Petrovo-Dalnee.

The deputy chief of Khrushchev's personal guard (chief Litovchenko himself was on leave) orders his team:

"Not a single command is to be issued without my personal knowledge. That is the instruction of the Central Committee leadership."

And at that time at the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, they were presenting the grim reckoning to Khrushchev: "You made a mess of agriculture! As a result, we are forced to purchase grain abroad... The Sovnarkhozes [Soviets of people's farms] you created have not justified themselves!... You groundlessly removed managers who did not please you. You resolved these issues personally, and made of us, the Presidium members, silent executioners of your will... This year alone, thousands of photographs of you have been published in the press. Could this not confirm a new cult of personality?"

Khrushchev was stunned and pressured, but tried to object all the same. But they listened to him poorly, and interrupted him.

"My friends!" he almost begged.

"You do not have any friends," Voronov cut him off.

Only Mikoyan called for objectivity.

"Khrushchev's activity is the party's major political capital," he declared.

At about 8 in the evening they decided to break off the meeting and gather the next morning. Khrushchev immediately stood and left. The rest agreed:

"Don't go near the telephone today! What if he starts calling around among us, and he manages to get someone on his side."

However, when Mikoyan's telephone rang, he picked it up and did indeed hear Khrushchev's voice:

"I'm old and tired. Let them manage it by themselves now. Could anyone have dreamed of us saying to Stalin that we weren't satisfied with him, and propose that he retire? There wouldn't have been a trace of us left. Now everything's different. The fear has disappeared, and the conversation is among equals. That is my service. And I'm not going to fight."

When the CPSU Central Committee Presidium meeting was renewed on 14 October, these words of Nikita Sergeyevich were undoubtedly already known to his opponents.

"I understand that this is my last political speech, so to say, my swan song," he announced. "I am not going to speak at the plenum. But I would like to make a request of the plenum..."

"That will not be the case" Brezhnev categorically interrupted him.

"That's right," Suslov seconded.

P.Ye. Shelest recalls that tears appeared in Khrushchev's eyes.

"Well, then," he found the strength within himself to finish. "I am prepared for it all... I request that the announcement of my retirement be written; I will sign... If you need it, I will leave Moscow."

The lunch recess was announced. Khrushchev declined to be present there; they did not detain him. He went home. The other issues were already discussed without him. Whom to recommend to the plenum for first secretary, whom as head of Government. They decided—L.I. Brezhnev and A.N. Kosygin. And who will read the speech? Brezhnev refused, and Podgornyy after him. Then M.A. Suslov was entrusted...

While they were settling on all these and other details, Semichastnyy called repeatedly:

"Leonid Ilyich, you stay in session until the delegations of Central Committee members come to you. I can hardly get away from the phone calls..."

"Calm everyone... The plenum is at 6 o'clock."

However, Brezhnev himself was not calm. Upon calling Yegorychev, he said:

"We have conferred here and think that the debates should not be opened. Khrushchev gave notice: 'due to the state of health.' Why should we finish him off here? Better later, at the regular plenums, when we discuss all the issues in detail..."

"Well, fine," agreed the head of the capital party organization. "Let it be so, however, if need be, I am ready for a speech."

Suslov began his plenary speech "On the Abnormal Situation Existing in the Central Committee Presidium in Connection with Khrushchev's Incorrect Actions" by saying that he had been entrusted to expound the unanimous opinion of the Presidium members and candidate members, as well as the Central Committee affairs in the party and society. In general, it did not discuss the concrete program of actions. On the other hand, a great deal was said about "certain" individuals positioned near Khrushchev, and supposedly constituting a bad influence over him. This concerned especially his son-in-law, A.I. Adzhubey... All this time, Nikita Sergeyevich sat in the furthest chair in the Presidium. He held his head in his hands and did not raise it once; he did not glance at the hall.

After the voting, Khrushchev rose and left for the back room. Not without pathos, Brezhnev summed it up:

"So Nikita Sergeyevich debunked Stalin's cult of personality after his death, and we are debunking the cult of Khrushchev during his lifetime."

Twenty-five years have passed since that day. How do the participants of those events evaluate them today?

"As completely logical and well-grounded," K.G. Yegorychev considers the decision then made. V.Ye. Semichastnyy agrees with him: "In the final analysis, Khrushchev had run the matter into a dead end... I would add to that the uncontrollability." But at the same time, he added a significant reservation: "Had there been collegiality in the Presidium, had the Central Committee shown some character and expressed its opinion, I think that everything would have come out differently."

"He had more than a few mistakes, but the other leaders working alongside him should have shared them," supposes P.Ye. Shelest. He is certain that there was no objective necessity to replace Khrushchev with Brezhnev: "That is my firm conviction, even though I myself participated in what took place. I now criticize myself and sincerely regret it."

G.I. Voronov also holds the same opinion: "Even Khrushchev's most glaring miscalculations weigh far less than the main things that he accomplished... The participants' motives were disparate, and what was the result? Rather than correcting the errors of one bright personality, we emphasized another, mediocre one. Such a thing is inevitable when there is no mechanism for criticizing the leadership, for replacing it."

Well, it is hard not to agree with this observation. And, taking into consideration our common experience, including both our achievements and losses, the most important thing should not be forgotten: In order that yesterday's errors not be repeated, the course toward final dismantling of the command-administrative system must be steadfastly continued, in order to make all of us genuine masters, in our party, in our trade unions; in every place where we work and live. And then no decision "in our name" will be taken without us, without consideration for our opinion and our interests.

Belorussian SSR Hydrometeorology Chief on Monitoring Radioactivity

90UN0248A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 17 Oct 89 p 2

[Interview with Yu.M. Pokumeyko, chief, Belgidromet, by Yu. Bekhterev, BELTA correspondent: "Time for Accurate Boundaries"]

[Text] Yu.M. Pokumeyko was one of the first to learn of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. He found out about it a few hours after the explosion. It was he, chief of Belgidromet [Belorussian State Committee for Hydrometeorology], who in May 1986 reported the rapid increase in radioactivity to the republic government. His signature is on all radiation maps. The contamination levels calculated by the Belgidromet center for radiation control became a very important argument for deciding the fate of the affected regions. Today Yu.M. Pokumeyko answers questions from a BELTA correspondent.

[Correspondent] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, let us turn once again to those tragic spring days in 1986. You knew more about the scale of the accident than did any of us. Apparently you understood what consequences it would have. For almost 2 years you kept silent. The safe in your agency reliably concealed from the republic's inhabitants what may be the most important truth for them. I understand that there are state secrets and party discipline; however there is also civic duty and responsibility for the fate of your people.

[Yu.M. Pokumeyko] You mention I "knew the scale of the accident", and "understood what consequences it would have." However, the saddest thing is that at the time we knew nothing and were able to guess correctly about very little. I myself am a hydrological engineer. I began a serious study of radiology only after Chernobyl. Prior to this, if the conversation turned to curies or nuclides, it was only in a military context. Measurements of gamma radiation were taken in Belorussia only once a week, using somewhat obsolete DP-5 instruments. The radiation monitoring system was temporarily taken out of use.

At about 8 pm on May 26 the institute received a telegram ordering it to organize hourly monitoring at stations in Bragin, Mozyr and Lelchitsy. Initially we thought that this was more training. After 2 hours the stations began to transmit information showing that there were no problems. Radioactivity levels began to slowly rise only on May 27.

Although a USSR Goskomgidromet ruling made data on the contamination of the territory secret during the first months after the accident, the population in the affected regions usually knew this information. We consciously violated instructions and told people the truth. This February, a few months before the official declassification of information about Chernobyl, Belorussian newspapers published maps of radioactive contamination. Such maps appeared much later in the central press.

[Correspondent] I also saw these maps. However, they showed only the "cesium spots." What about strontium, plutonium and a dozen other long lived elements?

[Yu.M. Pokumeyko] We are analyzing the entire spectrum of radioactive substances. If somebody is interested in these data, they can freely learn about them at our institute. A map of the contamination of Belorussia with strontium will be published not later than November.

A better based study of the entire range of radionuclides remaining in the Belorussian land requires the newest equipment, most of it imported. Belgidromet now has only one express laboratory, but needs eight. Because of the instrument shortage we are not able to conduct detailed research even on cesium. The geographic range of our work has now been considerably expanded; it covers Vitebsk and Grodny oblasts. Their inhabitants want every settlement and every household checked. The time has come to determine the boundary of each area of radiation contamination down to within a meter. We are doing this work, but unfortunately not as quickly as we would like.

[Correspondent] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, the editors receive quite a few letters from writers doubting the reliability of Belgidromet research. In Korma they even decided to ask for help from Moscow specialists, who, for a sizable fee, compiled an objective map of contamination in the rayon.

[Yu.M. Pokumeyko] Everything depends upon the calculation methodology. Several samples are taken from each section of land. After they have been analyzed, our associates, doing as they are supposed to, calculate the average contamination indicator. Specialists from Gosagroprom and other institutes usually include only maximum readings. This gives rise to different numbers. Measuring instruments are far from perfect; their readings can differ by 20-30 percent. To avoid such contradictions, it is necessary to increase the number of samples and to study, not entire villages and fields, but each household, street and small plot of land. Instead of more precisely determining boundaries, today we are forced to spend most of our efforts and time retesting previous results.

Of course, nobody is forbidden to doubt Belgidromet data. However, I have in front of me the research from the Moscow Ecological Center, conducted specially for Kormyanskiy Rayon. In 8 out of 10 cases its experts agree with ours.

For example, in the past 3 months alone about 2 dozen more settlements have been found with contamination levels ranging from 5 to 15 curies. So then, the Kormyanskiy Raykom had no need to spend more than 100,000 rubles on a totally unjustified review. It would have been far better to spend this money to purchase equipment for assisting the public.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless, the lack of accurate data on the radiation situation hindered Belorussian SSR

Supreme Soviet deputies in the last session from reaching complete agreement concerning the State Program for Eliminating the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES. The desire was expressed to make monitoring more up to date and thorough. Is Belgidromet ready to expand its research in this direction?

[Yu.M. Pokumeyko] In addition to making more accurate maps of the contaminated zones, something we are working on constantly, the state program calls for organizing around the clock monitoring of radioactivity throughout the entire republic. To this end, by 1991 it is planned to create a network of automatic stations continuously receiving information and transmitting it to a central data bank. Then our operators will be able to call up any indicators on a display screen. The data bank will be directly linked with illuminated panels in oblast cities and rayon centers in the regions affected.

USSR Goskomgidromet and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers are ready to allocate the resources needed to implement the plans—around 3-4 million rubles annually. I am not certain we will be able to use this money. In Mogilev, for example, construction work has not begun on a building for the radiation monitoring center. This threatens to disrupt the entire program.

Now, when there is active preparation in the republic for the next session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, we are ready to provide deputies and representatives from all public organizations and informal movements with any data on the radiation situation. At their request we can do additional research, such as was recently done in Vitebsk Oblast. Its inhabitants wanted once again to be certain of the safety of the Ignalinskaya AES. In short, there are now no difficulties in obtaining radiological information. There is difficulty in restoring faith in it.

Plant to Handle Chernobyl-Affected Soil Proposed

904E0034A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in
Ukrainian 21 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by N. Sukmanska, department editor with the magazine *NAUKA I SUSPILSTVO*: "The Price of Silence Is High"]

[Text] All those to whom our native land's natural environment is dear should not impede but should help accomplish prompt construction of a facility to process radioactively-contaminated material from the 30-Kilometer Zone around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

"When we on the Committee on Architecture and Construction were confirming Kononov as minister of medium machine building, and I put the question to him, since the entirety of nuclear power engineering will be administered by him, he who gave approval to build in the Chernobyl zone a facility to process nuclear waste, to which nuclear waste will be hauled in from all over the

world to be processed, as if we were some sort of serf state, he finally admitted, when he was backed against the wall: 'You people are really something! Your own Paton, president of the Academy of Sciences, proposed construction of this plant.'" (From statements made by writer V. Yavorivskyy on the television program "Rukh and the Issues It Addresses," which was aired at the end of June 1989).

Everything began with this. Subsequently, scientists from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences made statements in the press, and once again V. Yavorivskyy, in *VECHIRNIY KYIV*. And passions were aroused.... Let us take a look at this issue, as RADYANSKA UKRAYINA promised in the report from the First Congress of the Green World Association on 15 November, a look at this enterprise code-named Vector, in a business-like manner, that is, let us address the issue in terms of documents and facts.

When the Chernobyl disaster occurred, there was no time for reflection. It was like war. People's lives were being saved. All decisions were made without any documents, agreements, signatures, or vacillations. They hastily dug pits and trenches and dumped at these locations contaminated equipment, soil, trees—in short, everything that was maintaining a high background radiation level. People were working day and night.

Finally everything was buried, washed clean, and plowed under, and the population had been evacuated. Everybody sighed with relief. But time has passed, and areas of radioactivity are appearing where they did not exist at first, and the radioactivity is gradually spreading. Incidentally, that is to be expected, for the radioactive waste was not disposed of. It was not stored in accordance with approved standards, but remains where it was initially dumped and covered over. In addition, within the Zone there are no true radioactive waste disposal facilities, but rather so-called radioactive waste temporary localization sites. Wind, water, and any human activity do their nefarious work—promoting the spread of radioactivity.

What is to be done with the millions of tons of radioactively-contaminated material which has accumulated in the Zone? Should it be hauled away? But this would require thousands upon thousands of massive trains. In addition, it would be impossible to eliminate the radioactive dust generated during loading, unloading, and transport. What would then happen to the Ukraine? The fact is that the Chernobyl material would contaminate not only our republic but would be scattered to the four winds. But what is the solution? We cannot leave it there, and it is dangerous to haul away....

The Kombinat Production Association was established to neutralize the consequences of the disaster in the 30-Kilometer Zone. V.I. Komarov, the then chief engineer of this association, appeared before a session of the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences and proposed "proceeding immediately with planning

and disposal of radioactive waste in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Zone."

The above quote was taken from the stenographic record of his statements. He also stated: "Long-lived radioactive waste would be processed (asphaltized, processed into concrete, vitrified—whatever the scientists recommend) and transported to central disposal sites or repositories, in the Semipalatinsk area, for example...."

V.I. Komarov also proposed building a third unit at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. The Academy of Sciences emphatically rejected this proposal. But it voiced approval of the need to build an enterprise to process the radioactive waste which is temporarily buried on the territory of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Thus another document was generated, approved in December 1987 by M.F. Lukonin, the then USSR Minister of Nuclear Power Engineering—"Project to Design an Enterprise for Processing and Disposal of Radioactive Waste in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant 30-Kilometer Zone." It was approved by the chairman of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology, the chairman of the Kiev Oblast Executive Committee, the head of the Third Administration of the USSR Ministry of Health, and the vice president of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences.

At this point, scientists should have spoken up in the press and explained to the public what they were planning to build and for what purpose. But scientists were not yet accustomed to this kind of action and did not at all expect that the public would be deliberately misinformed, for what was being planned was an enterprise the purpose of which was to protect the Ukraine from radioactive waste. I should note that I too feel culpability before the public: I knew that they were planning such a construction project in the Zone. I heard about this on several occasions from scientists and from colleagues in the joint campaign against the proliferation of nuclear power generating facilities in the Ukraine, and yet it did not come to me to write about it. But who had any inkling?

In the meantime, things were moving forward. The project was given to the All-Union Scientific Research and Design Institute for Power Engineering Technology in Leningrad. And within a year's time another document appeared, consisting of six volumes and entitled "Technical and Economic Substantiation [TEO] for Construction of a Complex for the Radioactive Decontamination, Transportation, Processing and Disposal of Radioactive Waste From Areas Contaminated as a Result of the Disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant." (Code name Vector). Let us take a look at this document.

"The main purpose of establishing in the 30-Kilometer Zone of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant an enterprise for the collection, transportation, processing, and disposal of radioactive waste created as a result of the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant is to

reduce levels of radioactive contamination within the 30-Kilometer Zone to prescribed health standards, to prevent the migration of radionuclides above established standards by means of transport by surface runoff and groundwater as well as by wind, to reduce the volume of radioactive waste material and to concentrate it at a single, rigorously-monitored site and, as an end result, to prevent radioactively-contaminated material from affecting the environment.

"At the present time there continues to be a potential danger of spread of contaminated material beyond the boundaries of the 30-Kilometer Zone, although the danger is not immediate. We feel that any complacency in this matter, such as has been observed recently, is dangerous. Only the collection, processing, and reliable disposal of radioactive waste can permanently eliminate the danger of uncontrolled spread of contaminated material. This is an additional factor which makes it necessary to establish a special enterprise to process and dispose of waste and to develop methods and means of collecting and transporting radioactive waste to a single, rigorously-monitored site."

Does anybody still entertain any doubts about the purpose of the enterprise code-named Vector? We quote again from the TEO: "...The TEO should not contain materials with a security classification of Secret, with the exception of adopted technical solutions at the statement of engineering requirements stage.... The TEO should be subjected to environmental impact assessment, and the main provisions should be made known to the public."

Just why is it that they have not been made public? They simply have not had time to do so. Serious scientists never rush into publication. After all, the TEO still had to be submitted to an environmental impact assessment.... Incidentally, the TEO is presently being examined at the Kombinat All-Union Association, and after its assessment is completed (which should be in the very near future), it will be forwarded to all those agencies which have been working on preliminary specifications.

Why is it that the public is so hostile toward an enterprise conceived for the purpose of protecting the public? Is it because the public is uninformed, underinformed, or is not familiar with the scientific terminology involved? If that is the case, one is hard put to understand why it is that those who have made statements in the press made no attempt to obtain information from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. But there is also an explanation for this: the situation has been tense since Chernobyl, and there has been extreme distrust of government and government agencies.

But how does one explain the fact that an article appearing in the 25 September issue of the newspaper VECHIRNYA KYIV entitled "Truth is Entitled to the Truth" contains a response by USSR Minister of Power and Electrification Yu.K. Semenov to questions put by USSR People's Deputy V. Yavorivskyy pertaining to construction of an enterprise in the 30-Kilometer Zone?

Two sentences were omitted from the article, which in my opinion completely changes the content of the response. The full statement follows, with the omitted portions boldfaced.

"I can easily answer that question, for the government also made me deputy chairman of the government disaster recovery commission. I spent more than a year at Chernobyl. In 1986, I was there for 7 months straight. For this reason, I am familiar with the situation. The proposal to build a plant in the 30-Kilometer Zone originated at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, with Comrade Paton. Since the area is contaminated, his reasoning went, let's build it here. Our position toward this proposal is negative. **A specialized organization, Spetsatom, was established there, for the purpose of conducting disaster recovery and rebuilding activities, which it is in fact doing. Incidentally, after the earthquake this organization gave considerable assistance to Leninakan, as it had a unique 180-ton crane with an 80-meter extensible boom. They worked wonders in Leninakan. The plant will cost 120-150 million rubles. The idea of building this plant is being encouraged by your Ukrainian scientists, since in their opinion the nuclear power plant's water impoundment—part of the Zone in which fallout occurred—is contaminated by radioactive waste, and for that reason this radioactive waste material should also be removed from the water impoundment, to prevent it from spreading to the rest of the Ukraine, and should be processed.** Therefore you yourselves should determine the question: if you don't want it built, we will not build it. If you want it built, we will build it. I have stated my opinion: I am against this construction."

Why is it that in the heat of debate this people's deputy omitted words which reveal the very essence and substance of the future enterprise and give an answer to his question? And, most important, he was not at all surprised at how quickly this ministry became reeducated, a ministry which, together with the Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering, has covered the Ukraine with a network of nuclear power generating plants. I recall how at the All-Union Conference on Problems of Development of Power Engineering, which was held last September in Kiev, there were statements of opposition against any Ukrainian scientist who was attempting to protect even some small part of our land against the pernicious effects of the "peaceful atom." This very ministry is opposing the alternative draft energy program for the Ukraine drawn up by our Academy.

And then suddenly such forbearance: "If you don't want to build, we won't build." What is happening here? Has the minister of power and electrification lost his ministerial interests? Of course not! The minister was stating the truth: he is against construction of an enterprise to decontaminate the Chernobyl Zone, for it will cost the ministry 150 million rubles. And as is evident from the cited statement, Yu.K. Semenov feels that Spetsatom is sufficient for our needs. It helped at the time of the earthquake, and it will also help in decontamination efforts. Why spend more money? This is why an enterprise which is so needed today by the entire

Ukraine is planned for construction over a period of six (!) years. And one should be fighting not to prevent its construction but rather to ensure its completion at the earliest possible date. Herein lies the problem right now! If an enterprise to decontaminate the 30-Kilometer Zone around the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant does not begin operating in the very near future, radioactive dust will settle, in the figurative sense, on the clothes of its opponents.

A question arises: what will happen to the enterprise when it has processed all the radioactive waste? Who is going to want to do the job of dismantling this facility, which cost so much to build? In the first place, as already stated, there are great quantities of radioactively contaminated material—millions of tons. By the time the plant is built and has processed and disposed of the radioactive waste, it will be time to retire reactor units 1 and 2 at the Chernobyl plant. And what about the "Sarcophagus" [concrete shell encasing the stricken reactor]? It can't just remain there forever. As we see, there will be plenty of work to do.

In general the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Science's scientists would like to get the Chernobyl plant retired from service as soon as possible, and to establish a prohibited area, a protected area, and a radiological environmental scientific research facility in the 30-Kilometer Zone. There should be no economic activity in the Zone—no farming, no construction, and no mass transportation, for all this promotes the transport of radionuclides out of the zone. In addition, the area should be planted in trees, shrubs, and special plants which would inhibit dust and prevent soil erosion.

Of course concern about construction of a radioactive decontamination enterprise exists not only among the public but within the scientific community as well. Perhaps Corresponding Member of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Ye.V. Sobotovich expressed it best: "The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences welcomes the building of an enterprise to decontaminate the zone, but it is absolutely opposed to any measures which could worsen the radiological-environmental situation. In my opinion we should obtain from Glavatomenergo and the Kombinat All-Union Association a guarantee that no radiochemical production facility (of any type) will be built within the 30-Kilometer Zone."

In other words, they are planning one thing, but they could build something quite different. But we still have the UkSSR Supreme Soviet, whose job it is to ensure proper oversight over construction, which cannot be done by any republic-level agency, including the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences. Nor would a citizen-type commission do any harm.

"Nature has been kind to us these last three years," stated Ye.O. Yakovlev, head of the hydrogeological projects and protection of the geological environment department of the Ukrgeologiya Administration. "We have not had any major seasonal flooding. For this

reason, we must literally immediately process all radioactively contaminated material, separate out the neutral material, concentrate the highly-radioactive waste and remove it from the Zone in special sealed containers, transporting it to special repository facilities located in stable bedrock."

Vice-President of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Academician V.I. Trefilov stated: "No normal individual, let alone a scientist, would ever dream for a single moment of planning the construction of a spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility within the Chernobyl Zone, where the level of radioactivity is already so high, and to haul waste from the world's nuclear power generating plants to this site 'like to some kind of serf state.' It is particularly regrettable that charges of such intentions are being leveled at people on whose clothing radioactive dust has in fact settled on repeated occasions, for they were working in the Zone during those difficult days and nights in May and June 1986. We must protect the population of this republic against additional doses of radiation, and therefore we must speed the pace of construction of an enterprise to decontaminate the 30-Kilometer Zone."

Here is a statement by another scientist, a "Chernobyl-ian," Corresponding Member of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences V.M. Shestopalov: "The overall directional thrust of the plan for the proposed enterprise is correct. It must be built in order to clear the Zone of concentrations of radionuclides. This will make it possible to improve the environmental situation in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Zone and to safeguard the population of this republic."

In conclusion, I would like to quote from another document, a letter from USSR Minister of Atomic Energy and Industry V.F. Konovalov to the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences: "As regards your inquiry pertaining to the storage of radioactive waste from the nuclear power plants of the USSR and the CEMA member nations on the territory of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Generating Plant and the Ukrainian SSR, I hereby inform you that the ministry has never had any such plans. I have given exactly the same reply to deputies at all meetings of committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet before which I have appeared."

Baltic MD Official on Military Provisions of LPF Draft Program

*90UND1144 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
3 Oct 89 pp 2, 3*

[Article by Maj Gen V. Sein, first deputy chief of the Baltic Military District Political Directorate: "Drafts and Realities: Comments Regarding the Military Portion of the LPF Draft Program"]

[Text] At the Latvian CP Central Committee Plenum in August, the speeches of a number of Communists contained demands for complete demilitarization of the Soviet Baltic. The Latvian People's Front (LPF) also has not ignored this issue. As we know, the drafts of the new LPF Program and Rules are a unique compass of one of the most influential and mass republic sociopolitical organizations. Will it sincerely strive for mutual understanding, compromise, and consolidation of forces, or will it prefer the path of further supercharging political and inter-ethnic passions? Time will tell, but today people are giving a detailed and comprehensive assessment of the LPF program documents. As a military man, I would like to talk a bit about the aspects of the program affecting the army.

What caught my eye during the first reading? It was the general nature of all eight paragraphs of Section 11—particularly emotional, isolated from life, and, one could say, utopian. Even the very title of the section—"Demilitarization"—is not in keeping with the political, economic, historical, and military realities that have taken shape today.

It is known that, in a situation in which various sociopolitical systems and opposing military blocs exist in the world, demilitarization cannot be structured on a unilateral basis. Yes, in May 1987, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact adopted a new—both in form and content—defensive military doctrine. Its main political and strategic goal is to prevent war. And this policy is demonstrated not only in political commitments, but also in the orientation of military organizational development, planning, combat training of troops, and operational training of staffs—in everything that pertains to the military-technical aspect of the doctrine.

They may ask: Is someone really a potential adversary for us today? After all, the various sides claim that the threat of war does not come from them. But this, so to speak, is in words. But in actuality, both the United States and NATO do not hide the fact that they still consider the USSR and the Warsaw Pact states to be their potential adversaries. This is also confirmed by the NATO exercises taking place near the Baltic region, where they are practicing namely offensive and not at all defensive troop actions.

Reliance on force and deterrence—that is the militant philosophy which, unfortunately, was reflected in the Brussels Declaration adopted by the NATO military-political leadership in May of this year. And it was

adopted not during the "cold war," but today in the new, positive conditions of development of the international situation.

We in the military know well the capabilities of the U.S. aircraft carrier strike task forces and NATO's naval forces, which surpass the forces of the USSR Navy many times over. Sea-launched cruise missiles, which the United States refuses to limit and deploys on submarines and surface ships, pose a great danger today. The American administration actually opened the flood gates for series production of B-2 "Stealth" bombers—a first strike weapon (incidentally, the flight time of cruise missiles to the borders of the Baltic region is only several minutes), refuses to suspend nuclear testing, and is nurturing plans to compensate for the medium-range missiles being eliminated.

The NATO states that belong to the Baltic Basin also are not at all thinking about melting down their tanks and aircraft, and the NATO military fleets continue to ply the waters of the Baltic. As far as we know, even traditionally neutral Sweden and Finland do not consider demilitarization of their countries to be a task of the immediate future. Does all of this really give us real grounds to "lay down our weapons," as the LPF is already calling for today, proclaiming the policy of demilitarization of Latvia?

Yes, the Soviet Union is restructuring its defense organizational development, ensuring its effectiveness primarily by qualitative parameters with respect to the equipment and military science as well as the composition of the armed forces. The USSR has rejected "mirroring" the West in producing the latest types of weapons. The decision of the Soviet Government on the unilateral reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe, announced at the United Nations, was a large practical contribution to the change from "superarmament" to the principle of **reasonable sufficiency** for defense and to building a common European home. As we know, over a period of 2 years (1989-1990) the personnel strength of conventional armed forces will decrease by 500,000, and the number of tanks and other weapons will decrease by 10,000. It is also rather interesting to recall that, besides this, the USSR military budget will decrease by 14.2 percent. Production of armaments and military hardware will be reduced by 19.5 percent.

But this is on the scale of the USSR Armed Forces. What changes have taken place directly in the Baltic Military District? I must admit, many paragraphs of the section on "Demilitarization" reflect the incompetence and lack of information of its compiler.

What can the LPF's appeal in the fourth paragraph to "immediately cease increasing the military contingents in Latvia" evoke other than surprise? To what "increase" are they referring, if the planned reduction of the army on the territory of the Baltic Military District is virtually complete? The number of personnel has already been

decreased by 3.4 percent. And what about the early discharge of VUZ students? As we know, they number 176,000, including several thousand for our district. The same can be said for equipment and armaments.

Or let us take an aspect such as conversion, the "reprofiling" of military equipment. The Baltic Military District has sold to the national economy and also to cooperatives hardware, equipment, and assets in the amount of 4.081 million rubles: 1.392 million rubles worth of motor vehicles of various makes alone, 902,000 rubles worth of engineering equipment, and 300,000 rubles worth of property and communications equipment have been transferred. In addition, 640,000 rubles of written-off equipment and property have been sold through the district's material resources department.

The provision of the draft LPE Program on the control of republic authorities over the activities of units and subunits stationed in Latvia also makes one wonder. In my opinion, the authors of the draft are simply passing off what they desire as reality. You see, it is clear that Soviet Latvia is a component part of the unified federation of Soviet republics, and the Baltic Military District is an integral part of the USSR Armed Forces which, according to generally accepted world traditions, enjoy the **right of extraterritoriality**. Therefore, before making such a serious demand, it would be a good idea to address world experience, above all, the experience of Western countries, which, in the eve of many LPE figures are truly the indisputable authority. You see, it certainly would have appeared absurd to the authors of the draft, for example, to demand that the states of the United States break down their country's army into individual formations and regulate their activities not so much in the interests of national defense as in local interests? I think that, even without such proposals, it is clear that **decentralization** of command and control of the armed forces can only lead to disastrous consequences and reduce the fighting effectiveness of troops, especially in carrying out tasks of a strategic nature.

The strategists of the LPE also chose a "weighty" argument with respect to the demand to eliminate air force bases and military training grounds: "Considering the limited areas of agricultural lands." This, it turns out, is why Latvia's agriculture is "spinning its wheels." It does not have enough training ground land. But, you see, weeds often do not even grow there, and before the land was scarce and rocky. How and where, may I ask, will we train soldiers to shoot, drive combat vehicles, and practice tactical actions if the training areas are eliminated? On our fingers, or on 1 per

"The USSR Ministry of Defense must pay rent for the land and facilities which the USSR Armed Forces occupy in Latvia. When transferring to the national economy previously occupied territories, the military department must conduct a complete recultivation of the surroundings." This is categorically stated in the LPE Program. But what if you look at this paragraph realistically? Are military installations really built at the

expense of republic appropriations? The authors of the draft did not stop to think that, in demanding unique financial "satisfaction" from the army for the land and facilities which the USSR Armed Forces occupy in Latvia, they may receive financial counterclaims from the army for the facilities it erected using its forces and resources of the Ministry of Defense, the housing fund, and so forth. You see, this does not take place in practice. What is more, last year alone the district's Billeting Directorate transferred free of charge to local authorities and organizations barracks and housing inventory with a total area of 12,138 square meters. Before the end of 1989, it is planned to transfer two more barracks areas with a total area of 2,163 square meters and also 1,726 hectares of land. Do these facts really not attest to the Baltic Military District's readiness to help the economy of Latvia cope with economic difficulties? However, the authors of the draft have tried not to "notice" them.

The totally unrealistic demand to re-create in the foreseeable future a territorial Latvian military formation migrated without changes or amendments from the existing program to the pages of the new draft program. It would be interesting to find out: What do the leaders of the LPE see as the material basis for such a formation? And how, in particular, will its command cadres be manned, if you consider that one of the paragraphs of Section II of the program again **calls for and demands** "the elimination of military youth camps" and the "withdrawal from the territory of Latvia higher military educational institutions of the USSR"? Here, with a stroke of the pen, the authors are trying to eliminate even the military school bearing the name of a prominent son of Latvia—Yakov Alksnis.

The LPE categorically protests making permanent residents of Latvia perform military service *against* the republic against their will. "Democracy protest contribute to the spreading of a spirit of distrust among Latvia's draftees, the result of which, for example, was the recent desertion (going off alone without leave) of Vlady which was reported in the local press." Now they all will answer the full brunt of the law. But what responsibility, I would like to ask, will those bear who incited them to do this?

The demand to serve only on the territory of one's own republic is nothing more than speaking out against the extraterritorial principle of manning the troops. It is hard to understand that the stationing of troops and the associated need for people do not correspond to the availability of induction resources in a number of regions. The territorial principle of manning the troops is contrary to the interests of defending the state. As is emphasized in the CPSU Platform adopted at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 20 September 1989, the USSR Armed Forces are organized on a multinational basis; all citizens, regardless of nationality, must perform military service in accordance with the all-union laws. As we know, the USSR Ministry of Defense has accommodated the numerous demands of

citizens of the Soviet Baltic, and now more than 20 percent of the draftees from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are left to serve in the Baltic Military District.

One of the paragraphs of the program formulates the provision on revising military instruction in schools, "intensifying physical and ethical instruction." I have nothing against sports or ethics. But, you see, comprehension of military science in a school lecture-hall is impossible without sufficient reinforcement by practical actions. Without initial military training, the draftee is "doomed" to a longer period of mastering the military specialty. So, is this a matter of increasing the terms of service instead of reducing them?

Finally, why do we forget about the educational function of our army? Can we really ignore the generally recognized fact that it is in the army that young people go through a good school of moral and physical training, a school of patriotism and internationalism?

The requirement of the LPP Program that "individuals whose religious, political, or pacifist convictions do not allow serving in the armed forces be granted the right to work for this period in the national economy" is not at all in keeping with the known provisions of the USSR Constitution and the USSR Law on Universal Military Service Obligation.

Did the authors of the draft stop to think how many there would be in this case who desired not to experience for themselves the rigors and deprivations of a soldier's life, quickly changing their views and convictions? This is particularly true if you consider that the local mass media, waging an energetic anti-army propaganda campaign, contributes to this to no small extent.

By the way, and I particularly want to emphasize this, the fall draft in the Baltic republics, despite the complexity of the political situation in the region, was fairly efficient and organized. Of course, there were individual misuses and blunders, but as a whole all the young men who were supposed to be drafted and sent to the troops. According to the comments of commanders and political workers, they are serving in a fitting manner. Somehow the attitude toward them on the part of those who believe it is necessary to reject the participation of military members in compulsory term of service in the elections to local soviets does not work out well against this background. After all, from all appearances, the authors of the draft advocate that human rights and freedoms on the territory of Latvia be guaranteed for any person, regardless of race, skin color, sex, nationality, religious or political convictions, social origin, position held, place of birth, and other circumstances. Why then openly discriminate against military members in compulsory term of service drafted from other regions of the country?

Our army is inseparably linked to the people and to the party. I could cite many examples in which people in uniform were the first to come to help in a time of need, a time of trouble. These include the Chernobyl tragedy, the earthquake in Armenia, saving crops on virgin lands,

and helping the workers of the Soviet Baltic. However, despite this, massive attacks on the army continue.

It looks like the authors of the draft, in drawing up Paragraph 11 of the LPP Program, also tried to drive a wedge between the people and the army, to run down and discredit the armed forces in the eyes of the public and draft-age young people. It seems to me that the fallacy of such attempts is obvious.

Latvian SSR Supsov Okays Riga Humanitarian Institute

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[Unsigned article: "Findings of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's Working Group to Study the Baltic-Slavic Society's Proposal Concerning the Creation of the Riga Humanitarian Institute (RHI)"]

[Text] Taking into consideration the considerable amount of public interest in the republic toward problems of restructuring higher education in the humanities in Latvia and toward creating the Riga Humanitarian Institute, as well as the numerous requests, the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet offers the following abridged version of the Working Group's Findings.

With the purpose of informing the broadest possible public in the republic and providing a frank and democratic discussion of the problem of creating the RHI and developing education in the humanities, the Working Group, through the republic's mass media, asked all the interested individuals and organizations to express their views and comments. Regular discussion of the incoming recommendations at open sessions of the Working Group was organized. The republic's leading specialists with regard to education in the humanities were invited to those sessions and participated in the discussion. The press published more than 20 articles, brief items, and round-table materials.

The Working Group considered as the first fruit of its activities the recommendations made by the Baltic-Slavic Society (BSS) concerning the opening of the Riga Humanitarian Institute.¹ The crux of the recommendations lies in creating in the republic an educational-cultural scientific center for the representatives of the national minorities, primarily the Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Tatars, and Poles living in Latvia. It is recommended that the center carry out the training of cadres of intelligentsia in the arts and the humanities from among the national minorities and carry out the appropriate scientific research. The center is supposed to become a place for the renewal and dissemination of the culture of the representatives of the national minorities in Latvia and to promote their integration into the republic's life.

The functioning of the RHI would make it possible, according to the BSS, to form within the republic a more viable social and national structure and to lessen the interethnic tension in Latvia.

The consideration of the BSS recommendations indicated that the majority of the interested individuals and organizations that took part in the open sessions of the Working Group, on the whole, supported the idea of creating the educational-cultural-scientific center for the representatives of Latvia's national minorities. Positive responses with a number of recommendations that deserve attention were received from: the Latvian SSR Association of Industrial Enterprises; the Latvian Cooperative Union; the Latvian SSR Workers International Front; the Latvian Branch of the International Slavic Culture Foundation; the USSR Social Inventions Foundation; the Unity movement (Lithuanian SSR); the Dnipro-Ukrainian Cultural-Educational Society; the Litsey Studio for the Free Development of the Child; the Pushkin Lyceum; the Democratic Initiative Center; etc. The creation of RHI has been included in the Latvian CP Program of Actions that was adopted by the September 1989 plenum of Latvian CP Central Committee. The Working Group also received a number of official responses.

The Latvian SSR Minfin [Ministry of Finance] does not have any major objections to the creation of RHI and is ready to make recommendations concerning the sources of financing to maintain it.

Latvian SSR Gosplan recognizes the need to improve the training of specialists with higher education in the republic in the humanity specialties, economic specialties, and art specialties, but it recommends resolving the problem by means of alternating in the institutions of higher learning the admission of students in these specialties in a Russian track and a Latvian track, and also notes the existing complications in assigning certain specialists. However, the Working Group feels that this path will lead to a reduction in the number of students studying in the Latvian track, which is unacceptable and still would not make it possible to resolve the problem of raising the cultural level of a considerable number of persons living in Latvian SSR.

The Latvian SSR State Committee for Culture agrees that there is a need to expand specialist training in the field of culture. As an alternative for resolving the matter, the State Committee recommends improving the admission into the existing institutions of higher learning, and also by means of the creation of the Latvian Academy of Culture, where instruction would be given basically in Latvian and where persons of nonindigenous nationality who are fluent in Latvian could attend. In the opinion of the Working Group, this would not contradict the idea of creating the RHI.

The Latvian SSR Ministry of Education and the republic's Council of Rectors of Institutions of Higher Learning recognize the need to expand the training of specialists in the humanities for representatives of the national minorities, and feel that that would have a favorable effect upon harmonizing the interethnic relations in Latvia. The moot points are the deadlines and

the specific forms for implementing this idea. The republic's Council of Rectors of Institutions of Higher Learning notes that a promising step would be the formation in the city of Riga of a cultural-educational center that would provide refresher instruction, that would have the opportunity to provide higher education in a second humanity, and that would carry out scientific-research work. Actually this can be viewed as one of the alternatives for the gradual creation in the republic of an educational-scientific-cultural humanities complex for the national minorities.

The findings of the Latvian Association of National-Cultural Societies (ANKOI) emphasize that the situation with regard to education in the humanities in the republic by no means satisfies the public. At the same time, the analysis of public opinion that was carried out and the discussions at the open sessions of the Working Group do not make it possible to agree with ANKOI's conclusion that the implementation of the RHI idea "does not lead to the achievement... of the basic tasks confronting ANKOI—it does not promote either the bringing of the national cultures closer to Latvian culture, or the increased understanding of the native culture." It would seem to be obvious that the BSS recommendations are directed specifically at implementing these principles, and, moreover, neither in the remote future nor in the form of the individual channeling of a few specialists into studying in their ethnic homeland, but in the republic itself, where there are valid opportunities for making the representatives of all nationalities closer to the wealth of the culture of the Latvian nation, thus precluding the possibility of polarizing the interests of the indigenous and nonindigenous nations residing in Latvia and it will promote specifically the harmonizing of the interethnic relations that have become so acute. The Working Group shares ANKOI's opinion that the creation of any cultural, educational, or scientific center should not be opposed to, or infringe upon, the development of Latvian and Latgal cultural centers, whether already existing or being created in the republic.

It is apparently also completely natural that the initiators of this idea were the representatives of the most numerous nonindigenous nationalities residing in Latvia—the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians represented in BSS—and that the Russian language, which has been recognized in the Latvian SSR Language Law as being one of the languages of communication among ethnic groups, can be chosen as one of the basic working languages at RHI.

The Working Group supports ANKOI's conclusion concerning the need for further working out of the long-range concept of developing higher education in the republic, and at the same time it feels that the basis for this can be the concept recommended by the republic's Council of Rectors.

The Working Group emphasizes that the need to develop higher education specifically in the humanities is recognized in absolutely all the responses, even the negative ones.

**State of Education in the Humanities in the Republic
(For Persons of Nonindigenous Nationality)**

The discussion on problems of developing education in the humanities in the republic, which discussion is being carried out on the initiative of the Working Group, has encouraged the appearance of a number of new interesting ideas, constructive recommendations, and supplemental and alternative versions for creating a new type of higher educational institution in Latvia and for developing the entire system of higher education in the republic.

The proposed ideas are based on the real problems existing in the sphere of training cadres in the humanities, but certain authors see the path for resolving the problem in the creation of independent scientific, educational, and cultural organizations, including those within the confines of the existing structures, although it is recognized by everyone that up until the present time those structures have been unable to resolve appropriately the problems that have accumulated in society with regard to satisfying the need for education in the humanities for representatives of the national minorities who are living in the republic. In the event that this path is chosen, there is no resolution of the question of the formation of cadres in the humanities from among the national minorities in Latvia, inasmuch as they can arise only if there exists a single complex on the educational-scientific-cultural level. It will be necessary to resolve not the purely branch problem—the problem that is a narrow one from the point of view of the needs of the republic's residents—of training various specialists, but, rather, the sociopolitical problem of establishing qualitatively new, harmonious interethnic relations that are based on the rising cultural level of the representatives of all the nationalities residing in Latvia.

Numerous facts confirm the specialists' opinion concerning the unfavorable state of affairs in the education of the humanities in the republic on the whole and as applicable to the national minorities in particular.

The seriousness of the deformations can be judged from the following data. With the share of the employment rate of the national minorities among the total number of workers and employees in the national economy in 1987 being 52.4 percent, among the workers in public education that share constitutes 41.2 percent, in institutions of culture and art, 25.4 percent, and among the scientific workers at the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences, 31.8 percent. The national minorities are concentrated in the group of workers; among them there is not a sufficient segment of intellectuals in the humanities that could form and raise their cultural level, or channel their social participation in the interests of developing the Latvian SSR. This can lead to the fusion of social and national contradictions, and can complicate the interethnic relations.

One observes in the republic the development of a negative tendency toward the reduction in the share of training specialists with university education, including

teachers, economists, and jurists, in the total number of specialists. Whereas in 1960 they constituted 45.1 percent of the total number of specialists with higher education, in 1985 they constituted only 39.5 percent. In the economically developed countries one observes the completely opposite situation. For example, in the United States from 1975 through 1985 the number of graduates with higher education among the economic (management) personnel approximately doubled, and their share in the total number of graduates increased from 13.6 to 22.2 percent. In Great Britain the share of these specialists constitutes approximately 25 percent. At the same time, in the 1988-1989 school year the admissions to daytime departments at institutions of higher learning in Latvia in the general economic specialties constituted only 6.2 percent; and the economic-engineering specialties, 6.1 percent. The admissions in the specialties of culture and art constitute only 2.7 percent; and in the humanities, 10.1 percent (1988-1989 school year, daytime department) of the total admissions to institutions of higher learning.

At the same time the forecasts made by the Riga Polytechnical Institute's NIL [Scientific-Research Laboratory] of Problems of the Higher Technical School System attest to the assumed considerable increase in the demands for specialists in the humanities. By the year 2005, as compared with 1985, the republic will need 93.4 percent more economists and 89.7 percent more university specialists, including teachers.

The problem of training specialists in the humanities is especially acute when considered from the point of view of the languages of instruction, inasmuch as complete fluency in one's native language is the chief condition for the normal and efficient activities of the specialists in the humanities.

As V.A. Rayangu, chairman of the Estonian SSR Gosobrazovaniye [State Committee for Education], remarks so validly, "when establishing the language of instruction, we proceeded chiefly from the consideration that the primary role of the institutions of higher learning has always been the preservation and development of national science and culture. And it is naturally that this task can be fulfilled only by a higher school system in which the instruction is given in the native language" (see VESTNIK VYSSHEY SHKOLY, No 8, 1989, p. 39). The Working Group feels that this approach is the **absolutely fundamental one** also for providing higher education to the representatives of the national minorities in Latvia, provided there is compulsory and thorough study of the history and culture of the Latvian nation, and the graduates have a thorough knowledge of the republic's state language.

At the present time in the republic, the training of specialists at institutions of higher learning is conducted only in Latvian and in Russian. At the same time the USSR has examples when, in the union republics, a more flexible and more realistic linguistic policy is conducted in the union republics, for example, in the institutions of

higher learning in Georgia, the instruction is given in six languages, and the Tbilisi Pedagogical Institute has departments of the Azeri and Armenian languages and literatures, which train teachers for the schools.

The share of the training of specialists in the humanities in the Russian tracks is considerably less than the share of the national minorities in the republic. Among the students in the day school, and it is precisely that school that gives completely valid education in the humanities, at LGU [Latvian State University] as of the beginning of the 1984-1985 school year they constituted 31 percent, in the Latvian SSR State Academy of Arts, 8 percent, the conservatory, 16 percent, Līepaya Pedagogical Institute, 22 percent, and only in Daugavpils Pedagogical Institute, 59 percent.

In recent years one has observed the tendency toward a reduction in the training of specialists in the Russian tracks of the day departments of institutions of higher learning, both on the whole and by the individual specialties in the humanities.

Whereas in the 1987-1988 school year the day departments of the republic's institutions of higher learning accepted into the Russian tracks 40.8 percent of all the students, in the 1989-1990 school year, according to preliminary data, that figure is less than 35 percent. At the same time, in the 1988-1989 school year, out of 339,800 students, 157,000 students (46.2 percent) attended schools with Russian language of instruction, and 172,800 students (53.8 percent) attended schools with Latvian language of instruction. In Riga, out of 99,300 students, the respective figures were 66,400 (66.8 percent) and 32,800 (33.2 percent). For LGU [Latvian State University], which is the leading center for training specialists in the humanities, in the 1987-1988 school year the admissions in the daytime department in the track with Russian language of instruction constituted 30.7 percent; and in the 1989-1990 school year, according to preliminary data, only 18.5 percent. Similar processes are occurring in the republic's pedagogical institutes: at LPPGI [Latvian Pedagogical State Institute] in the 1989-1990 school year, with Russian language of instruction, 15 percent, and at DPI [Daugavpils Pedagogical Institute], 52.1 percent.

Meanwhile the need that the youth in the nonindigenous part of the republic's population have for obtaining an education in the humanities is extremely large. This can be judged, in particular, by the size of the entrance-examination competition for admission to institutions of higher learning. For example, in the 1989-1990 school year, the competition among the applicants for the daytime department at LGU in the Russian track constituted 2.6 applications per place in the Latvian track, 2.1, at LGIFK [Latvian State Institute of Physical Culture], 2.8 and 2.2, DPI, 1.6 and 2.0, LGPI, 2.6 and 1.4, and RMI, 2.6 and 1.5.

With the purpose of the more profound study of the need that the nonindigenous population has for obtaining

education in the humanities, the Working Group carried out a pilot sociological study of the opinions of the upperclassmen in the 19 secondary schools in the city of Riga. Results were obtained from a questionnaire conducted among 1163 students, which is an extremely representative sampling. Of the total number of persons interviewed, 951 persons, or 81.8 percent, expressed the desire to continue training at a higher educational institution; 89 persons, or 7.6 percent, had not made a decision, and the rest had no plans, as of the day when the questionnaire was made, to obtain higher education.

A number of the persons interviewed decided to receive higher education outside the confines of the republic, for the following reasons: uncertainty about the high quality of education in the republic's institutions of higher learning, 72 persons, and individual orientation toward specific institutions of higher learning in other places in the USSR, 69 persons. The republic's lack of any admissions to the Russian track in the chosen specialty was noted by 402 persons.

As of the moment of the graduation from secondary school, 781 persons were planning to receive education in institutions of higher learning in Riga. One hundred eighty-two persons were planning to attend LGU, RPI, 329, RMI, 106, RKHGA, 95, LGIFK, 39, LGK, 1, and GAKh, 6.

Out of the 1163 persons interviewed, 1021 persons answered affirmatively to the question of their desire to attend Riga Humanitarian Institute in the specialties indicated in the questionnaire in the event that it opened within the next few years. The desire to attend was expressed in that instance even by those who were not planning to receive a higher education, if the structure of the educational institutions in the republic did not undergo any changes.

In the opinion of the Working Group, an obviously unsatisfactory state of affairs is observed in the cultural sphere among the republic's national minorities. Against the background of the rather high development of Latvian culture, although here too there is a vast field for activity, one is struck by the almost complete lack of dance and musical ensembles, choruses, exhibitions, and museum displays, and the lack of festivals, competitions, and celebrations by the non-Latvian segment of the population. The bulk of the national minorities proved to be alienated from their culture in everyday life.

The attempts that were undertaken last year alone to bring about an active rebirth of the national cultures and languages within the confines of the public formations and national-cultural societies that were created require right now a large number of specialists in the field of national culture and language for the national societies, schools, other educational institutions, club houses, clubs, and houses of culture.

The mass training of this type of specialists must be carried out within the republic itself, inasmuch as the students need to assimilate the cultural and historical

traditions of Latvia, and to penetrate wholeheartedly into its life. The mechanical transferring of the traditions of other cultural communities by means of the "importing" of specialists will scarcely benefit the republic and can only cause a conflict with the Latvian national culture and complicate the interethnic relations, and still will require the prolonged cultural adaptation of such specialists in Latvia. The problem of introducing the humanities into education also pertains to the training of economic and administrative cadres, which constitute a small but extremely important social segment. At the present time it consists basically of persons who received narrowly technical education.

The Working Group feels that it is necessary to overcome the negative tendency that has been developing during the past decade in the development of higher education in the Latvian SSR, and to overcome the republic's loss of advance positions. For example, whereas in 1959, from the point of view of the level of education per 10,000 persons of population, Latvia occupied third place among the union republics, in 1986 it occupied fourth place; with regard to the number of specialist employed in the national economy who had higher education, in 1959 Latvia occupied second place and in 1986, tenth place¹.

As a result it is necessary to take decisive and emergency steps both to restructure the existing system of training the republic's specialists in the humanities, and to create new educational institutions where there would be a broad combination of instruction in courses on the theory and history of culture, social studies, and the administrative disciplines.

On the basis of an analysis of the specialists' findings and the actual state of affairs with the obtaining of education in the humanities, the Working Group has come to the conclusion that the republic has a persistent need to create an educational-cultural-scientific center for the representatives of the national minorities. In the opinion of the Working Group, the activities of this center would correspond to the job of improving the interethnic relations and would correspond to the decisions made by the Latvian Peoples' Forum, to the Latvian Communist Party's "Along the Path of Latvian Sovereignty" Program, to the decisions of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet that were made recently, and to the keynote documents of such large-scale social and political organizations in the republic as the People's Front and Interfront.

Accordingly, the Working Group deems it to be desirable to begin the work of creating in Riga an educational-cultural-scientific center for the representatives of the republic's national minorities.

As the second trend in its activities, the Working Group carried out a search and selection of the incoming constructive recommendations for creating the Riga Humanitarian Institute and the republic's possible need for the appropriate specialists.

Analyzing the situation, the Working State asserts that, in the approaches taken by a number of ministries and departments and the republic's central economic departments to the possibilities of providing higher education to residents of the republic, the approach that continues to predominate is the technocratic, narrowly departmental, and erroneously understood narrowly economic one, which is oriented chiefly toward satisfying the current needs for the training of specific specialists. There has not yet been in the republic any decisive turning toward the person himself, toward his needs to obtain the appropriate education. There continues to be a lack of a state understanding of the fact that the chief value in any society is man himself, and that the overall level of people's culture determines, to a decisive degree, the level of development of society itself.

Accordingly, the Working Group especially emphasizes that the restructuring of the higher educational system in the republic must be based both on the satisfying of the needs (the current and especially the long-range ones) of the Latvian SSR national economy for the appropriate cadres of specialists, and on the broadest possible granting of the opportunity to satisfy the need for the appropriate education for the most significant groups of the republic's population in their native language.

It is precisely from these positions that the Working Group considered the idea of creating the RHI and the incoming comments and recommendations. The discussions that were conducted revealed that the overall trends for the RHI were selected by the organizing group of the Baltic-Slavic Society for the most part correctly. However, a number of the recommendations that were made need a considerable amount of further development, concretization, and study, and certain of them are insufficiently substantiated. As a result of the joint work of the Working Group and the specialists who were invited to participate, it has been established that the creation and functioning of the center must be based on the following basic principles:

1. RHI is given the status of an autonomous educational-cultural-scientific center within the Latvian public education system.

That means, the financing of its activities both with the use of state funds and with the use of funds from public organizations and enterprises, cooperatives, and private individuals, the joint administration of RHI on the part of state and public organizations by way of the appropriate agency, which the center's Founders' Council could become.

2. RHI becomes the initial and central link in the continuous-education complex that includes, on contract principles, the schools specializing in the humanities, the lyceums, and the secondary special educational institutions.

3. RHI engages in developing and disseminating knowledge, culture, the language and literature, and the traditions and customs of the indigenous nation and the

national minorities and promotes the integration of the latter into the spiritual and social life of Latvia.

4. Of the total number of RHI teachers, only some are permanent staff, and the others work on a contract basis for one or two semesters.

In the opinion of the Working Group, the cadre potential that exists in Latvia, and especially in Riga, makes it completely possible to provide highly trained teachers, scientific workers, and cultural specialists for most of the trends in the activities of the center being considered.

According to data provided by the Latvian SSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], as of the end of 1988 the republic had 13,980 scientific workers, approximately 50 percent of whom were scientific-pedagogical personnel at institutions of higher learning, including 461 doctors of sciences and 5006 candidates of sciences.

5. The creation of RHI must not infringe financially on the already existing secondary special and higher educational institutions in the republic; it must proceed at the expense of additional financing, which is realistically possible at the present time at the expense of the reconsideration of the structure of expenses paid from the republic's state budget, and the considerable increase in the share of the expenditures for public education (at the present time the republic is lagging considerably behind the other Baltic republics with regard to this indicator).

6. The language of instruction, beginning with grade 3 or 4, becomes free, depending upon which language the lecturer is fluent in. RHI provides knowledge of Russian, Latvian, one foreign language, and one national language, which knowledge makes it possible to carry out professional activities.

7. RHI trains not only specialists in specific, narrow specialties, but also specialists with a broad area of knowledge in the humanities.

8. Prolonged probationary periods for students at institutions of higher learning in other republics are a mandatory component of instruction at RHI.

9. The group of specialties in which the students are trained at the institute must be determined by the following requirements:

First, the expansion of the list of specialties in which students are being trained in Latvian institutions of higher learning.

Secondly, training also in certain specialties that are already been taught at institutions of higher learning. This will make it possible to eliminate the existing monopoly in instruction and to improve the quality of education. This approach is the predominant one in the practice of the countries with the most highly developed higher educational systems and it can be used in our republic.

10. Instruction at RHI must be provided chiefly in the daytime department, that provides the most valid

education in the humanities. In the long-term period it may be possible to train specialists by allowing them to be released partially from their place of work (instruction is provided two or three days a week on work days and on Saturday) for the interested organizations.

It is possible to obtain at RHI a second higher education, in the humanities, and also to be trained in accordance with an individual plan.

11. The institution of higher learning independently determines its structure, which is flexible. At such time its subdivisions have the maximum amount of freedom with regard to instructional methodology.

12. The training of specialists in the field of culture proceeds in close contact with the national-cultural and cultural societies, partially in accordance with their expressed needs and with their direct participation, including the involvement of members of the national-cultural societies for instruction, the carrying out of scientific research, and cultural work. In this regard, it is necessary for the Latvian SSR State Committee for Culture to provide for the considerable expansion, within the system of institutions in the State Committee, of permanent-staff positions for leaders of clubs and ensembles and for other workers in the cultural sphere who are satisfying the demands of the Latvian national minorities.

13. An entity that functions as part of RHI is the preparatory department, which provides instruction in languages, primarily the Latvian language and the languages of the appropriate national minorities in Latvia, and engages in raising the overall educational and cultural level.

14. For certain specialties, RHI can assume the function of training (on a contractual basis) specialists from among the national minorities of Lithuania and Estonia, thus promoting the easing of the complicated interethnic relations in the Baltic area as a whole, especially under the conditions of the integrational processes that are occurring in the Baltic republics.

15. The version for creating a branch of RHI that is a promising one is the branch in Latgale. As the first step, it is possible to create an instructional-consultation station in the city of Rēzekne. (Recommendations concerning the creation of such a branch were received by the Working Group.)

16. At RHI it is necessary to provide, following the example of certain highly developed countries, a special system of courses to resolve conflicts and to search for compromises, including courses to analyze interethnic problem situations.

When analyzing the need of the republic's national economy for specialist cadres, the Working Group concluded that at the present time the republic lacks scientifically substantiated computations for determining the necessary number of specialists for the national economy either in the next few years or for the long-term period.

with regard to a considerable group of specialties. The existing practice does not take into consideration the fundamentally new situation that is developing in the republic as a result of the changeover to economic independence, and to an even greater extent it fails to take into consideration the major shifts that are occurring in interethnic relations.

The evaluations made by the experts make it possible to state the following conclusions with regard to the trends in specialist training that pertain to the RHI draft.

One expects a considerable increase in the need for skilled specialists for working in the mass media, especially in the press, as a result of the fact that there will be an increase in the number of public, cooperative, departmental, and special publications, and new radio and television studios will appear. These workers will have to know both the Latvian and Russian languages, as well as the languages of the national minorities.

There will be broad development of the informational and advertising departments at enterprises as a result of the changeover to economic, market methods of management, and designers will also be needed at most of the major enterprises.

In the republic, taking into consideration the new socio-political and economic situation, an insufficient number of specialists are being trained in the field of the new type of administration and economy, and it is specifically those specialists who will assume the basic burden of the work to restructure the economic mechanism. The share of economists among the economic administrators is infinitesimally small. There has been a sharp increase in the demand for these specialists as a result of the development of the cooperative system and individual labor activity.

The expansion of the need for legal cadres is influenced by the requirements to create a law-governed state, in which the laws regulate the entire social and economic life. At the first stages it is most necessary to train jurists for economic work, and then, by drawing on the jurists and economists, to form cadres of professional politicians.

Large reserves for increasing the effectiveness of the work performed by the enterprises lie in the training of specialists possessing vast knowledge in the field of sociology. This knowledge is also necessary as a result of the increase in the political participation of all segments of society. It is possible to train multiple-specialty experts in the field of social relations, with a knowledge of sociology, economics, jurisprudence, and social psychology. Unfortunately, the country's institutions of higher learning have been producing up until now practically no specialists of this type.

At the present time the rate to which the republic as well as the country as a whole, is provided with cadres of sociologists is considerably lower than in the developed and even certain developing countries.

An area that can become a promising one in the activities of RHI is the training of pedagogical cadres, the need for whom continues to be unsatisfied in the republic, especially under conditions of the beginning changeover to the 12-year period of instruction in schools with Russian language of instruction. At the same time one observes Latvia's lagging behind with regard to the share of teachers with higher education who are working in the schools, as compared with Lithuania and Estonia. For example, in Latvia during the 1988-1989 school year the share of teachers with higher education is 75.8 percent. That indicator, as compared with 1985—76.8 percent—has even dropped.

Among the teachers at schools that give instruction in history and the principles of state and law, teachers with higher education in the 1988-1989 school year constituted 88 percent; music and singing, 45.6 percent; the fine arts, 44.3 percent; and labor instruction, 50.5 percent. A considerable number of teachers in the school system do not have special higher pedagogical education in a number of specialties.

Another area that is a promising one for expanding the training of pedagogical cadres is the providing of instruction in the daytime department to specialists in physical and mental disorders. It is necessary to note that most of the special schools in the republic are concentrated in the Riga area, and this makes it possible to use them as partners of the institution of higher learning.

The Working Group feels that a recommendation that deserves attention is the one conveyed by LGU specialists concerning the creation, within the confines of RHI, of a scientific-pedagogical center that exists on the fundamentally new basis of training researcher-teachers, folk teachers, and practicing psychologists.

The Working Group also considers it to be possible to implement in the republic the idea of instructing, over the period of two or three years, in accordance with a special program, a series of courses in the humanities and culture for women having young children. This instruction will make it possible to raise the cultural level in the republic's families and actually to give the chief importance to education in the family during the preschool period.

This form of instruction can also be simultaneously a method for professional selection for continuing instruction in pedagogical specialties at RHI.

In the group's opinion, the state of affairs that is most serious is the state of affairs in the training of specialists who have been called upon to promote the increase in the population's cultural participation. According to data provided by the Latvian SSR State Committee for Culture, within its system 6.9 percent of the library workers have higher special education, 6.3 percent of club house workers, and 45 percent of the teachers in secondary educational institutions have higher special education; and the same situation pertains with cadres in the other systems.

Among the specialists in the field of culture, the needs that have to be satisfied first of all are those of the national-cultural societies.

At the present time, in a number of subjects, there are practically none of them in the republic.

The Working Group, with the involvement of the appropriate specialists, carried out an evaluation of the possible cost of building the RHI complexes, as stipulated by the BSS construction plan. The tentative cost of the instructional-laboratory building with a total area of 15,000 square meters constitutes approximately 4 million rubles (including approximately 3 million rubles for construction-and-installation operations). The cost of the sports center is 1.1 million rubles (including 0.94 million rubles for construction-and-installation operations).

At the same time the Working Group considers it to be possible to begin the operation of the center in one of buildings that have been made available as a result of the reduction in the administrative-management apparatus, and also to transfer to the jurisdiction of RHI one of the dormitories as a result of the reduction of the migratory

population.

The Working Group considers it to be desirable to consider the question of transferring the Riga Library of

Friendship of Nations to complex, with the appropriate change in its functions, thus making it possible to solve the problem of the literature collections in the languages of the national minorities; the library would become part of the RHI's National Culture Center.

Considering the fact that the problems confronting the national minorities of Latvia can be resolved only if there is a considerable expansion of the scientific-research projects in the field of culture, education, and social development, the Working Group deems it necessary to have as part of the center the following scientific subdivisions:

- a laboratory of the culture of national minorities and national relations;
- a laboratory of the problems of the social development of the Latvian SSR;
- a scientific methodology center for new forms and methods of education;
- a laboratory of the problems of interregional relations and management.

If the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet decides to open the educational-scientific-cultural center, its creation, in the opinion of the Working Group, should be carried out in several stages (over a 6-to-8-year period).

At the first stage, the concept of the functioning of the RHI within the republic's public education system is modified. For that purpose, on a competitive basis, a

working group is created for preparing all the necessary documents, including the substantiation of the admission of students, the development of the curricula, etc. The work plan for one of these possible groups has already been submitted to the working group⁴. Two games involving organizational activities are being carried out: one deals with the concept of the functioning of the center itself, and the other one dealing with the place and role of RHI in the republic's public education system. The tentative cost of conducting these operations is approximately 50,000 rubles.

Other necessary steps are being carried out, which deal with the admission of students to the first year, the organizing of a scientific-research laboratory, and the staffing of the library.

The initial admission of students should be established at the level of no more than 100-125 persons.

At the second stage, the instructional, personnel, scientific-research, and cultural base of RHI is gradually expanded.

The admission of students is expanded to 150, and the total number of students to 600-700. The instructors and students complete probationary periods at other institutions of higher learning and scientific centers.

The formation of the Center for the Culture of National Minorities, the "RHI—Humanities Lyceum" complexes, and the scientific-research subdivisions comes to an end.

The third stage is the completion of the creation of RHI as an educational-scientific-cultural center. The admission of students is stabilized at 250-300 students, and the total number of students is 1250-1500. The instructor contingent, including part-time instructors, is 250-300 persons. For the most part, the creation of the material-technical base is being completed.

Footnotes

1. As of today's date, there are already more than 30 of them.

2. The persons who are developing the RHI concept proceed from an expanded treatment of the concept of "the humanities," according to which the humanities include the social and economic sciences.

3. The number of students at institutions of higher learning per 10,000 inhabitants of the Latvian SSR was 171 in 1970, 184 in 1980, and 164 in 1988, which means an actual reduction in 1988 in the number of students in the republic, respectively, of 2000 and 6000 persons.

4. The RHI Humanities Project that was developed by the Litsey group on assignment from the Working Group received a certificate from the All-Union Competition for Developing New Forms of Education, which competition is conducted by USSR Gosobrazovanie [State Committee for Education].

Creation, Aims of Surgut Youth Organization Detailed

90UN00764 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by S. Kiselev, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent, and A. Tsyganov: "A Social Portrait of the Opposition Phenomenon"]

[Text] The word "opposition" is heard more and more frequently in our arguments. And "majority" and "minority" are showing up more and more often in resolutions of various problems. This is recognized, normal and democratic. But old fears still cloud our minds and some people still see this as "undermining the foundations."

Since January 1989 the name of the small Siberian town of Surgut has taken on almost political status in Komsomol circles. And whether we want it to or not, from now on Komsomol history will see it as the symbol of radicalism and the desperate hope among Komsomol members to renovate the Komsomol in the 80's. And why is that?

There were people in Surgut who renounced the outmoded idea of "not being the first to stick their neck into a noose" and risked "having their own opinion" to save the situation in the Komsomol.

There were thirty of them, official participants at the meeting. All were Komsomol workers, the very ones that, no matter what, are functionaries at the rayon level. But as opposed to many of the others, these were far-sighted, bold and fearless people, and that you cannot deny. What a "lieutenant corps," one that openly announced that it intended to be more decisive and go further along the path of changes than did the "Komsomol generals."

They argued for several days and as a result announced the creation of the Surgut Komsomol Organization and adopted the "Platform of the 30," almost every point of which seems seditious for those times. They stated that there was a crisis in the Komsomol, despite the evaluation by the 20th Komsomol Congress (conditions are excellent). In short, it was a ChP [an extraordinary event]. By the way, the story on the meeting, a story that appeared soon after in KOMSOMOLKA, was entitled "ChP At The Union Level" (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA of 31 January 1989).

What happened then?

January. The Komsomol Central Committee Secretariat approved the results of the Surgut meeting.

February. Komsomol committees from around the country and entire organizations began to join the Surgut Komsomol Organization as collective members.

March. Three of the ten Surgut meeting participants who were proposed as candidates for USSR People's Deputies were elected.

May. How fast time flies. The "Platform of the 30" was supported in speeches by central committee members at the 7th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum. There was even a recommendation to accept this platform as the basis for general Komsomol discussion.

July. The 8th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum evaluated conditions in the Komsomol to be much the same as seen by the people in Surgut. What we heard was, "Yes, there is a crisis within the Komsomol." They decided that there had to be a congress and the Komsomol had to have its own Political Program and new Regulations.

August. "Surguti's" gathered for their second meeting in a satellite city of Volgograd, Volzhskiy. This time there were almost two hundred of them...

We are nonetheless strange people: we are afraid of words, but are fearless in the face of a real threat. We shy away from "concepts that are not ours" as we would from a plague-stricken hut, yet we accept tightrope walking along the edge of a precipice with the foolhardiness of the brave...

All of this because the meeting at Surgut represents generally typical opposition within the Komsomol. Even if it does not proclaim itself as such, that is what it is. An inter-regional group of deputies that has declared itself to be only a working agency of the USSR People's Deputies also represents opposition. The "April" Writers' Association that has come out as a social organization within the Writers' Union represents opposition. In a very literal, dictionary, sense, this word means "the opposition, resistance, or contrast of one's views and policies to the policies and opinions of another." That is all it is and there is no need to faint because of it.

Let's be consistent. After we have said "a," let's learn to pronounce "b," even if this letter does not sound harmonious to some. After saying the word "pluralism," let us agree about how it developed organizationally. Otherwise pluralism of opinions degenerates into marketplace cacophony and democratization stops at the point of being poetry at meetings.

Thus the Surgut meeting is also the "organized" "opposition views" to the official views as stated in Komsomol Central Committee documents of those times. A new political reality was formed in the Komsomol and the date of its origin was January 1989.

Now, some words on my main topic.

Many of the democratic innovations in our political life today showed up for the very first time in the Komsomol. Let us go over some of them: "informal" conduct at plenums and conferences; having choices when electing committee secretaries; political clubs and discussion centers; and funds for social initiatives... Even the microphone that was taken into the hall during sessions of USSR People's Deputies Congresses had as its precursor

the "free microphone" during the 1986-1987 Komsomol reporting and electoral campaign. The ideas for creating a Russian Komsomol and calling for a congress ahead of schedule and for new Regulations were part of this same sequence. But Lithuania? This summer's restoration of the Communist Youth Union of Lithuania, independent from the central union, was essentially the start of discussions about the status of Communist Parties in the republics.

What will come of all this? Will these changes in the youth environment be the prototype for future "adult changes?" Will young people be a barometer for political development in society? And if so, then the Surgut meeting is not simply "amusements for young people..."

People noted long ago that any new idea has to go through three stages before it becomes trite. The first is "that cannot be," the second—"there is something to that" and the third—"yes, that is evident."

These "Komsomol Lieutenants" were not the first with this radicalism. It first took place among the privates. After the 20th Komsomol Congress in Moscow a handful of students who called themselves the "Democratic Faction of the Komsomol" announced themselves in Moscow. In comparing their ideas with those of the "Surguti's" today, we find that ninety percent of them coincide. It turns out that all of this, the "first in interests," defending the rights of the minority and independence for the Komsomol press, has already been said and has passed on. Because "it could not be."

Obviously the social consciousness that every idea has its own time and place has already been established. The "Democratic Faction" appeared at the wrong time; another two years had to pass before the old ideas gained new life. Professionals took the place of the amateurs.

These people operated openly: a secret is part of the arsenal of conspirators and court plotters, while glasnost is indispensable to the life of all constructive opposition. These people invited journalists to Surgut and themselves copied and dispersed the "Platform of the 30" throughout the country. They understood that social opinion would be their arbiter.

And social opinion gave its answer: "There is something in this."

The third stage is the most frightening. Without any official support and without getting involved in constructive dialogue, the opposition is clearly announcing its break and is creating a new organization. This, by the way, also happened with the "Democratic Faction," many members of which became founders of the "Federation of Anarchist-Syndicalists." Internal opposition became opposition from within. This outcome has also not been ruled out by the "Surguti's."

One of us witnessed a discussion between Central Committee Secretary V. Zyukin and leaders of the Surgut

meeting on the eve of the 8th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum. The secretary wanted to know, "What if the Plenum does not support your ideas?" "Then we will think about creating our own organization," Volgograd Obkom [oblast committee] Assistant Secretary A. Kiselev answered for all of them.

Matters did not get to that point. Moreover Surgut meeting participants were invited to get involved in preparing for the plenum and take part in it. And two of them, Aleksandr Baykov and Aleksandr Bek, became Candidate members of the Central Committee. It was later announced that the parallel structures had become interwoven and many of the things that the opposition had recommended became the official point of view.

Did the opposition die off?

In the initial days of the Volzhskiy meeting we received confidential reports to the effect that "We will get the movement into shape." Well, a movement is a movement. But, by the way, which direction is it moving? What are its goals? MGU [Moscow State University] Komsomol Committee Secretary Maksim Sotnikov answered with reference to eastern wisdom. "What is important is not the goal, but the path to it." Obviously one has to understand this to mean "if we define the forms for Komsomol work precisely and find adequate assets, nothing bad can come of it." In other words, regardless of what road you travel, you will come to the right temple. But there is more...

Streets in the city of Volzhskiy are long and very entangled. Every house in this city has two addresses: one—the location and block, and the other—a sequential street number. This is neither confusing nor unusual to the city's inhabitants, but it is torture for the newly arrived. And, literally repeating the city confusion, the Volzhskiy meeting also had several agendas.

"Surguti" leaders came to their second meeting with a lot of plans. Yenakiyevskiy Komsomol Gorkom [city committee] First Secretary and USSR People's Deputy Viktor Goncharov was interested in having the Komsomol take part in the up-coming pre-electoral campaign. Another People's Deputy, Aleksandr Kiselev, insisted on discussing the country's internal political situation. Maksim Sotnikov's team was "sick" about the selection of delegates to the Komsomol Congress and Sverdlov resident Vadim Dudarenko was upset about the idea of creating a Russian Komsomol.

And then something very interesting began. Sotnikov's group could not accept discussing the situation in the country at this meeting and saw no sense in it. But—they had to! The majority decided that they had to. And the group produced generally superficial results. We understand that, because one does not become wise by force. But we also understand Kiselev, for whom it is a tactical error to discuss a new Komsomol without an analysis of general political problems.

Both sides had met their match this time and the sparks of suspicion flew. On one side were the lads from MGU who wanted to force through their ideas at any price. And in response the other side simply decided to say nothing. Then, almost at the onset of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, one heard, "The Moscow group feels that it is smarter than the others," then they lost heart and what happened was...

Some people had their pride hurt, lobby negotiations began and alliances were struck. And all of this took place away from the eyes of strangers. On the surface work was in full swing. Only now it all seemed strange. For that entire time we never lost the feeling that at any moment the primary mission of the meeting's leaders would be cutting off sharp corners instead of looking for the truth.

One side proclaimed, "Down with the principle of democratic centralism!" "Don't condemn anything," answered the other side. There were contradictions, but discussions on this issue, as had been hinted at, had still not gotten started. What was heard was, "We are not discussing it." No fundamental issue was even put to a vote.

"The main thing is that you maintain unity," the Surguti's explained to us. And they showed us by maintaining their mass character. Now there were not thirty of them, but two hundred. Was this strength?

They sought agreement and found compromise. And therefore, in our opinion, the concluding document from the Volzhskiy meeting is a strange mixture: slogans from a gentleman's collection on radical-restructuring, general Komsomol "pabulum" and some sensible ideas that were lost among them.

Alas, we are all children of our parents. We think, feel and talk as they taught us to. And even if we criticize our parents, it is only with words that we heard for the first time from them.

It is certainly the lot of any opposition to be the twin of its own opponent. Initially everything feels different: the new-born has its own voice and its own moves and even its own first words seem to sound like a foreign language. Growing up eliminates these differences, especially when it entails moving from the youthful category of opposition to becoming firmly established. We see this in the examples of Poland and Hungary and, especially vividly, in our own Fatherland.

The parties, movements and people's fronts that are starting up and that are speaking out against the administrative system with irreconcilable criticism are at times themselves subject to its intolerance and illusion. Opponents shout in unison, "We have truth behind us," but truth is not on one side or the other and there is still no Dialogue. There is "contradiction, resistance and conflicting opinions."

After telling us that there is a crisis, have the people in Surgut come up with a diagnosis for the Komsomol? The people in Surgut came up with a diagnosis for Surgut! Because this crisis is not in Moscow, not along 3/13 Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Street and not in the offices of the Surgut opposition. The crisis is not the passiveness of "the first people," not the paper flow of reports and not the Komsomol members who are breaking from the organization. All of these are the consequences. The crisis is the state of our minds and the pattern of our spirits.

Where are we going? What are we working for? Where is truth? What values do we hold? What waits for us in the future? What faith do we profess? The crisis is these very questions and their existence. The most severe shortage we have is not the lack of "sausage-sugar-meat," but the answer to precisely these questions. Young people are looking for and awaiting these answers.

At Volzhskiy we associated with more than just Komsomol workers. We also found the time and discussed documents covering the meeting with line Komsomol members from a local factory. They told us, "Everything is correct, true and written," but "it is not inspiring us..."

And when the birth of the Surgut movement was proclaimed on the fifth day of the meeting, with total unity among the "opposition," we broke off. Although we were violating the golden rule journalists, that of not getting involved, we ourselves announced... the creation of factions within the movement.

We declared that after noting inconsistency in the decisions that were made and noting the superficiality of the analysis of the situation within the Komsomol, we reserved our right to publicly criticize the "Surgut Alternative" movement (strictly speaking, we could only plan to criticize and this is what we are doing).

Twenty people had signed our declaration within ten minutes and in an hour we were up to forty signatures.

"Muzhiki [peasants], what are you doing?" begged Surgut Komsomol Gorkom First Secretary A. Baykov. "Everyone is signing this!"

Everyone did not sign it. And thank God our "faction" lasted a total of only one night. The following morning it was transformed into a working group to prepare for the third All-Union meeting of Komsomol secretaries. And the "Surguti's" themselves understand perfectly well that they still have not found a way out of this crisis.

The next meeting will be held in Novosibirsk.

END OF

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